TOURING WITH A TWIST

On January 31-February 3, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a series of official visits to Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan unanimously dubbed in the media as Pompeo's anti-Russian tour. Let's try to analyse the tour to find out whether it was anti-Russian indeed and what goals Pompeo pursued in general.

"Fortress between Eastern Europe and authoritarianism"

Contemporary American public figures are often remembered for their allegorical statements and comparisons, illustrating their rich imagination. This time it was Pomepo's turn, who started his official tour from Kiev and met with President Vladimir Zelensky. Pompeo said that Ukraine was "a fortress between Eastern Europe and authoritarianism." I do not know if Zelensky liked the statement, but it obviously demonstrates the attitude of the current American administration to Ukraine. If Ukraine is a "fortress", then "authoritarianism" ought to be Russia, according to Pompeo. By definition, a fortress is a single defensive facility or a group of such facilities. Since they are designed for defence purposes, they need to be strengthened. That is exactly what Americans are doing in Ukraine. The logic of American foreign policy on Kiev is clear. Russia, which controls Crimea and de facto controls Donbass, looks like an aggressor. The U.S. and the allies of Ukraine, which Pompeo calls the 'fortress', are therefore trying not only to strengthen the 'fortress', but also to protect themselves defending Ukraine from the advancing enemy—the Kremlin. So, according to Pompeo, Russia is the symbol of authoritarianism.

While the Ukrainian-Russian relations and the role of the U.S. in these relations are more or less clear, everything discussed outside this topic is unknown. If we take a closer look at Pompeo's visit, it is easy to assume that the Biden case was likely among the topics discussed in Kiev as well. Remarkably, the Trump administration regards the Biden case more significant than Russia and its actions in Eastern Europe. For Trump, Biden and his team members are more sinister figures than Putin, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Il combined. Because not Kim Jong Il, but Biden is Trump’s most likely rival in the ongoing presidential campaign, and everything that is harmful to Biden is to Trump’s benefit. Apparently, the most significant incriminating evidence against Biden is in Kiev. Ironically, Zelensky’s team has also got the most serious evidence against Trump as well.

It is getting increasingly relevant to resume the investigation against the Ukrainian company Burisma, where Biden’s son Hunter worked in exchange for military and financial assistance to Ukraine. It is known that Biden’s son has served on the Board of Directors of Burisma for almost five years—until April 2019. The Ukrainian authorities are working closely with the current U.S. administration on this issue. Earlier the correspondence of the office of Trump's lawyer R. Giuliani with the former Prosecutor General of Ukraine Yuriy Lutsenko, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, the incumbent head of the State Security Service Ivan Bakanov and the assistants to President Zelensky, Sergey Shefir and Andrey Yermak, was made public. This also indicates the ongoing cooperation between the parties on this topic.

On the other hand, Democrats continue to claim that the Trump administration is putting pressure on the Ukrainian government to get necessary information on Biden, although they failed to impeach the president. Impeachment failed, but the campaign is only gaining momentum, which is a more significant event than Ukraine.

"Relations with the greatest empire—the leading country in the world"

This is how the Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko determined the nature of his country's relations with the U.S.

If American politicians are known to be extravagant to some degree, then the President of Belarus can righteously be called the master of political scandals and provocations. Thus, the Belarusian leader made a statement that outperformed Pompeo's big offer on the willingness of the U.S. to provide 100% of the Belarusian market with American oil. He said that his relationship with Pompeo had a long history when the latter was the director of CIA, and "if we declassify all the materials, the world will applaud us."

If we ignore all these pathethic expressions, all we are left with is a bunch of pragmatic interests. Certainly, Americans are not able to meet Belarus’s demand in oil, since it is going to be more expensive than the oil offered by their closest competitors anyway. But even limited supplies to such a closed market as Belarus, which has always been considered exceptional for Russian energy companies, can have a political effect. For Minsk, this means strengthening its negotiating position with Moscow, for Washington—a chance to declare itself as an effective player in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

It is important for Belarus to establish itself as an independent and effective actor. But in doing so, it should be careful enough not to pose its relations with Russia as an obstacle to the development of full-fledged contacts with other states, including the opponents of Russia.

"As a sovereign and independent country, Belarus determines its foreign policy on its own. Did we harm Russia in doing so? Not at all!" Lukashenko said.

Pompeo’s announcement of the appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to Minsk after a 12-year pause could mean that the U.S. will try to strengthen the dialogue with Minsk. This should help maintain the effect of being present in this rather sensitive region of Europe.

The last item in the agenda, but not the last in the priority list

The last two countries of Central Asia in Pompeo's agenda were the post-Soviet countries of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By the way, this does not mean that the U.S. ranks these countries low in its foreign policy scale.

American diplomacy in Central Asia has its own agenda, and it is designed to strengthen the dialogue within the framework of the C5+1 format.

During his visit to Kazakhstan, Pompeo met with President Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, as well as Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi "to reaffirm [our] common commitment to peace, prosperity and security in Central Asia." In Uzbekistan, Pompeo met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov "to emphasise the U.S. support for reforms in Uzbekistan and the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity."

Then, the U.S. Secretary of State took part in the C5+1 ministerial meeting with foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This obviously demonstrates the commitment of the current U.S. administration to preserving the format launched in 2015 under the Obama administration to establish a joint dialogue on all urging issues of regional security, including Afghanistan.

By the way, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has previously stated that the true goal of the U.S. in Central Asia is "to redirect all projects in Central Asia toward the south, to Afghanistan but without the participation of Russia." This once again confirms Moscow’s suspicions of the U.S. activation in Central Asia.

However, many experts agree that C5+1 should not be considered as something anti-Russian. After all, the Central Asian countries will not allow the U.S. to reassign their current political priorities to the interests of any one country, however big and powerful that country might be.

Moreover, it is clear that the top priority of the U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia is to counter the growing Chinese influence. Pompeo explicitly warned that the regional countries should not be overly dependent on Beijing. He criticised Chinese business and the practice of lending by China to various projects in Central Asia, and openly discussed the persecution of Uighur and Kazakh minorities by Beijing.

Washington has repeatedly stated that it did not want to compete with Russia and China in the region. However, public calls for Central Asian countries to reconsider their relations with Beijing make such statements inconclusive.

Again, perhaps it would wrong to consider Pompeo's recent CIS tour 'anti-Russian' in the customary sense of the word. Rather, it was 'pro-American'. In real politics, such definitions are always arbitrary. But one thing is clear—the U.S. continues to be interested in the region even after Pompeo's departure.