SHOWDOWN SUDANESE STYLE

A military conflict broke out in Sudan a few weeks ago and is still one of the active topics on international agenda. Worsening socio-political situation in this African country coupled with the strength of the conflicting parties and the forces that support them, as well as frequent violations of still fresh ceasefire agreements increase the risk of further escalation. International political analysts warn of a high risk of a civil war in the country.

Reasons for conflict

Apparently, it was the decision of Sudan's transitional military government to dissolve the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as part of the military security reform package that became a trigger to armed clashes in the country. According to the decision, the RSF, which has since its inception become a de facto autonomous organisation within the army, is to be further integrated into the Sudanese army following its dissolution. On April 15, clashes erupted between the RSF and the army as a sign of refusal to accept the decision.

Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, soon became a battlefield with a death toll of over 500. With the situation threatening to spiral out of control, many countries began to evacuate their citizens from Sudan. Failure to observe the repeatedly reached ceasefire agreement and the spread of clashes increase the risk of civil war in the country. According to many observers, the current conflict between the two military forces will continue until one side wins and usurps power, eliminating the leader of the opposing side or forcing him to leave the country or surrender.

The Rapid Support Force was formed about twenty years ago during the civil war in the Sudanese region of Darfur. The country was then led by General Omar al-Bashir, who established the Janjaweed paramilitary organisation to quell the rebellion in Darfur. It was the Janjaweed fighters who were the government's main strike force suppressing the rebellion and killing the black population of the region. The paramilitary group later became a special unit within the Sudanese army, known as the Rapid Support Forces. However, even under President Al-Bashir, the RSF was not subordinated to the army, but rather operated semi-autonomously, being largely under the direct control of the head of state. Principal commanders of the RSF are members of the Dagalo family, namely Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Interestingly, Dagalo, who single-handedly rules over his organisation, was a camel herdsman in his youth. There are currently about 100,000 armed fighters in the RSF.

After the suppression of the Darfur rebellion, Dagalo established himself in the region, exerting tight control over the exploitation of limited mineral resources and other economic activities. With the beginning of popular uprising against Omar al-Bashir's thirty-year dictatorship in 2018, Dagalo and his military unit supported the president in the early months. But later, when the situation changed, they quit from the alliance, forcing al-Bashir to resign in April of that year.

At that time, the army and the RSF sided with the people. Thus, the instigators of the military coup were formally Mohamed Dagalo, the RSF commander, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudanese Armed Forces. Al-Burhan soon became a chairman of the Transitional Military Council (later the Sovereign Council), with Dagalo being his deputy. The same duo led the military coup that followed the 2021 revolution and brought the military to power.

However, during the same period, Dagalo was increasing his power in Sudan alongside al-Burhan's formal leadership. This was possible thanks to the 100,000-strong RSF army, large mining and other economic resources firmly tied to the country's leadership, and foreign support. So although Dagalo was formally the second man in Sudan's military command, his activities caused serious resentment. Another factor reinforcing this resentment and the latent power struggle between Dagalo and al-Burhan was the inclusion in the 2022 framework agreement on transitional civilian authority of an article on the integration of the RSF into the Sudanese army. Finally, it was the adoption of a law to integrate the RSF with the Sudanese army that escalated the growing confrontation into a military conflict.

External factor

Sudan is the third largest African country with limited energy and mineral resources. After years of war, the country's main oil-producing regions broke away in 2011, declaring independence as the Republic of South Sudan and leaving the rest of the once unified state with few hydrocarbon reserves. Currently, Sudan possesses only a certain number of gold and other precious metal deposits. However, the country occupies a strategically advantageous geographical position, for it borders seven other African states and the Red Sea. Sudan's highly sensitive neighbours include Egypt, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad. In other words, an escalation of the conflict in Sudan can have a serious impact on these countries as well.

Yet another factor contributing to Sudan's attractiveness for the Arab Gulf countries is the cheapness of its armed forces. Earlier, the Sudanese mercenaries, including the members of the RSF, have backed the UAE in the battles against the Houthis in Yemen. And have been generously rewarded for their services - the RSF leadership received and continues to receive large sums of money and support from its benefactors.

Russia is also active in Sudan. According to some reports, the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner has been operating in Sudan since 2017. During the 2018-2019 uprising, global media was full of reports about the support of Prigozhin's team to the then head of state Omar al-Bashir. The Wagner PMC itself and the country's two gold mining companies known for their proximity to the Russian government have recently been imposed sanctions by the US and the EU. In particular, they are accused of smuggling.

On the other hand, Russia is seeking to establish a naval base with 300 troops and four ships in Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, which has a key share in world trade and energy transport. Thus, in February 2023, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, visited Darfur and met with the de facto head of state and chairman of Sudan's Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, his deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and the country's foreign minister, Ali al-Sadiq.

Incidentally, all roads leading from Port Sudan to Khartoum are now largely controlled by the RSF units, hence some media reports about the secret support of the RSF command by Russia.

However, the current head of Sudan, General Al-Burhan, maintains close ties with the West. Remarkably, both conflicting generals were part of the operation to suppress the Darfur uprising, which led to a large-scale massacre killing 300,000 people. But this has not prevented al-Burhan from forging good relations with the West after coming to power as a result of the 2019 revolution. In 2020, he was also involved in the US-initiated Arab reconciliation process with Israel, meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Western countries then lifted a series of sanctions and embargoes imposed on Sudan during al-Bashir's presidency. However, after the 2021 military coup, certain sanctions were again imposed on Sudan. Nevertheless, al-Burhan sided with the West during Russia's military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, causing an armed conflict between the two warlords involving global centres of political competition. Interestingly, the Egyptian authorities, which have close relations with Russia, support General Al-Burhan.

What's next?

Obviously, there is a political power struggle behind the clashes between the two armed groups in Khartoum. One of the parties is represented by the army commander and de facto head of state, General Al-Burhan, and the other by the commander of a thousands-strong special military unit, Mohamed Dagalo backed with strong financial and foreign support. He is well aware that merging his unit with the army would mean losing his current power and opportunities, so he is resisting. With strong local and external support, Dagalo can resist the entire Sudanese army.

It is now clear that the Sudanese conflict is a usual power struggle in Africa. Armed power struggles have long been commonplace in African countries, especially after all sorts of revolutions. In general, Sudan, like neighbouring Egypt, has been under military rule for many years. The last head of state, Omar al-Bashir, was a warlord himself. Despite a popular protest against his dictatorship in 2019, the military eventually came back to power. Moreover, the military command stalled the transfer of power to an elected civilian government, as promised in the early days of the uprising, and then seized power again with a military coup. Now, to alleviate external pressures on the country, to ensure at least formal legitimacy, army commanders on both sides of the current conflict need to come to the negotiating table with civilian political forces. However, as far as we can judge from the position of the military in recent years, it is reluctant to hand over power to civilians.

The current military leadership of Sudan, one of the poorest countries in Africa plagued by numerous armed conflicts and harsh sanctions, cannot refuse international mediation, lest it be cut off from foreign aid and become totally isolated from the international community. It agrees to a ceasefire and also participates, albeit formally, in negotiations. But both internal power rivalries and the presence of foreign powers in the country are serious obstacles to lasting peace and civil rule in Sudan. This means that the conflicts in the country will continue. Establishing peace will be impossible unless one of the parties is defeated.