BETWEEN THE BEAR AND THE DRAGON

Throughout its history, Central Asia (CA) has served as a vital hub connecting the East with Europe, facilitating the exchange of goods and ideas. With its vast energy resources, including oil, gas and coal, this vast region is important both geo-strategically and geo-economically. Therefore, it is not surprising that major world powers are trying to influence the countries of the region to their advantage.

According to the Eurasian Development Bank, the GDP of Central Asian countries has grown more than seven times over the past 20 years, by an average of 6.2%. This is faster than in developing countries and twice as fast as globally.

Central Asia's strategic role in wider Eurasia will only increase, as will its importance for its immediate neighbours. Among them, Russia and China have historically made the greatest effort to ensure their influence and, if possible, political control over the region. Today the main challenge for the Central Asian states is to manoeuvre between the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon.

Although Russia still has political and military influence in Central Asia and is a major economic partner, it can no longer dominate the region as it once did. The Russian-Ukrainian war was a window of opportunity for the former Soviet republics to adjust their political vector.

Currently, China is more attractive to Central Asian states because it offers economic growth and has the advantages of a diversified and strong economy and demonstrates a lack of at least overt willingness to interfere in domestic politics.

Great plan

The 5+1 format of regular summits between the Central Asian states is nothing special. Japan was the first country to establish this form of cooperation with Central Asia back in 2004, followed by South Korea, the European Union, the US and now China.

Despite the obvious delay in adopting this format, China has been the driver of the regional economy for decades. Beijing is the most important or second most important partner of CA in trade relations. China is also a major investor in the region's physical and digital infrastructure.

Bilateral trade between China and Central Asia reached a record $70b last year, about 40% more than in 2021. In the first four months of 2023 alone, the trade turnover was $24.8b, which is 37.3% more than in the same period last year.

Just as CA needs trade and investment with China, Beijing needs the natural resources of these countries. Many Chinese cities depend on gas pipelines from Turkmenistan and oil from Kazakhstan.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched his flagship programme the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan. Under the programme, China has invested heavily in railways, pipelines and other infrastructure across the region.

Nevertheless, Beijing has long preferred bilateral relations. It is true that the countries meet regularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but these formats do not allow a direct focus on relations between Central Asia and China.

In 2020, China finally launched its version of the 5+1 cooperation format, marking a smooth transition from a predominantly economic relationship with the region to a closer political one.

Perhaps, Beijing seized that opportunity to increase its influence in the region amid the the COVID pandemic, which overloaded the CA's healthcare systems, stressing its economies.

Last year, when President Xi and the CA presidents celebrated 30 years of bilateral relations, they announced the creation of the Sino-Central Asian community with a shared future.

On May 19-20, the first face-to-face 5+1 meeting was held in Xi'an, a city in central China that was a key stop on the ancient Silk Road trade route, which for centuries linked China with Central Asia and the Middle East.

It was an important event for China, since long before it, in his correspondence with the CA leaders, President Xi had consistently put an accent on his yet another "ambitious plan" to improve relations with Central Asia. The Chinese leader outlined the plan based on four basic principles in his welcoming speech.

The first principle—protecting and helping each other—underlines the importance of deepening "strategic mutual trust" and providing support "on issues related to core interests such as sovereignty, independence, national dignity and long-term development...". Xi further highlighted the need to remain committed to "common development" under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative. The third principle has to do with maintaining "universal security", countering "external forces" trying to instigate "colour revolutions" and jointly confronting the "three forces of evil". Finally, President Xi mentioned the importance of "eternal friendship" and building a strong foundation for a future of close inter-generational ties.

This truly historic summit ended with the signing of seven bilateral and multilateral documents, as well as more than 100 agreements on cooperation in various fields.

Searching for like-minded people

Xi Jinping's regional ambitions are complicated by his friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the close ties between the two countries. But the Russian-Ukrainian war alerted Central Asia, raising serious concerns about the future.

Neither Russia nor the war in Ukraine were explicitly mentioned during the China-Central Asia summit, but President Xi tried to reassure his colleagues, saying that "the sovereignty, security, independence and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries must be preserved". Earlier, Beijing had announced plans to establish a regional anti-terrorism centre to train Central Asian security forces.

During the summit, Beijing even tried to secure the support of the CA countries for the Chinese mediation efforts to stop the Russian-Ukrainian war. Xi Jinping also used the platform of the summit to strengthen his Belt and Road initiative, which was under a serious risk this year when Italy announced its intention to withdraw from the investment pact. Prior to that, the three Baltic states had also withdrawn from the so-called 17+1 format of Eastern and Central European cooperation with China, calling on other countries to do the same.

It was no secret to anyone, including the CA leaders, that the summit was part of Beijing's broader goal of finding like-minded nations to oppose what it sees as a US-dominated world order. Therefore, Beijing insisted that the CA leaders would provide assurances in the joint statements adopted in Xi'an that they would not interfere in its policies in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Hong Kong, as well as in the struggle over Taiwan. Apparently, Beijing succeeded.

Interesting statement

China is certainly useful for the CA states to counterweigh Russia, but it is also dangerous as a potential new hegemon. For years, some Chinese intellectuals have claimed that China had territorial rights over all or part of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. In April, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shai publicly stated that China did not respect the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics because they had no "effective status in international law". Beijing eventually refuted the statement, but for the CA leaders it may have looked as if Lu had let Beijing's real intentions slip.

Obviously, the CA leaders came to meet with President Xi with two contradictory thoughts in mind: potential for getting economic benefits thanks to expanding partnership with Beijing, and the danger of potential Chinese influence in the region.

We will see soon whether they have been able to defend their interests or whether, in addition to economic dependence, they have found themselves under the political influence of China.