CONFLICTING PROJECTS

The Armenian expert and political communities have recently discussed the implementation of the Persian Gulf-Black Sea transport corridor through the territory of Armenia. It could be an alternative option for transport communication as part of the North-South project, the implementation of which may accelerate after the recent events in the region. However, it seems that only Yerevan expects to see this idea come true.

Armenian myths

But, apparently, Armenian observers forget that the discussed transportation route involves only automobile communication. Meanwhile, the cost of cargo transportation by automobile roads is higher than by other means of transport, the only exception being air transportation.

Azerbaijan provides routes for combined cargo transportation mainly through railway communication lines. This significantly reduces the transport costs and makes the Azerbaijani route the most efficient. It is no coincidence that Iranian cargo carriers pay close attention to the implementation of supply routes through the transport infrastructure of Azerbaijan. The new post-war reality in the region, as well as unblocking of communication routes open up new transit opportunities for the neighbours of Azerbaijan.

According to Armenian analysts, "the last year war in Garabagh made the Tehran authorities think about establishing communication lines bypassing the Turkic states, as their interests do not always coincide with those of Iran." That’s how they try to explain the relevance of the Persian Gulf-Black Sea transport corridor through Armenia.

In fact, the absence of any serious institutional base for the implementation of the project shows that it’s nothing more than a work of fiction of Armenian authors. In addition to Armenia, they persistently name Georgia, Iran, Bulgaria and Greece among the project participants. From 2016 till the present, representatives of these countries have held five rounds of consultations in Tehran, Sofia, Tbilisi and Yerevan.

Participants considered the possibility of getting India and China involved in the project, but they refrained from participating in consultations. Logistically, it is assumed the commodities from India and China arrive at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, then they are delivered to Armenia by road, then by rail to the Georgian port of Poti and from there through the Black Sea to the Bulgarian and Greek ports. It is claimed that a draft agreement on the principles of operation of the transport corridor is ready. But it has not been discussed anywhere else. Nevertheless, it is reported that a document may be signed in Sofia in the near future, which will be followed by the establishment of a coordination council to resolve all the remaining technical issues.

We can only guess whether this is true, but the current situation casts doubt on the realism of these plans.

Big geopolitics and small calculations

The hype around the issue in Yerevan can be explained with a single phrase from an analytical article characterising the expectations of the Armenian political establishment. "It is extremely important for Yerevan that the corridor passing through the Syunik region will make Tehran feel its responsibility for ensuring the integrity and security of the region." According to the author of the article, "the need to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the transport corridor provides a legitimate motive that can justify Tehran's claims for political and possibly even a military presence in Syunik."

Simply put, Armenian experts, who express the interests of influential political groups in Armenia, seriously believe that Tehran will pull itself into the current difficulties in the region and will defend Armenia's interests as its own only because the region hosts a highway connecting Iran with Armenia and Batumi in Georgia. At the same time, it is not mentioned that just a couple of trivial facts minimise the true value of this road for Iran. For example, the containers going through the route will have to be reloaded several times – first from dry cargo vessels to trailers, then to railway car platforms, then again to dry cargo vessels, and then back to platforms. It is expensive, time consuming and rather troublesome.

To implement the project in full, it is necessary to build or bring the infrastructure to a logical level. Primarily, the construction or thorough reconstruction of the missing road sections. Even Armenian observers admit that Iran is not going to bear all the expenses. It’s none of its business. After all, each of the participating countries will have to fund works on its territory on its own.

While the infrastructure of other states – potential project participants – is generally in a satisfactory condition and require only small expenditures for upgrade, the infrastructure in Armenia needs significant subsidies, which are not available currently. According to Armenian specialists, it was planned to complete the construction of the North-South highway in 2016. Over the past years, less than 100 km of the 490-km highway was built. In the summer of 2020, construction was resumed, but defeat in the war and the difficult economic situation of Armenia seriously slowed down the process. Loans provided by the Asian Development Bank and the European Investment Bank for the project are clearly not enough.

