TOMORROW COMES TODAY

The historical defeat of the Armenian occupation forces by the Azerbaijani army has created a new reality in the South Caucasus. “The reality has changed. We have heard many times that there were realities that we had to consider. Well, we have changed those realities," President Ilham Aliyev said.

Remembering the Madrid Principles

For many years, both the conflicting parties and the international community have been sceptical about the prospects of the negotiation process for the Daghlig Garabagh settlement. The entire process led by the OSCE Minsk Group has been based on the discussion of the so called Madrid principles, which have been delivered to the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia at the OSCE summit in 2007.

The Madrid principles assumed the return of the territories around Daghlig Garabagh to Azerbaijan and the provision of a temporary status to the region, providing the guarantees of security and autonomy. According to the document, it was proposed to create a corridor between Armenia and Daghlig Garabagh, to determine the future of the final legal status of Daghlig Garabagh through voting, the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and to offer international security guarantees, including the deployment of peacekeepers in the region.

Azerbaijan generally supported the main provisions of the document, while the Armenian side considered it unfinished and subject to significant revision. Thus, Yerevan avoided discussing the specific points of the Madrid principles.

At the same time, Armenia tried to improve the military component of its foreign policy. Strengthening of fortifications on the ceasefire line, the upgrade of the existing front-line infrastructure and regression in the negotiation process made Baku come to the conclusion that the Armenian leadership was not ready for compromises and did not intend to return the Azerbaijani territories in any form. The changing of geographical names to Armenian ones and the settlement of ethnic Armenians from other countries on all the occupied territories also confirmed Baku’s assumptions, albeit indirectly. Armenians began an active economic development on the occupied lands, including the construction of infrastructure facilities, printing maps with the ceasefire line indicated as "the outer border of Artsakh". Moreover, Armenian analysts claimed that it was necessary to create a 50 kilometre demilitarized "sanitary zone" around Garabagh. To achieve this, Armenians planned to continue shelling of the adjacent territories to terrorise the Azerbaijani civilians forcing them to move deep into Azerbaijani territory.

In addition, Yerevan did not hide its territorial claims to part of the Goranboy district of Azerbaijan, which they still consider the territory of the former Shahumyan district. By the way, the area has never been part of the former Daghlig Garabagh Autonomous Region.

The Lavrov Plan

Such a cynical and impudent behaviour of the Armenian authorities can be explained by their confidence that neither the Minsk Group co-chairs nor the leading world powers would ever agree with Azerbaijan's desire to liberate the occupied territories by force. At the same time, Yerevan relied on Moscow's support, on some allied obligations that would make Russia side with Armenia.

The situation began to change after 2014-2015, when the government of the former President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, began drifting towards the European Union amid the confrontation between the West and Russia on Ukraine. Moscow was also irritated by Yerevan's open dissatisfaction with the supply of Russian military equipment to Azerbaijan in 2011-2014. As a result, with the next round of hostilities in the conflict zone in April 2016, for the first time in many years Russia did not intervene and support Armenia either directly or indirectly, which caused a negative reaction in Yerevan.

Armenia missed the moment when Azerbaijan turned into a very promising economical and political partner for Moscow. At the same time, it was important for Moscow to maintain equal partnership relations with both Baku and Yerevan and to change the status quo in the conflict zone in accordance with the new realities.

It was after April 2016 that negotiations between the parties took place with the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group in Vienna and St. Petersburg. Moscow proposed a partial solution to the conflict, which looked very much like the so called Kazan formula recommended at the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia back in 2011 in Kazan.

In essence, it proposed Armenia returning the territories around Daghlig Garabagh, while Azerbaijan demilitarising these territories and unblocking communications leading to Armenia. In addition, internally displaced persons would return to the liberated areas following the provision of security to both the Azerbaijani and Armenian populations, including through the introduction of peacekeeping forces into the region.

In their current form, these proposals are called the Lavrov plan. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, voiced them at his meetings with the leadership of the conflicting parties until Nikol Pashinyan came to power in Armenia as a result of the "velvet revolution".

In December 2019, the incumbent Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan revealed some details of the draft plan negotiated by the Sargsyan government in recent years. He said that it contained some points related to the return to Azerbaijan of five districts around Daghlig Garabagh, and another two districts between Daghlig Garabagh and Armenia, which were unacceptable for Armenia. Later, the secretary of the Security Council of the separatist regime in Garabagh, Samvel Babayan, confirmed Pashinyan’s statement: “No matter what he (Serzh Sargsyan) says, today we have the negotiated documents, which say very clearly that we are going to return five districts, then two regions, then a corridor. But it is not about the settlement of the Garabagh conflict."

Thus, both Pashinyan and Babayan directly or indirectly confirmed that the Russian proposals have become the core of the negotiation process, and the main opponent of these proposals was the Armenian side. For Yerevan, any progress in the negotiations could mean the loss of control over the occupied territories without clear signs of a solution to the Daghlig Garabagh problem exclusively in the interests of the Armenian side.

Negotiation process in 2019-2020

In July 2020, after the aggravation of the situation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border in Tovuz, Minister Lavrov actually accused Yerevan of provoking the tension. “The geographical factor also become a kind of trigger: the idea of Armenia to restore the old border checkpoint 15 km from the Azerbaijani export pipelines increased concern of some and caused an unjustified response from others. As a result, we have the most unpredictable consequences now,” Mr. Lavrov said.

