REFORMATION IN MOLDOVA?

Presidential elections in the parliamentary republic of Moldova, a small Eastern European state, would hardly have attracted much media attention, given the growing number of the COVID-19 cases, busy political agendas in the US, the South Caucasus and Belarus. But there is one very remarkable factor. Many experts interpreted the election of a reformer politician, candidate from the centre-right Action and Solidarity Party (ASP), and former prime minister of Moldova, 48-year-old Maia Sandu, not merely as a victory of the pro-Western forces. They believe that this is Russia’s yet another defeat in the region, which further weakens its positions in the post-Soviet space. The first political statements of the newly elected head of state to the Ukrainian media outlet Европейская правда also exacerbated the situation "in a timely manner".

Fast start

Many observers in the West and the post-Soviet countries presented the events in Moldova as "a series of crises around the borders of Russia", as yet another attack of the West on the interests of the Kremlin. This idea has become even more relevant after the election of Joseph Biden as the new host of the White House, who is also expected to lead a ‘foreign policy offensive’ on Moscow. It is known that the key positions in the US security and foreign policy administrations will be held by the ‘hawks’ who are not that friendly to Vladimir Putin. That’s why Sandu with her Harvard background, experience at the World Bank and connections with the EU and American politicians and diplomats, as well as her past political statements certainly causes concerns in the Kremlin.

In the second round of elections on November 15, Sandu surpassed the Russian-backed incumbent Socialist president Igor Dodon by 15% (57.75% of the votes). She is called a symbol of the European vector of Chisinau and “another Soros man”. It is assumed that Sandu’s victory was ensured by the diaspora thanks to the votes in the embassies of Moldova. It is difficult to refute these allegations, since every fourth resident of the country has a Romanian passport and for the first time in the history of Moldova, the turnout at foreign embassies and consulates of Moldova was unprecedentedly high, despite the strict lockdown measures.

However, Sandu never concealed her political views. The only thing that was not expected of her was, perhaps, such a quick start. In her interview with Европейская правда on November 20, Sandu said that the conflicting parties (Moldova and Transnistria) should find a peaceful solution to the conflict, and that Russian peacekeepers should be withdrawn from Transnistria. At the same time, the president said that the settlement should take place with the consent of Russia, which she does not at all consider an "aggressor country" and with which she wants to establish strong economic ties. Although the majority of observers called her words ‘cautious’, the statement nevertheless sounds both in Moldova and in Russia as a sufficient reason to start discussions on the possibility of unfreezing the Transnistrian conflict.

The geographical factor

Meanwhile, many experts still do not believe in the possibility of an armed conflict in Transnistria. The armed stage of the conflict ended on August 1, 1992 with the direct participation of the Russian Federation, when the 14th Army led by General Lebed separated the parties. There have been no military clashes or confrontations on the demarcation line between Moldova and Transnistria since the 90s.

In addition, Chisinau is not ready to fight for Transnistria now. Moldova remains the poorest economy in Europe. In addition, it is going through a serious crisis, when about a third of Moldovan companies are facing bankruptcy, GDP fell by more than 10%, the levels of corruption, continuing outflow of labour are high, and ineffective measures are implemented to combat the coronavirus. So, perhaps Sandu is more concerned about the unblocking of Moldovan exports to Russia and paying off debts for gas than the solution of the territorial problem. It will be difficult to blame her for this. For example, she said that Chisinau does not intend to pay for the Russian gas supplied to Transnistria (already more than $6 billion). Indeed, according to the agreement between the Moldovan government and the Russian Gazprom, the natural gas is also supplied to the so called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), which pays to neither Chisinau nor Moscow for the gas but the debt sticks to Moldova. At the same time, the fuel to Moldova, which is completely dependent on Russia, passes through the territory of the unrecognised PMR.

The situation is even more confusing with the power supply, which Moldova receives from the Transnistrian city of Dnestrovsk on the border with Ukraine. There is a hydroelectric plant owned by the Russian Inter RAO UES. The entire Moldovan gas transportation infrastructure is owned by Moldovagaz, which is also controlled by Gazprom. Chisinau is making attempts to get out of this dependence but so far not very successfully.

The proximity of Ukraine and the conflict in Donbass also add to general nervousness. Sandu advised Ukraine not to repeat the mistakes of Chisinau meaning that PMR has the opportunity to trade with the EU countries using the free economic zone of the RM-EU, which makes it possible to send 65% of its exports to the EU. But in this case it is necessary to take into account the geographical factor, that is the fact that the unrecognised PMR has no common borders with Russia. Even the rotation of the Russian military takes place through the Chisinau airport. And if we consider the worst scenario for Russian interests, namely the blockade of PMR by the joint efforts of Chisinau and Kiev, then, as some experts believe, the Kremlin may want to open a corridor to Transnistria through Ukraine. Can you imagine what may be the consequences of this move in the entire region and even in the world?

The EU factor

Another point defining the Moldovan political agenda and affecting the interests of the entire EU is the issue of Moldova's unification with Romania, which Sandu supports. Without going into the history of the issue, we can note that the Romanian factor plays an instrumental role in Moldova at least because many Moldovan citizens have Romanian citizenship. The question, however, is whether the EU needs such a replenishment. After all, Romania itself is not a rich state in the EU economically. Moreover, Romania is a constant source of migrants to other, wealthier EU countries. Brussels most likely will not be happy to take all the Moldovans aboard, which would also mean canalising additional funds to various regional development projects in the updated Romania.

With the Transnistrian problem unsolved, Moldova in any case cannot come to terms with Romania. It is rumoured that Sandu allegedly wants to get rid of Transnistria to join Moldova to Romania. Obviously, this is too much of an assumption, given that many residents of the unrecognised PMR have Russian passports (about 200,000 people).

In turn, Romania is suspected of initiating Romexit for the sake of new territories. However, with all these allegations, economic and energy problems of both countries are still relevant and have to be solved either way - through Brussels or Moscow.

Interdependence factors

So it's too early to talk about a complete and final victory for Sandu. First, she still needs to get a majority in parliament, which is occupied by Dodon's socialists. Secondly, it is possible that Dodon himself may even take the post of prime minister. To consolidate her victory, Sandu needs early elections but how relevant it is now, at the end of the year, is a dubious question. Moreover, none of the parliamentary factions but Sandu’s ASP are interested in early elections. The socialists are split by Renato Usati’s party, while the democrats are not confident in their strength.

We yet to see Russia’s further moves under the existing circumstances. The Kremlin reacted emphatically calmly to Sandu's victory, clearly showing that it did not credit Dodon's loss to its own account. Although Russia does not have effective levers of influence on the political leaders of Moldova, there is a feeling that Moscow follows the situation confidently and has plans of action for various options for the development of the situation. Also, most likely, the Kremlin expects that the above factors of interdependence, which make the complex geopolitical fabric of the region, will nevertheless play a deterrent role. Whether this will be enough to prevent Moldova from becoming another weak link along the perimeter of Russia will become clear in the near future after Maia Sandu (and Biden) takes office.