SPRING OFFENSIVE… IN SUMMER?

The planned spring offensive has been the main topic of discussion around the Ukrainian conflict. We have yet to see it launched, although summer is approaching.

Analysts believe there are several reasons for this. One of them is the "deep misinformation of the enemy" when, contrary to expectations, a strike is launched at a different time and place. In Ukraine, authorities believe that the counter-offensive will be decisive in the entire military campaign and will make it possible to return all the captured territories.

However, some Western military analysts are not so optimistic. While acknowledging that the Ukrainian army may indeed achieve significant accomplishments in the counter-offensive, they do not consider the imminent liberation of Crimea, and thus the final end of the war this year, possible. Instead, they assume that with the depletion of forces on both sides, they can, with the help of mediators, arrive at some sort of temporary status quo that will last until one side dares to break it.

Anticipating new military activity

Indeed, the autumn offensive in Kharkov and Kherson oblasts was so successful that one might think that the Ukrainian army equipped with modern Western tanks and ammunition will repeat the same success this year as well. As we know, as a result of that offensive Ukrainians could return almost half of the territory seized by Russia—almost 75,000 square kilometres. Anything that involves the return of smaller areas can be regarded by supporters of Ukraine as a failure. But the logic of war suggests that victory can be forged even at the cost of smaller gains. One way or another, Ukraine has repeatedly stated that only the liberation of the occupied territories can paved the way for further talks. There has been no significant change in this position.

But this position may not suit those governments in Europe who want an early cessation of hostilities, since it is them who bear the main costs of continuing the war, apart from the direct participants in the war. These include both direct military and economic costs. Obviously, more time, more bloodshed and more weapons will be needed to win. In other words, if Europe and Western countries in general want to assist Ukraine, they must demonstrate greater willingness to continue their assistance.

These are the considerations of the opponents of continuing the war. But their opponents argue that the conflict, if it ends at this stage, will leave Russia not only Crimea but also large areas of the occupied lands, which is roughly 18 per cent of Ukraine's territory. "Russia has cut off the Sea of Azov and a large chunk of the Black Sea, seized a fat chunk of Ukrainian territory and created a land corridor to Crimea. Now there is only one thing left: to get a foothold, to nail down those territories that are already there," Yevgeny Prigozhin, owner of the Wagner PMC, said.

Counting the loss

With such an approach, any suspension of military action by Ukraine can be regarded as a weakness of Western democracies, which collectively have failed to stand up against Russia alone. A number of analysts believe that such an outcome would play in the hand of other countries hatching aggressive plans against their neighbours and seeking to overthrow the world order based on the well-established rules. Politicians in the West wonder: what is the point of values if their defenders are helpless before brute force and cannot defend themselves and their allies? Some even cite the example of thirty years ago, when the countries of the world came together in a single coalition and forced Saddam Hussein to abandon Kuwait, occupied in 1991, thereby restoring the latter's independence.

It is true that unlike the Gulf War, which lasted only a few weeks and was on a much smaller scale, the Russian-Ukrainian war, in its nature and the scope of the parties directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, resembles a world war. It is no coincidence that it is often associated with the Third World War. Its political and economic consequences are unparalleled.

Russian offensive is known to have exacerbated the upward trend in oil and gas prices in recent years after the global economy emerged from the pandemic lockdown. Sanctions against Russia have made the situation much more difficult.

They have had a particularly negative impact on the European energy market, which is closely linked to Russia. Within a year, Russia's share of the European gas market has fallen from 40% to 10%. In addition, many low-income consumers faced so-called 'fuel poverty', which translates into a partial substitution of gas with alternative energy sources. Although Europe survived the first winter without Russian gas at a relatively low cost and there was no catastrophic collapse, some companies had to either reduce their gas consumption (by 13 percent or 55 billion cubic meters in total) or stop production altogether.

The International Energy Agency warns that Europe should not expect another warm winter this year and that alternative fuels such as liquefied natural gas and coal could become more expensive.

After the Russian invasion, America and European countries imposed a series of harsh sanctions against the financial, energy and transport sectors. Sanction packages cut Russia off from international financial markets. The country's assets in the banking sector have been frozen, as has money deposited by Russian oligarchs. Russia can now neither borrow money on international markets nor buy stocks.

Such a broad and radical set of sanctions targeting financial markets has never before been applied to any country. The immediate result of these measures was a drop in the Russian rouble and in the value of shares on the Russian stock exchange. Although the Russian economy has subsequently adapted to new conditions, the impact of sanctions has been irreparable.

But Ukraine's damage from the war has been incomparably greater. Its economic potential has been severely undermined. Suffice it to say that the war is still going on and Ukraine is the scene of hostilities.

According to the deputy head of the Committee for National Security, Defence and Intelligence of Ukraine, Yuriy Aristov, the war has caused $143.8b worth of damage to the country. This is only direct and documented losses. Ukrainian authorities estimate the total amount of damage at more than $800b.

Beneficiaries and losers of the war

Ironically, the war in Ukraine was beneficial for some countries. First and foremost, the key exporters of military equipment. The list is topped by the United States. According to the Swedish think tank SIPRI, the US had a 37% share of the arms market (2016-2020), with France (8%) and Germany (5.5%) following it over the same period. Russia is also an arms exporter, but as a belligerent with significant losses in military equipment, it is losing its former position in the arms market.

Thus, Western countries led by the US increasingly become the world's leading suppliers of military equipment in the short term, especially since all of these countries are experiencing significant increase in military budgets.

Since the start of the war, the Biden administration has provided more than $25b in aid to Ukraine, mostly arms. The same is true for a number of European countries.

Apparently, other beneficiaries of the war in Ukraine have been oil and gas producers, mainly in the Middle East, but also Indonesia, Nigeria and Venezuela. Russia and Iran could also benefit from the situation. But that is if they manage to circumvent the increasingly harsh sanctions with fewer risks. In the latter case, however, Russia has much more to lose than to gain.

But it is the world's poorest countries, and indeed the already precarious global security system, which clearly lose from the ongoing war.

"The world is facing a series of unprecedented crises, making the situation on the international stage the most tense since the UN was founded," António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, said.

The top UN official believes that "tensions between the major powers are now at an unprecedentedly high level". Therefore, according to Guterres, the risks of new conflicts are high. "This can happen by accident or because of miscalculations by one side or the other," he added.

We do not know whether he was referring to the situation around Taiwan or Iran's nuclear programme, or wanted to draw attention to the developments in Sudan. But it is clear that all of these and any other possible events can have far more dramatic consequences in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

Closing remarks

Meanwhile, the situation on the front is following a highly unpredictable scenario. Bakhmut remains the centre of military activity with the bloodiest fighting of the war. The Russian side controls most of the town, but the Ukrainian army does not have any intention to give up their positions so easily either.

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky said in his recent video address that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could not leave Bakhmut because if they did so Russian troops would have a chance to occupy more territories. Additionally, full control over the city would create a springboard effect for a further offensive against Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. The Ukrainian president reiterated that his country was preparing for a counteroffensive, which could become a turning point in the military campaign.

Meanwhile, the White House spokesman John Kirby suggested that the Russian army was also preparing for an offensive, waiting for weather conditions to improve. Moreover, it may launch an offensive in several sectors of the front at once. It was not reported when or where.

Most observers believe that Ukrainians can start the offensive from the Sea of Azov, in Zaporozhye, which can divide the occupied territories and cut off land routes to Crimea and the Kherson oblast. We have yet to see whether this scenario comes true and whether the expected spring offensive will take place this season or shifted to summer months in the near future.