THE IDLIB TEST

Despite all the difficulties and contradictions, Turkey and Russia continue cooperation in the Syrian war. This is the main conclusion from the agreements reached by presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin on Idlib. These agreements should also be considered a signal to the West, which is interested in curtailing the strategic partnership between Ankara and Moscow that has gained significant momentum in recent years. The partnerships even under obvious difficulties and contradictions.

De-escalation Memorandum

The situation in the Syrian province of Idlib has significantly aggravated. In fact, it took Russia and Turkey on the brink of direct clashes after the death of 36 Turkish soldiers as a result of an air strike by the Syrian army. In response, Turkey launched the Spring Shield military operation and within a matter of days, inflicted serious damage on the facilities and personnel of the Syrian army.

The unfolding of a real Turkish-Syrian war, which would inevitably attract more Russian military power to the territory of Syria upon consent of official Damascus, prevented the meeting between Putin and Erdogan on March 5 in Moscow. Even on the eve of meeting, the parties exchanged signals that confirmed their reluctance to continue hostilities in Idlib. The Kremlin made it clear that it expected that the parties would "come to a common understanding of the causes of the crisis, its harmful aftermath and developing joint measures to curb it." Ankara directly acknowledged that "the main goal of the meeting of the two presidents is to ensure a truce in the Syrian province."

The parties indeed agreed upon establishing truce in the province. According to the agreements, the ceasefire came into force four hours after the meeting between the heads of Russia and Turkey - at 00.00 of March 6. The memorandum between Putin and Erdogan envisages the creation of a 6-km wide security zone to the north and south of the M4 highway connecting Aleppo and Latakia. Russia and Turkey, starting from March 15, will jointly control the route.

The memorandum confirms a slight decrease in the area of the territory negotiated in accordance with the previous Russian-Turkish agreements, the so-called security zone in the Idlib region. The Putin-Erdogan memorandum does not mention the Syrian M5 highway connecting Aleppo with Damascus and the city of Serakib, where the M4 and M5 intersect. In fact, the bloodiest battles in late February - early March took place around this intersection. It turns out that Erdogan agreed with the transfer of the M5 and Serakib routes to the control of the Syrian government.

Clarity in this last point is extremely important because of the prospects of the Moscow agreements between Putin and Erdogan. Because if Turkey, in principle, does not agree with the advance of the Syrian troops along the aforementioned highway, then another escalation of the situation is likely. Moreover, Erdogan in Moscow warned that Turkey, regardless the prior and existing agreements, reserves the right to respond to the attacks of the Syrian army.

Meanwhile, Russia's claim to Turkey regarding Ankara’s failure to fulfil its obligations, according to the Sochi Memorandum of September 17, 2018 remains valid. In essence, Russia claims that Turkey did not dissociate the armed opposition concentrated in Idlib and ready for dialogue with the Syrian government, from terrorist groups. Consequently, Moscow considers that the further political process continue only if Turkey clears Idlib from the terrorists.

However, can we argue the effectiveness of the last meeting between Putin and Erdogan, taking into account the likelihood of a new aggravation of the situation in Idlib? Definitely not, and here's why.

The goal of the meeting was not to overcome the crisis in Idlib overnight but to end the escalation caused by the Syrian attack on the Turkish army. It is no coincidence that Putin began the meeting with Erdogan expressing his condolences over the death of Turkish troops in Syria, trying to explain the exceptional nature of what happened: "Unfortunately, no one, including the Syrian army, knew about their location."

The de-escalation of situation in Idlib means, inter alia, the legitimisation of the Turkish military presence in Syria, which is also confirmed by the Putin and Erdogan memorandum. In other words, if Russia could solve the problem of legitimising its own military presence in Syria because its troops were invited thanks to the official invitation of the Syrian government, then Ankara acquired this right mainly through the Astana agreements initiated by and reached between Turkey, Russia and Iran. The Moscow agreements confirmed that Putin, in fact, recognised Turkey’s right to military presence in Syria during the transition to a long-term settlement of the protracted armed conflict. Why? The answer to this question lies in the coincidence of the approaches of Russia, Turkey, and, of course, Syria itself to the essential issue of the Syrian settlement - the assertion of the sovereignty and territorial unity of the Arab country. The talks between Putin and Erdogan once again demonstrated that Ankara had no intention of encroaching on Syrian sovereignty over Idlib. Otherwise, the Russian-Turkish dialogue on Syria would not be possible at all. "The objectives of Turkey in Syria have never included attempts to invade or annex Syrian territory. We want to ensure the territorial integrity and political unity of Syria as soon as possible."

Thus, for Turkey, the presence in Idlib is significant only as a means to ensure its interests in the north of the Arab country during the long-term settlement of the Syrian conflict. Turkey's strategic objective is to prevent threats to its security from the Kurdish terrorist groups.

