DIRECT DIPLOMACY

There were various unofficial peacebuilding projects exploiting the principle of "people-to-people diplomacy" popular in the South Caucasus in the second half of the 1990s. As a rule, they included meetings of journalists, experts and civil society activists from Azerbaijan and Armenia. These meetings could be organised by unspecified NGOs or by authoritative international organisations. Traditionally, they were held in Georgia. The choice of the venue seemed quite obvious. Tbilisi has normal relations with both Baku and Yerevan and has a well-developed tourism infrastructure since the Soviet era. So it was perfectly possible to organise such meetings there.

This time it was no longer a meeting of experts, but direct talks between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, held in Tbilisi. Although ministerial talks had been held in the region before and after the 44-day war, experts described the current one as unprecedented.

By the way, Georgia did not act as a mediator, but merely hosted the meeting. Tbilisi did not propose its own settlement project and did not take on the role of guarantor of the implementation of the agreements reached. Georgian authorities only provided a ‘platform’ and technical support, nothing more.

Face to face without face

The majority of politicians, experts and observers welcome the first meeting of the foreign ministers. And this is not just a diplomatic courtesy. An initiative to hold talks without mediators is a major shift in the bilateral dialogue.

It can be argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan will in any case have to find a way towards peace and negotiate it; that it is up to both countries to go their own way towards normalising relations and that no mediators will do this instead of Baku and Yerevan. They can offer something to each other, but the days of ‘superficial agreements’ and externally drawn borders are over.

Some may argue that without outside actors playing tricks on the conflicts, Azerbaijan and Armenia would have reached an agreement on their own long ago, and it is good that the sides have now started a dialogue.

In reality, however, things do not run smootly. A meeting without mediators does not mean the disappearance of external players. Especially given Yerevan's permanent intention to wage war against Azerbaijan by involving other parties. Traditionally, such support in Yerevan is expected from Russia. In the first months after the ‘velvet revolution’ in Armenia, Yerevan expected support from the West.

However, the situation on the Western front is quite bad for Armenia. Azerbaijan signed a 'gas memorandum' with the EU during the visit of the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and Yerevan understands very well how this will affect the balance of sympathies and antipathies. They have exploited all their lobbying potential in this area, but the new gas deal between the EU and Azerbaijan have literally nullified their expectations.

There are intensive rumours about the construction of a new Russian military base near the border with Azerbaijan, in the Tavush district of Armenia, where the hostilities broke out in July 2020. There is no official confirmation of this information. However, the Armenian media confidently predicts the location of the new base, while the Azerbaijani experts are trying to understand the move. The deployment of a military base close to the Azerbaijani border amid incessant Armenian armed provocations is risky and can be regarded by Baku as clearly unfriendly. Moreover, it also contradicts the spirit of the declaration on cooperation signed between Moscow and Baku.

This is hardly a reason for Armenia to rejoice either. Azerbaijan's pipelines and railways are very important today, and any attempt of military attack on them can result in such a retaliation that no military base can help.

Either way, Yerevan is actively looking for new partners. According to the Indian media, a high-ranking delegation from Yerevan has visited New Delhi. According to the official version, it is there to buy weapons. According to the unofficial version, this is an Armenian way of demonstrating Moscow how dissatisfied they are. At the same time Armenians are harassing their Indian partners: "Do you remember what the Turkish President Erdogan said on Kashmir? Are you aware that Azerbaijan is friends with Pakistan?" With such political traditions in Armenia, a face-to-face conversation does not guarantee that Yerevan will actually make independent decisions and generally behave as an adequate partner. Unfortunately, progress in the format of the meeting does not correlate with real progress in the dialogue.

Difficult dialogue

One might say that after twenty-five years of confrontation one can hardly expect quick results from Armenia and so on. But Azerbaijan once again alarms that Armenia is frustrating the post-conflict settlement and is not fulfilling its obligations under the trilateral November 10, 2020 statement. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated this directly at the meeting devoted to the results of the first six months of 2022. He noted that "although certain steps have been taken in the first six months of this year towards the normalisation of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, unfortunately, there have been no real results. Unfortunately, Armenia is not fulfilling its commitments even after a year and eight  months passing since the Patriotic War", said President Aliyev.

