MIDDLE POWERS

With the United States struggling to defend its position as the world's superpower amid China's growing economic and diplomatic power, as well as the confrontation between the collective West and Russia, the world is going through a transformation of geopolitical realities, redefining the term middle power along the way. This process goes in parallel with the construction of the so-called multipolar world—a concept, which looks tempting for middle powers in their attempts to increase political and economic influence in the international arena.

The term middle power is not new. The concept was defined as early as the late 16th century, when the Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero divided the world into three types of states: grandissime (empires), mezano (middle powers) and piccioli (small powers). In Botero's definition, a middle power "possessed sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the help of others".

Middle powers are further defined as states with a moderate ability to influence the behaviour of other states. Middle powers are characterised by a desire for regional integration and, at the same time, creating and maintaining their own identity, differentiating themselves from the weaker states in their region. On the global scale, they are looking for multilateral solutions and compromises, mediation. Most importantly, they try to avoid direct confrontation with the great powers. During the Cold War and at the beginning of the 21st century, countries such as Canada and Australia were often referred to as middle powers. In general, about 50 countries were considered middle powers at different times. The list included Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, UAE, many EU member states, New Zealand, etc.

Meanwhile, middle powers are now more likely to include the states that do not want to take sides in the confrontation between the West and Russia or between the US and China. In other words, based on the new geopolitical realities, the list of middle powers can exclude such countries that have developed economies and are clearly side with the West and NATO, such as Canada, Australia or South Korea. These adjustments help to shape the contours of the future geopolitical layout. In the emerging new geostrategic space, middle powers are increasingly acting independently, voicing their concerns and attempting to dictate their own terms. At the same time, they are avoiding direct confrontation with the great powers and actively refusing to take sides unequivocally. Middle powers are increasingly and more clearly demonstrating pragmatism. Such states are often dubbed as the Global South. Many of them are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, while some are part of the G20.

The 2007-2008 global financial crisis due to the apparent failure of the Western countries represented by the G7 to manage the international financial system was an incident that also coined the term middle power. It also gave birth to the G20 format resorted to resolve the ongoing crisis. Admittedly, the major powers also demonstrated poor performance in managing the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. Meanwhile, international relations were suffering from the economic and indirect military confrontation between the US and China. And then came the war in Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, the revival of the spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement was a very distinctive moment. Many countries see non-alignment as a safer option for their strategic present and future. They realise that it is better and safer to avoid joining political blocs led by Washington or Moscow, which traditionally use the tactics of pressure. Instead of providing advantages, these blocs impose serious restrictions, reduce the room for manoeuvre, and make the member states sacrifice important, sometimes strategic interests.

Undoubtedly, Türkiye is the perfect example of a middle power, which is frequently called in foreign media "a post-Western power". Despite its membership in NATO, Türkiye is not the closest ally of the United States, nor is it perceived as an unambiguous part of the Western bloc, especially in terms of ideology, culture and identity. Instead, it effectively balances among the interests of major powers, hoping to find more opportunities for itself in various spheres. Ankara effectively and confidently pursues its own interests in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. As a consequence, Western countries, Russia and China have no other choice but to look for ways to negotiate with Türkiye rather than dictate its terms. At the same time, Russian and Western experts frequently refer to Türkiye's pragmatism and its regional ambitions allowing for more room for cooperation. For example, a number of experts suggest that Washington should focus more on economic co-operation with Türkiye to secure some support when it tries to balance against the interests of Russia and China.

Türkiye's closest ally, Azerbaijan, which has long been actively and successfully consolidating its economic, political, diplomatic and military potential, is also becoming a similar state. Thanks to accumulated opportunities and advantages, Azerbaijan has managed to defend its territorial integrity and is now unequivocally recognised as the strongest state in the South Caucasus and an influential force in the Caspian region. It is also worth noting Baku's mediation capabilities resorted to by world actors more than once.

Hungary is another country trying to become a middle power. Despite its dependence on the West and Russia in various spheres, it is increasingly assertive in pursuing a multi-vector policy. Budapest is actively developing relations with the countries of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), primarily with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, and seeks to become an intermediary in relations between the European Union and the Turkic countries. It is following a pragmatic system of mutually beneficial partnership, trying to develop an individual development strategy based on historical values. Hungary's goal for the next ten years is to become a new middle power in Europe. Indonesia is another candidate to become something more than the regional power it is now. The same is true for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. And the list goes on.

There will be more countries like Türkiye in the future. They will be neither enemies nor allies, but will try their best to preserve their independence and secure their interests as much as possible. This is the real Realpolitik.

But how effective will such a world order be? What can we expect from the absence of a global hegemon or policeman?

Some opine that global multipolarity is dangerous and therefore the West should serve as a balancing force to maintain a rules-based international order. The independent behaviour of the middle powers is no longer regarded as a sign of states with independent and pragmatic contractual powers, but rather hidden supporters of Russia and China. It is argued that global multipolarity will still be divided into several spheres of regional unipolarity with their own leader, which again entails rivalries and can lead to dangerous situations if the unambiguous authority of the West is not recognised. Otherwise the middle powers are in danger of falling back into dependence from Russia or China.

Moscow constantly promotes the idea of its important role in maintaining the global balance of power and building a multipolar international system. Beijing also supports this idea. Promoting multipolarity is part of the Chinese foreign policy, which proclaims China's unique role in changing the international order in line with its own worldview. Therefore, American experts speak of the common role of the US and the West as a counter-balancing force. They note that Washington should deprive its adversaries of the opportunity to form regional unipolar centres, to counter the spread and assertion of the idea that the so-called multipolar world may bring more prosperity and sovereignty to medium and small powers on a regional scale. During negotiations with the representatives of neutral states, US officials should emphasise that initiatives such as China's BRI, EAEU, and BRICS are attempts to divide the world into spheres of regional unipolarity with Beijing and Moscow at the head of each.

"Ultimately, whether the West prevails in its new great game against its geopolitical adversaries depends on the alignment of pivotal, often neutral powers. The existential challenge posed to American leadership by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the economic rise of China—both of which threaten the post-WWII international order—has made it urgent to counter the narrative of multipolar diplomacy and secure the support of middle powers." This is how young American experts Axel de Vernou, Associate Fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and Will Kielm, a recent graduate of the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, view the situation. Their article An American Grand Strategy for Middle Powers was published on August 24, 2023 in The National Interest. Thus, it turns out that middle powers do not want to be drawn into the confrontation between different geopolitical centres, but risk being at the very forefront of it.

On the other hand, in the rapidly changing world, with increasingly urgent climate factors and economic risks increasing despite expert predictions, it would be wrong to draw such long-term conclusions. Most likely, the 21st century will indeed be the Golden Age of middle powers, who will determine the future face of the new world order.