Therefore, it is necessary to somehow cajole potential transit countries, in particular Iran. So, on May 24, acting Armenian Minister of Territorial Development and Infrastructures Suren Papikyan met with the Iranian Minister of Road Construction and Urban Development, Mohammad Eslami. He said that Armenia was preparing a bill, which would revise tariffs for transit through the territory of Armenia for Iranian carriers. It is planned to reduce tariffs by several times.

Each Iranian truck upon entering Armenia pays about $250-270, but such exorbitant tariffs can scare off any potential carrier, Armenian experts say.

Pitfalls of the Armenian corridor

No matter what Armenian wants, it has to accept the post-conflict realities developing in the region after Azerbaijan's victory in the 44-day war. Accept and draw appropriate conclusions. But it apparently has problems with the latter.

In fact, what Armenia stubbornly keeps silent about is that important sections of road communication with Iran pass either in the immediate vicinity of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, or even through the territory of Azerbaijan. For example, part of the Gafan-Alvank highway enters the territory of Azerbaijan, and at present, the safety of travel along this highway is provided by Russian military. This is actually one of two routes from Gafan to Meghri, as well as adjacent settlements. Moreover, it is shorter and more functional in terms of the passage of large transit trucks.

Another route goes along the exclave Azerbaijani village of Kerki, which is still under the control of the Armenian military. According to trilateral agreements, Armenia must hand over the village back to Azerbaijan. It is not difficult to imagine what happens to the unfinished Armenian section of the “grand project” then. Otherwise, it will be necessary to relocate the road and build additional bypass sections, which requires many millions of dollars that can only be borrowed. Or to negotiate with Azerbaijan and involve it in the project as one of the participants as a transit country.

Remarkably, by proposing to implement the concept of the Zangezur transport corridor, Azerbaijan considers Armenia as a partner country and is ready to share with it all the advantages of the new route. However, Yerevan demonstrates the opposite position, wishing to isolate itself not only from Azerbaijan, but also from new regional realities.

Frequent provocations at the border indicate that Yerevan continues to demonstrate a confrontational line of behaviour in order to prevent the unblocking of communication lines and the return of border sections still under the control of the Armenian Armed Forces to Azerbaijan, including the strategically important village of Kerki. Recently, Armenia even announced that it was suspending its participation in the trilateral working group on Garabagh, which is responsible for the unblocking of transportation lines in the region. Presumably, this was a futile attempt to push Azerbaijan to bargaining on border issues, as well as to disrupt the trilateral agreements of November 10.

In fact, Armenia can no longer particularly influence the situation, and the process of unblocking the transport routes goes on regardless of Yerevan’s position. For example, on May 27, 2021, the Armenian government adopted a decision to provide land plots in Zangezur (Meghri, Qafan and Tekhe) for free use of Russian border guards. The Zangezur corridor should pass through this region to restore the transport communications of Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic interrupted during the First Garabagh War. The border directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation will ensure the operation of the corridor.

A few days earlier, speaking at the ceremony celebrating the dispatch of new cars to the Armenian subsidiary of Russian Railways – South Caucasus Railways JSC, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said that “soon it will be possible to start unblocking transport routes in Transcaucasia." The company plans to completely re-equip the fleet of cargo cars until 2024, implying that Moscow is preparing to unblock the railways of the region and strengthen the position of its companies, which will be involved in the cargo transportation.

As far as the “Armenian corridor” is concerned, it seems these dreams will never come true. Even if Armenia lowers tariffs for the transit of Iranian goods through its territory, most of the Iranian road transport will still go through Azerbaijan. Since the risks of damaging goods and vehicles passing through the poor Armenian roads far exceed the low duties to be paid by each truck.

In addition, it is not clear what Armenia itself will have from the reduction of duties. It turns out that Armenia is ready to even incur losses just to upset its neighbour. If so, where is the logic? Either way, these are questions related to psychology.