19 December 2024

Thursday, 13:18

THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS IS DEAD

Matthew Bryza: “Armenia really does not have much of a chance to hold the current positions, given the strategy of Azerbaijan.”

Author:

15.10.2020

Matthew Bryza is a diplomat and expert who is very well familiar with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since 1997, he has been directly involved in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eurasia as a high-ranked US official. He served as the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair and the US Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Currently, Mr. Bryza is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and continues to work actively on the region. He shared his views on the escalation of hostilities in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone in his interview with Region Plus.

"What do you think led to such a severe escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after a long period of observing the ceasefire?"

“Excellent question. I think what happened was, first of all, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, who was forced by the old political system and by radical nationalists Dashnaktsutyun to abandon the negotiated framework that, frankly, previous Armenian leader Serzh Sargsyan and President Ilham Aliyev have agreed to in January of 2009, what was called the Madrid principles. By the way, the Kazan Principles are a modification of the Madrid Principles.

“Pashinyan abandoned what Armenia had already preliminarily agreed to about a year ago, when he said ‘Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Armenia, period.’ Then, just a couple of weeks ago, he actually explicitly said: «I no longer feel like I am bound or Armenia is bound by the Madrid Principles to let us totally refresh. We want peace in Armenia but the Nagorno-Karabakh representatives have to be part of negotiations, which means, in fact, he is saying that Azerbaijan must recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence before the negotiations even begin. That is not fair, and the whole point of the Madrid Principles was to avoid forcing either Azerbaijan to say ‘well, the Nagorno-Karabakh isn’t anything but a part of Azerbaijan’, or Armenia to say ‘we recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan’. The Madrid Principles actually postponed that question to a very end, but Pashinyan said ‘let’s talk about that right now.’

“That made it impossible for the negotiations to perceive from Azerbaijan’s perspective. So, two weeks ago, President Aliyev said there was no sense of perceiving negotiations any further.

“In other words, the negotiations process is dead. Meanwhile, in July, there have been military confrontations along the Azerbaijani-Armenian border. After that, both sides had been moving heavy weapons and armored vehicles toward the line of contact in Azerbaijan. All it took was either a provocation or a mistake and some shooting to begin for Pandora’s box to be opened and war to resume. That is what happened, and it is tragic.”

"What is the most likely scenario for the nearest future?"

“My best guess is that the most likely scenario based on how things have been going for the last few days (the first week of the Azerbaijani counter-offensive, R+) is that Azerbaijan will recover more territory in Jabrayil and Fuzuli districts not only in flat lands but also in higher elevations to make it more defenceble and will stop. Azerbaijan will also consolidate its positions in the north of the conflict zone and maintain its positions that allow it to use artillery fire to cut off the new road linking Vardenis of Armenia to Kelbajar and to Mardakert (Aghdere, R+) in the occupied area.

“At that point a new political map will be drawn. Azerbaijan will be in a stronger negotiating position when it returns to the negotiations. At that point it will be important that Russia convinces or compels Armenia to return to the negotiating table without the preconditions that Prime Minister Pashinyan currently has in place; most importantly that Azerbaijan must also negotiate with the representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh in addition to those of Armenia. That sort of a position by Yerevan is unfair and wrong because the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh it whether remains part of Azerbaijan or something else can only be determined through a negotiating process. That is the big prize for the Armenian side is what in final legal status other than being status of Azerbaijan. So, if Armenia’s precondition to begin the negotiation is to get its biggest prize, then Azerbaijan has no incentive to begin the negotiations. I know Russia understands that and my guess is Moscow will compel Yerevan to return to negotiations table once the fighting stops.”

"Many observers have noticed that Moscow has decided not to take sides this time and watch the developments from the outside. What could be the reason for such an attitude of the Kremlin to the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?"

