PIVOTAL ELECTIONS

The presidential elections slated for June 18 in Iran will be held in a rather fragile period for the country. On the one hand, the reformist Hassan Rouhani is close to the end of his eight-year presidency amid the growing influence of the conservative wing of the political spectrum. On the other hand, after the Democrat Joe Biden came to power in the United States, relations with Iran softened, while Washington and Tehran even reached the first agreement.

Therefore, the upcoming elections in Iran will also determine the country's future course, as well as the position of its people and political power. In the meantime, Iranians and observers who carefully monitor the ongoing processes in the country are tying to answer the following question: who will be the next president of Iran? He can be a revolutionary and a "second Ahmadinejad", who was known for his rather tough stance towards the West. Or he can be both a reformer and a "second Rouhani" who managed to find a common language with the West.

Seven nominees and other surprises

President is not the first person in the country in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet there are always plenty of people willing to take the post. This year this number reached at least 592 people. However, most of them (more than 90%) could not even pass the primary qualification stage. According to Iranian laws, candidates to the posts of president, members of parliament and the Council of Experts must be approved by the Supervisory Board, which sets the criteria based on religious and national laws and disapproves the ‘unsuitable’ nominees. An eligible candidate must be at least 40 and not more than 70 years old, and should meet the requirements of the electoral law.

On May 25, Iran's Central Election Commission announced the final list of candidates selected by the Council of Guardians, which now includes only seven people: Saeed Jalili, Mohsen Rezayi, Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, Alireza Zakani, Sayyid Mir Hossein Gazizadeh Hashemi, Mohsen Mehralizadeh and Abdul Nasser Hemmati. Thus, one of these candidates will become the next president of Iran.

The first difference of the current presidential campaign was that the relevant state body disapproved the overwhelming majority of nominees. Among them were those who held important positions in state and political power and were considered probable candidates for the presidency. For example, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former Foreign Minister and current Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri. All three candidates were considered the real presidential candidates. Candidacy of Mustafa Tajzade, a well-known representative of the reformist wing in the Iranian political power, was also rejected.

The day before the announcement of the final list of candidates, the adviser to the Iranian Supreme Leader and former Defense Minister Hussein Dehgan, as well as the former oil minister from the conservative wing, Rustam Gasimi, withdrew their candidacies in favour of Ebrahim Raisi.

Another surprise after the selection of candidates was the withdrawal from the presidential race of General Sayed Mohammed (53), General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to observers, he was one of the most likely candidates for the presidency. Most likely, his candidacy was rejected in order to prevent a possible split in the conservative wing.

Ethnic Azerbaijanis as Iranian presidential candidates

Two of the seven registered presidential candidates are ethnic Azerbaijanis: former vice president and governor of Isfahan province Mohsen Mehralizadeh (64) and Abdul Nasser Hemmati, an economist, former chairman of the Central Bank of Iran and ambassador to China. Both of these candidates represent the reformist wing of political power.

The remaining four candidates – Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, Mohsen Rezayi, Saeed Jalili and Sayyid Mir Hossein Gazizadeh Hashemi – represent the conservative wing. In particular, the first three people on the list are very popular in Iran: Raisi, Rezayi and Jalili.

General Mohsen Rezayi is the former Commander-in-Chief of IRGC and is currently the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council. In recent years, he ran for president several times, but all attempts were unsuccessful.

Saeed Jalili previously held important government posts, for a long time participated in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. His previous attempts to run for the president have also been unsuccessful. However, other candidates are also no different.

In the conservative wing, the main focus is on the candidacy of Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi. Previously, he was the head of the Imam Reza sanctuary complex in Mashhad, as well as the main rival of the incumbent President Rouhani in the 2017 elections. At present, that is before participating in the elections, he is the Chief Justice of Iran.

Key rivals

Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi – the main candidate from the judicial and religious elite of Iran – was a favourite of the conservative wing in the last elections. However, during the pre-election debate, the experienced politician and ‘sheikh of diplomacy’ Hassan Rouhani could defeat his opponent with a gloomy face and a easy-going character. Moreover, Raisi's membership in arbitration courts in the early years of the Islamic revolution and, in general, his involvement in this system has an ambiguous effect on Raisi's reputation, especially among the Iranian youth. On the other hand, his current post of Chief Justice, closeness to the Supreme Leader of Iran and strong support of the religious elite increase his chances of winning the elections. As in case of Saeed Mohammed, Raisi's full political support will depend on his actions during the election campaign.

Meanwhile, the latest CEC selection shows that Raisi will be the main candidate from the conservative wing. Under current conditions, this gives grounds to assume his probable victory in the elections. The appointment of Raisi as Chief Justice immediately after the 2017 elections indicates a great confidence in him in state circles, which eventually led to his joining the current presidential elections.

Among the reformers, Raisi's main rival is Abdul Nasser Hemmati, one of the most influential figures in the national economy of Iran. Hemmati's nomination by the reformist wing is partly due to his economic activities.

In recent months, the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Javad Zarif was considered the main candidate of the reformists. But the recent scandal with the audio recording dealt a serious blow to his political career. Also, the harsh criticism of the Supreme Leader Khamneyi cast a shadow on Zarif’s career. Some claim that even the attempts of the former reformist president Mohammad Hatemi and Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the leader of the Islamic revolution Ruhollah Khomeini and one of the main representatives in the reformist wing, failed to persuade Zarif to consider nomination.

The current format of the presidential elections reflects the views of political circles on the future of Iran. So, supporters of Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi dominate in the camp of conservatives, who see Raisi as the future leader of the country with a pronounced religious identity, loyal to the values of the revolution, a native of the Iranian judicial system. The reformers, on the other hand, send a special signal to the Iranian public by nominating the country's former chief banker and experienced economist amid the nuclear negotiations with the West and discussions on easing sanctions. In other words, Iranian voters will have to choose between these two lines.

The 2021 presidential election will set a perspective direction for the Islamic Republic over the next four years. The elections will show whether the people of Iran is ready for dialogue and continue negotiations with the West and the US, or oppose the reconciliation. It should also be noted that the nuclear deal and Hassan Rouhani’s dialogue with the West failed 8 years ago. Since then, the economic situation in Iran has deteriorated. Harsh sanctions imposed by the Donald Trump administration over the past four years have buried Iran’s hopes on the dialogue with the West. As expected, one of the main reasons the conservatives won a majority of parliamentary seats in last year's elections was the failure of this dialogue. Even the resumption of negotiations on the nuclear program and certain concessions by the new Washington administration led by Joe Biden to encourage the reformists before the elections are unlikely to lead to significant changes in the positions of the latter.