SYRIAN PLAN OF ANKARA

We can observe the rise of tensions in the Syrian war zone controlled by the Turkish army. In mid-June, the Turkish military conducted an operation against PKK/YPG militants in the districts of Manbij and Tell Rif'at, as well as in the Azez-Jerablus operational zone. In August 2016, more than 40 terrorists were neutralised there during Operation Euphrates Shield.

Preparation for a new operation or disagreements?

Meanwhile, an armoured vehicle of the Russian army was hit, killing one and wounding three soldiers. Despite the claims by local sources that a Turkish UAV or artillery was involved in the incident, it was hushed up and concealed from public view.

Turkish army also struck YPG positions in areas bordering Syria. Notably, for the first time since 2019, Turkish artillery shelled the targets just 38km away from the Syrian-Turkish border—Kurdish positions near the village of Ahdas in northern Aleppo. Despite official Turkish assurances that the main goal of the operation was to clear terrorist elements from a 30km wide border strip, it appears the Turkish command decided to extend the coverage area this time. Meanwhile, some reports suggest that on May 31 the Turkish army dispatched a convoy of 17 vehicles to Idlib.

The Kurdish population of Syria responded to Turkish actions against the YPG in northern Syria with protests against the Russians. YPG supporters accuse Moscow of creating favourable conditions for Türkiye by withdrawing its military forces from the area. We can assume that by retreating, Russia is giving Türkiye a go-ahead to conduct an operation in Tell Rif'at, since the military commands of the three countries are known to coordinate their actions well in northern Syria. Under such circumstances, the probability of one country's military equipment being destroyed blindly by another country is negligible. It seems that the Russian armoured vehicles were deliberately hit in order to justify the retreat of the Russians.

In the days following the incident, Russian aviation began shelling Syrian opposition positions in Idlib. This happened just before the 20th summit between Iran, Russia and Türkiye scheduled for June 20-21 in Astana. It seemed that each side wanted to go to Astana with serious cards in hands. But it was not as simple as that.

The Astana roadmap

The main agenda of the 20th international meeting in Astana was the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation, or the withdrawal of the Turkish army from the country, Syrian media reported. In addition to delegations led by deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Türkiye, Iran and Syria, the meeting was attended by Syrian opposition led by Ahmed Tuman, UN Special Representative for Syria Geir Pederson, as well as commissioners from Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. For the first time, the Astana process included representatives of governments, the Syrian opposition, as well as neighbouring countries.

According to official reports, the summit participants discussed a batch of issues, including the political situation around Syria, fight against terrorism, the release of prisoners, the search for missing persons, the reconstruction of destroyed settlements and the return of refugees.

However, the key topic of discussions was the preparation of a roadmap between the representatives of Iran, Russia, Türkiye and the Syrian government to restore the Syrian-Turkish relations.

Unexpected was a statement of the Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Tumysh, who said that the current meeting on Syria would be the last within the Astana format. All the goals set six years ago when the negotiation process was launched have been achieved, he said. Tumysh added that another meeting on the Syrian issue would be held in the second half of 2023, but did not specify the venue of the planned event.

Factors hindering Turkish-Syrian reconciliation

Although the leaderships of both Türkiye and Syria are leaning towards reconciliation, there are serious obstacles on this road. Previously, there have been Turkish-Syrian contacts at the level of the heads of armies, intelligence services and foreign ministries of both countries, which have common interests as well as disagreements on some issues .

Syrian authorities mainly demand that Ankara withdraws its army from the Syrian territory. On May 29, one day after the elections in Türkiye, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faysal Mikdad, said that the normalisation of relations between the two countries would be possible only after this.

On June 12, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reiterated the same demand during his reception of an Iranian delegation led by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Askar Haji. He said the withdrawal of the Turkish army from the Syrian territory was the main demand of the Syrian side in the negotiations with Türkiye.

The withdrawal of the Turkish army from Syria does not simply mean the withdrawal of one of the foreign armies from the territory of this Arab state. It is also home to a large US military contingent, and Damascus does not yet know how to remove the Americans from the country.

If Turkish troops leave Syria, it will unleash Damascus and leave the opposition in Idlib in a helpless position. As a result, Assad may be tempted to destroy the Arab political and military opposition.