“Yes, I agree that Moscow's reaction to the fighting has been surprising for many observers because Russia has not come to the assistance at least diplomatically of its treaty ally under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is Armenia. Instead, what Russia has said is that both sides need to stop fighting. Both sides, not that its ally is more morally justified but that it is the two who need to stop fighting. That is quite significant. Additionally, in the joint statement made with presidents Trump and Macron yesterday, President Putin also said that both sides need to come back to the negotiating table without preconditions. Well, that is quite important because Azerbaijan has no preconditions for returning to negotiations, only Armenia does. So, this is another sign that Moscow is putting pressure on Pashinyan. Why? The main reason I think is that President Putin does not like Prime Minister Pashinyan. Pashinyan is Putin’s biggest fear meaning an example of somebody outside of the political system who was able to rally popular support on the streets and overthrow the entrenched political system. I think also that President Putin thinks that Pashinyan has been reckless over the course of the last year through his statements as  ‘Karabakh is Armenia, period.’

“President Putin knows as a Minsk Group co-chair head of state that is simply not true not even for Armenia, which does not officially recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as being part of Armenia or independent. Thirdly, I think Russia just does not want to get drawn into a military conflict against Azerbaijan and was angry in July when Pashinyan called for a meeting of the CSTO when there was some gunfire on Armenian territory. You may recall that Pashinyan quickly pulled back that request. I think when Moscow said they were not going to come to Armenia's aid militarily in Tavush, nobody in the CSTO is. For all those reasons in addition to the fact that Russia would like to improve its relations with Azerbaijan already being in such deep control of so many elements of Armenia the Kremlin has not been on the side of its treaty ally, Armenia.”

"What are Armenia's chances to hold its positions, considering its army's current state and the lack of support from third countries?"

“I think Armenia really doesn’t have much of a chance to hold the current positions, given the strategy of Azerbaijan. What do I mean: Armenia thinks to have been prepared for Azerbaijan to launch a sort of ‘blitzkrieg’ strategy meaning to try to attack in a narrow, a specific place, blast a hole in Armenia’s defense’s fence and penetrate deeply into the Armenian occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Armenia is well prepared to stop something like that, so that is not what Azerbaijan seems to be doing. Instead, Azerbaijan seems to be trying to move in a step by step fashion using its superior electronic warfare and unmanned air vehicle capabilities to destroy and degrade Armenian military assets one by one, whether it be tanks and other armored vehicles or buildings or S-300 air defense missile systems or troops without extending its supply lines too far, so that they would become vulnerable. Given Armenia’s much smaller number of troops and equipment and lack of electronic warfare capabilities, as well as short-range air defense capabilities, I do not think it is any way Armenia can stop this, unless Russia were to intervene. I do not think, as I said in the last answer, there is any chance Russia is going to intervene, unless the situation changes dramatically. For example, Azerbaijan attacks Stepanakert (Khankendi, R+) because, let us say, Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. I don’t think that is going to happen. And I do not think Azerbaijan wants to push Armenians out of Nagorno-Karabakh, I think what Azerbaijan simply wants to do is make sure its citizens may return to their homes and that international law can be appalled and Azerbaijan will regain control on its own territory.”

"When you were co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the so-called "Kazan Document" was on the negotiating table. How relevant is this formula today for bringing the parties back to negotiations, given that Yerevan refuses to withdraw from the occupied lands?"