Throughout the weeks preceding Azerbaijan's counteroffensive, Russia was actively preparing a platform for negotiations. However, the practical steps of Armenian authorities demonstrated that Yerevan was not interested in real results.

Recently, it’s been reported that N. Pashinyan was allegedly interested in reaching an agreement with Azerbaijan after coming to power and offered President Aliyev the holding of bilateral negotiations. Thus, Baku initially hoped that the new Armenian leadership, which had nothing to do with the Garabagh Clan and was not involved in the seizure of Azerbaijani lands, would follow a position different from that of the former leaders of Armenia. However, this did not happen. Pashinyan used time and the negotiation process to strengthen his own position, as well as to strengthen his political influence in Daghlig Garabagh bringing people loyal to him to power there.

Meanwhile, over the past months, Baku has made it clear to the Armenian leadership that it has lost confidence both in it and in the negotiation process. The turning point in the position of Baku was in September 2019 after N. Pashinyan, while in Daghlig Garabagh, said that ‘Karabakh was Armenia, period.’ Yet another irritating point for Azerbaijan was the inauguration ceremony of the so called president of the separatist regime in the city of Shusha, which is the political and cultural centre of the Azerbaijani population of the region.

New reality: war and settlement from scratch

By September 27, the military and political situation has escalated to the limit. On the morning of that day, in response to yet another shelling of Azerbaijani positions by Armenian armed forces, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale counter-offensive along the entire front line in the Daghlig Garabagh conflict zone. In a matter of weeks, Azerbaijan achieved by force what the negotiating parties could not do for more than a quarter of a century.

Now, after the liberation of the territories seized by Armenia about 28 years ago, negotiations with Yerevan based on the previous agenda lost practical meaning. Direct negotiations with the Pashinyan government is also meaningless, as he showed that he is not a reliable negotiator responsible for his words and actions.

In fact, Pashinyan undermined the position of Russia, which was confident in the implementation of intermediate solution to the problem followed by the introduction of Russian peacekeepers to the conflict zone. The Armenian leadership made it clear that it did not accept plans that provide for the return of lands to Azerbaijan. Yerevan knew that its demand to recognise Daghlig Garabagh as an independent state in exchange for the return of the seven occupied districts was unacceptable for Baku.

Past several weeks have clearly shown that external forces could not have a direct pressure on Azerbaijan, since Baku acts within the framework of international norms and principles and is waging a war of liberation on its own territory. On the other hand, no one was going to exert any pressure on Yerevan, as before the war. Negotiations with Yerevan, when the Armenian leadership is completely demoralized and disoriented, and continues to act from destructive positions, have become meaningless. At least, it is quite obvious that the previous agenda of the negotiations, which assumed the discussion of the gradual return of Azerbaijani territories, is no longer relevant, and there is no new agenda.

The signing of a trilateral statement on November 10, which provided for a ceasefire in the Daghlig Garabagh conflict zone, opened up new prospects for the region, including for diplomatic contacts. In fact, the agreement put an end to the long-term conflict changing the course of the settlement from the military plane to the political and diplomatic.

The agreement was reached exclusively with the active intervention of the Kremlin, while the other co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group did not participate in its preparation. This caused an extremely zealous reaction in Washington, and especially in Paris.

A senior US State Department official said the US and France “remain committed to their roles as co-chairs of the Minsk Group... acknowledging the actions taken by Russia that led to a ceasefire that did last for a week. But we also acknowledge that there are many issues that the Russians need to clarify, such as the parameters of the agreement, including the role of Turkey. ”

According to the head of the International Committee of the Federation Council of Russia, Konstantin Kosachev, "the statements of the US and France are the manifestation of jealousy, as they are concerned that they could miss something."

According to the senator, Washington and Paris are now seeking the ways to get out of the existing situation, trying to understand why they were unable to fulfil the peacekeeping mission in Daghlig Garabagh as successfully as Russia did. At the same time, the politician said that "the Russian diplomats were in constant contact with their American and French counterparts at all stages (trilateral negotiations on Garabagh) of the process." In addition, Russia will continue to inform the co-chairs and members of the Minsk Group on the progress of the peacekeeping operation in Daghlig Garabagh, Kosachev said. He also noted that the joint Russian-Turkish monitoring centre in Azerbaijan "will closely monitor the peacekeeping mission without actually conducting peacekeeping operations."

On November 18, Mr. Sergei Lavrov took part in consultations with the French and American representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries. They discussed the situation in the region after a joint declaration of ceasefire between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on November 10.

The statement released at the end of the meeting shows that the parties only discussed the issues of coordination between the three chairing countries.

At the same time, no one talks about the prospects of the negotiation process under the new conditions, although Paris and Washington hint at the continuation of discussions on the status of Daghlig Garabagh. But under the new realities, such hints are simply irrelevant.

There are no serious prerequisites for constructive participation of Armenia in the political dialogue either. Amid the deteriorating internal political situation, calls for the resignation of Nikol Pashinyan in the country, the future of the incumbent Armenian government seems increasingly illusory. So it is very likely that Baku will start the new settlement process from scratch with the new leadership of Armenia.