Moreover, according to Mr. Aliyev, although Armenia has accepted the five principles suggested by Azerbaijan, no concrete steps have yet been taken. He also mentioned "Armenia's avoidance of the issues stipulated in the November 10, 2020 declaration". The following statement of the Azerbaijani President was quoted by many news agencies: "The November 10 Declaration is in fact an act of surrender of Armenia. As the party defeated in the war, Armenia assumed some obligations. These commitments are clearly defined in the document. One of them is the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from Garabagh. This issue has not been solved yet. We have repeatedly raised the issue, but Armenia is delaying the process. In parallel, we have conveyed the issue to the Russian military leadership. And during a visit to Azerbaijan several months ago, a high-ranking representative of the Russian Defense Ministry promised our Defense Ministry that by June the Armenian armed forces will be withdrawn from Garabagh. It is now mid-July and the issue still remains unsolved.”

President also complained that Armenia, despite its commitments, has not yet provided a communication passage between the mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, even though the Lachin road is operational. Moreover, as President noted, "we do not see Armenia carrying out any works in this direction.”

Also, as Mr. Aliyev noted, “the Armenian leadership has recently restarted talks about the status of Garabagh. Although when the war was over and Armenia was forced to sign the surrender act, there was a verbal agreement between us—the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia—that the status issue would not be addressed. For a certain period Armenia respected this agreement. But recently this has become a common occurrence. Armenian prime minister and minister of foreign affairs mention the status of Garabagh. After the war I said what happened to the status and I do not want to repeat the same statement. However, if anyone in Armenia has forgotten my statement, I can repeat it again. But I think that for now there is no need to do so. That's why I think that talking about status is very dangerous for Armenia, because we can also start talking about the status for Zangezur, for example, which was joined to Armenia back in 1920.”

The Zangezur ultimatum

Baku is not simply reminding Armenia of its commitments. Azerbaijan voices its own ultimatum, on several fronts at once. If Yerevan and its allies continue to delay the withdrawal of troops, Baku will resolve the issue on its own. And it is not difficult to guess that this will be very painful for Armenia. If Armenia tries to resuscitate the issue of Garabagh’s status, Azerbaijan may raise the issue of Zangezur's status.

Baku has repeatedly made it clear that Azerbaijan was ready to push Armenia to fulfil its commitments.

For illustrative purposes, we can mention the situation with the bypass road Lachin corridor, the construction of which will be completed by Azerbaijan soon. Once it is over, both the town of Lachin and the village of Zabukh (Agavno in Armenian) will be returned to Baku's control. The Armenian head of the village, Çavushyan, liked giving interviews with loud statements such as 'if a Turk comes to our land, he will be taken out in a horizontal position', 'we are all ready to take up arms' and so on.

Let's leave aside the loud statements about ‘our land’, as there was no Armenian population on this territory even before the war; that’s why after the occupation Armenia have resettled ethnic Armenians from Syria to the houses of the expelled Azerbaijanis. However, recently Armenians ceased their verbal activity. For a simple reason: even separatist leader Araik Harutyunyan is forced to admit that if Armenia tries to refuse "the relocation of the corridor," the consequences will be disastrous. This means that Azerbaijan is pushing on the issue. It is not difficult to guess that in the same way Baku will press on the issue of withdrawal of the Armenian armed groups from the zone of temporary deployment of Russian troops. It is indicative that immediately after President Aliyev's statement, Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council, assured that no more conscripts will go to Garabagh and that the separatist armed groups will be responsible for their own security. By doing this, he framed Moscow and admitted that Baku's accusations were well grounded. Also, he indicated that Armenia understood that it was not worth turning a blind eye on Baku's warnings.

This contrasts quite sharply with the events of spring and summer 2018. After the April 2016 fighting and the Gizilgaya-Gunnut operation, Baku has indeed reduced its pressure on Yerevan. This was followed by the ‘shishlik revolution’ in Armenia, with Nikol Pashinian declared the leader of the "party of peace". There were hopes that negotiations would definitely move forward under Pashinyan’s leadership. But he should have been given some time to consolidate his power, to analyse the situation around, and only then wait for results.

But this, unfortunately, was followed by the arrival of hawks like David Tonoyan and Vagharshak Harutyunyan, drunk dances on Cıdır Düzü, Araik Harutyunyan's inauguration in Shusha and phrases like Garabagh is Armenia, period. And finally, there was a new war, in which Armenia suffered a crushing defeat.

Now Baku is no longer willing to give Pashinian time or a chance to save his face, to accept his lamentations about local political problems. Azerbaijan will demand that Armenia honours its own commitments.

Yerevan is better not test Baku's patience, which can run out.