“Actually, when I was the US co-chair of the OSCE Minsk group, the Kazan document was not on the table. That was after me. What was on the table is the Madrid document, and a Kazan document is just a variation of the Madrid document. A real foundation of the way forward to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains the Madrid document, or the Madrid principles, and it is relevant, completely relevant from Azerbaijan’s perspective because Azerbaijan says it is. The big news in recent months is that Prime Minister Pashinyan said that the Madrid document no longer means anything to him, that he rejects it. That is not fair because in January 2009, his predecessor, the then president Serzh Sargsyan agreed with President Aliyev that the basic concept of the Madrid document was accepted and was a way forward. Then the two sides needed to finalize some important details, but they never materialized because both leaders realized that their populations were not ready to accept the compromises they themselves had accepted earlier. So, for that reason in late 2018, after President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan had their first meeting in Dushanbe and announced that they were ready to prepare their populations for peace and to accept these basic principles, I was very happy, I thought Pashinyan was a new fresh leader outside the old ‘Karabakh clan’, which dominated Armenian political system, and he would now move to finalize those Madrid principles. But during the last year, he has been pressured I think by the old regime in Armenia and by the Dashnaktsutyun to back away from finalizing the Madrid principles or the Kazan principles, as you call them. And I think it is that abandonment of all the progress of the negotiation process over fifteen or so years that led president Aliev to say  that he has lost any hope in a negotiating process, which indeed has become senseless because Pashinyan has decided to abandon the process. In fact, we see Pashinyan saying ‘well, I would like to return to the peace negotiations but the precondition is, essentially, that Azerbaijan recognizes that Nagorno-Karabakh is not the part of Azerbaijan. That is just not acceptable to any citizen of Azerbaijan.”

"How involved is Washington today in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, given the upcoming elections in the United States?"

“The US is not very involved. Of course, we still have a co-chair, who is also a great diplomat, but what is different is that there is no focus by the Secretary of State or the President that I was familiar with. During my tenure as the co-chair, I knew that the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was deeply interested, I knew that if it was necessary to ring president George W. Bush, he would be involved. I don’t think that is the case today. President Trump, not only because he is sick now with COVID 19, not only because it is an election, but is just not interested at all in foreign policy in general and in the South Caucasus.”

"In your opinion, what steps can mediators take today to stop the escalation of the conflict and bring the parties back to the negotiating table?"

“If you mean the Minsk group negotiators, there is nothing they can do. Several days ago, French President Macron disqualified France as a mediator or co-chair of the Minsk Group by clearly choosing one side in a conflict. You cannot be impartial, if you choose one side. Meanwhile, the US is not focused and not engaged at the high level, which leaves Russia alone. So, Russia can and will help to bring Armenia to the negotiating table once Azerbaijan’s military operations have completed. At that point, there may be a need for somebody to convince Azerbaijan to come to the negotiating table. I guess that is going to be Turkey. Once Russia and Turkey get Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively, to agree to come back to the negotiating table, than there needs to be a form to conduct that mediation. I hope it will be the Minsk Group because I think it is a good job, even if Azerbaijan and Armenian people will disagree. As I said, the Minsk group convinced the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to agree to the Madrid principles. It is just now that Prime Minister Pashinyan has abandoned them. But for the Minsk Group to be relevant, France and personally President Macron is going to have to retract his recent statement saying that essentially France is on the side of Armenia. I do not know if he will be able to do that. In that case, the mediators will de-facto be Russia and Turkey, and there might be a need of the sort of political cover from other organization. I do not know what that is to help the negotiations go forward.

“Also, it is not the Minsk Group mediators’ job to stop the military operations whether or not a country decides to engage in a war. It has never been a decision of mediators. It is the decision of the head of states of that two countries, and the heads of their respective governments.” 

"How should the actions in today's military confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh be considered from the international law point of view?"

“The answer is pretty clear and straightforward to me. There are four UN Security Council resolutions from 1993 calling on Armenia to withdraw immediately from the territory of Azerbaijan, the territories under occupation, and calling for the end of military actions. The military actions did end in 1994, but Armenia never left. So, the UN Security Council resolutions are the highest form of articulation of the international law. Armenia is on the bridge of the international law and Azerbaijan has every right to recover its occupied territories. It is not just I am saying that. If you look at American politics and the US House of Representatives latest resolution, which has been driven by mostly the members of the Congress from California, where the Armenian-American Diaspora is so powerful, there recent resolution accuses Azerbaijan of being aggressive, but it never accuses Azerbaijan of violating international law or behaving illegally. I think that speaks for itself.”


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