The results of the Moscow meeting between Putin and Erdogan turned out to be beneficial for both sides. Turkey had to agree to narrowing its influence in Idlib territorially but received a confirmation of its legitimate military presence in Syria. Russia acknowledged the Turkish presence to satisfy the interests of Ankara in the north in Syria during the final settlement of the conflict, consolidated the latest military successes of its ally, Damascus, and confirmed that the Astana process was the main platform for resolving the Syrian problem.

The most important conclusion of the bilateral meeting was that Putin and Erdogan again agreed to take into account the interests of Russia and Turkey, which objectively meet the interests of Syria itself, as they recognize its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity. That is why the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad welcomed the final agreement between Russia and Turkey also by reminding symbolically about the brotherhood of the peoples of Syria and Turkey.

By and large, the results of the Moscow talks between the heads of Russia and Turkey were predictable. Despite all the contradictions around Idlib, both countries are still interested in expanding close partnerships. This was openly stated by Putin: "We should discuss everything with you, the existing situation, so that nothing like this repeats and destroys the Russian-Turkish relations, which you and I consider significant and appreciate."

Recep Tayyip Erdogan also praise the value of Russian-Turkish relations, noting that both countries reached the peak of their relations, which can develop further. "This cooperation applies to the defense industry, trade relations, and so on. We believe that our biggest challenge is to promote and develop these relationships. I believe that we will succeed in this matter," Erdogan emphasized.

Such statements clearly did not meet the expectations and forecasts of various critics, who were very sceptic about its consequences, expecting the start of a new Russian-Turkish war. But Putin and Erdogan have demonstrated that the vital interests of Russia and Turkey are based on a completely different plane - close peaceful cooperation for the benefit of these and other nations.

Reaction of the West

Undoubtedly, the U.S. and the EU continue to monitor any manifestation of strategic rapprochement between Russia and Turkey zealously and extremely critically.

The U.S. attempts to take advantage of Russian-Turkish contradictions in order to return Ankara to unconditional American influence. U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison urged the Turks to understand that the U.S. "is the ally of Turkey in the Alliance." At the same time, the U.S. sent the Turkish authorities another warning about the need to abandon the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. However, no one in Washington could explain why the U.S. ignored Turkey’s request for American Patriot missile systems on the eve of the escalation of situation in Idlib. The U.S. also blocked a statement at the UN Security Council meeting, which welcomed the achievement of Russian-Turkish agreements on a peaceful settlement in Idlib. Statements by Western, including American, diplomats about the premature adoption of this document because of the alleged vague nature of how Russia and Turkey are going to implement the agreements seem unconvincing. After all, the positive impact of these agreements on the situation in Syria, as well as the fact that they encourage the peaceful settlement of the conflict clearly deserves an acknowledgement from the entire international community.

The EU's reaction to the Turkish intention to stop playing the ungrateful role of a buffer on the path of migrant flows from Syria to the West is worth mentioning too. Obviously, one of the reasons why Ankara could not turn a blind eye to the Syrian army's offensive on Idlib was it does not want to allow the arrival of thousands of new refugees to Turkey. "Our goal is to create conditions, which would make it possible for 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey and 1.5 million on the border with Turkey in Idlib to safely return back to their homes," Erdogan admitted.

At the end of February, at the time of significant aggravation of the situation in Idlib, Turkey was forced to open its borders to refugees, making thousands of migrants flock to Greece. The EU regarded these actions of Ankara as "attempts to achieve political goals through the migration crisis." Speaking about the "political goals" pursued by Turkey, the EU means, apparently, Ankara’s desire to achieve Brussels support for its actions in Syria (primarily in relation to Turkish opposition to American plans for the autonomy of Kurdish-populated areas in northern Syria). At the same time, Europe requests that Ankara comply with the migration agreement of March 18, 2016, according to which Turkey closed its borders with the EU for migrants, for which Brussels pledged to pay Turkey 6 billion euros and provide a visa-free regime.

However, Turkey reminded the EU that it did not fulfil its own promises based on the migration agreement. Brussels not only refused a visa-free regime under the pretext of the need to review anti-terrorism laws in Turkey, but also paid only half of the agreed amount. While Turkey spent $40 billion to settle Syrian refugees on its territory.

"The EU still cannot recognise the extraordinary burden and efforts that our country faces in migration issues. Accusations that the country with the largest number of refugees in the world uses the issue of migration for political purposes is yet another evidence of the hypocritical approach that we have been challenging for many years."

As an example of "hypocritical approach", Turkey cites the EU’s attitude towards Greece’s anti-migrant measures, which enjoys the support of Brussels, despite the obstacles it creates for the movement of refugees across its border, contrary to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the EU law.

The ongoing processes only add to the extraordinary complexity of the historical moment and the foreign policies of Russia and Turkey, acting as key guarantors of the territorial unity of Syria.