It is clear that Ankara does not want to withdraw its military contingent from Syria. The existence of Ankara-affiliated opposition groups, including the Free Syrian Army, depends primarily on Türkiye, or rather its army. Without a political agreement on them, Türkiye cannot withdraw its army. Otherwise, Russian and Syrian troops will take control of Idlib. Furthermore, the withdrawal of the Turkish army without a prior plan for the return of nearly four million Syrian refugees to homeland can lead to the failure of the repatriation process.

Nor is Washington interested in the current situation. In recent months, the US has increased its military contingent in the Kurdish-controlled northern region of Syria, especially in the south of the country.

This is how Washington is trying to maintain control over the oil and gas fields in the north-east of the country, including in the Kurdish-populated Deir ez-Zor and surrounding areas, as well as the crossing of roads leading from Iraq into Syria to the city of Albukamala. This should foil Iranian attempts to transport arms and equipment to Syria via Iraq. And to implement these plans, the US is trying to link its military base in the Tanaf area in the south of Syria to Deir ez-Zor.

There have even been media reports of American meetings with local Arab tribal leaders. In other words, the Americans are now working hard on this issue, especially since a surprise attack on the Tanaf base earlier this year by militias linked to Iran. This confirmed the risks Americans are facing in the current situation in the area. With all this in mind, Washington has no interest in Ankara's withdrawal from Syria, although the Turkish presence poses a serious threat to the Kurds, the main US ally in the country.

On the other hand, as soon as the Turks leave the area, Syrian and Russian troops can easily destroy and disable the opposition in Idlib. The West does not want it, as it still hopes for political changes in Syria.

Another problem that prevents Türkiye from solving the Syrian issue is Washington's sanctions on Damascus. They make any coordination with Ankara useless, increasingly delaying projects like the return of refugees to northern Syria and the construction of new settlements.

Ankara's short- and long-term goals

Ankara's main goals in Syria are to normalise relations with the local authorities, launch the process of repatriation of refugees and simultaneously implement construction and infrastructure projects to accommodate them. At the end of May, a group of Turkish government representatives attended a groundbreaking ceremony for 5,000 housing units, the first phase of a 28,681-unit housing project funded by the Qatar Development Fund in the Jerablus area of northern Syria. Thanks to the Qatari support, the Erdogan government is planning to relocate 1 million Syrians back to their homeland. This process has already started.

Russia and Iran are putting pressure on Ankara to reconcile it with Damascus. On the other hand, Gulf countries with which Erdogan is already close, are also normalising relations with Bashar al-Assad. All these developments encourage Türkiye to reconcile with him, too.

However, this also requires that a number of serious issues be solved. In addition to the return of Syrian refugees, the Turkish authorities are willing to determine the fate of Idlib and the opposition groups deployed there, as well as ensuring their security and withdrawal from Syria once the Kurdish issue is resolved.

Interestingly, the positions of Ankara and Damascus on the Kurdish issue are completely the same. They both do not want to see a PYD-ruled Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria, i.e., near Türkiye's southern borders. That is why the Assad government is not particularly concerned about Ankara's military operation against the Kurds and even willingly ignores it. Indeed, thanks to direct military support from the US, the Kurds have become the most powerful military and political group in northern Syria. And the only force that can weaken their influence is Türkiye. Given that the Turkish authorities have repeatedly raised the issue of the PKK terrorism before Washington over the years, rest assured the White House is well aware of Ankara's sensitivity on this issue.

In recent months, Washington has taken some steps to build relations with local Arab communities in Syria. In other words, it is highly likely that the Kurds will be chosen as a scapegoat for another Turkish-Syrian-Russian reconciliation.

This suits the interests of Moscow, as the difficult situation in Ukraine is by no means a reason for the Russian authorities to compromise their positions in Syria.

As a result, under the current circumstances, Turkish authorities will try to liberate YPG-controlled areas in northern Syria, including Tell Rif'at, accelerate the construction of new residential areas for Syrian refugees, and negotiate with Bashar al-Assad's government with Russian mediation. Therefore, Assad's weak position on Kurdish issue gives Ankara some flexibility.

However, the normalisation of relations between Türkiye and Syria similar to how it happened between Türkiye and Egypt seems very difficult. Even the common interests of both states cannot be considered sufficient for a final peace between Ankara and Damascus.