REDRAWING THE MIDDLE EAST

Regardless of the outcome of the war between Hamas and Israel, which re-entered yet another hot phase on October 7, it will lead to major political shifts throughout the Middle East. And there have been significant reasons for such changes.

But before we talk about them, let's take a brief look into the background of the conflict. Let us review the ongoing events, as well as the changes that this war may cause. We will start with the closely interconnected internal and external factors behind the October incident.

What's changed?

The external factor that initiated the infamous events coincided with the launch of the new phase of the Abraham Accords concluded in 2020. The reconciliation process launched three years ago by Washington culminated in the signing of an agreement between the UAE, Bahrain, Oman and Morocco and Israel. It was supposed to continue this year with the admission of Saudi Arabia as a new friend of Israel. For this purpose, Riyadh and a number of other Arab capitals in the region have already established contacts with Israel.

Moreover, on September 13, at the G20 summit in India, an agreement was reached on the IMEC project - a new transport corridor from India to Europe. It was planned that cargoes arriving by sea routes from India to the UAE would be further transported through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel all the way to the Mediterranean coast using a new network of railway tracks specifically designed for this purpose. But the project actually left out the traditional countries of the transport corridor - Egypt, Iran, Türkiye, as well as China - a new regional actor. In other words, Washington planned to unite its regional allies, including India, in a new transport project.

On the other hand, the media reported about the alleged US agreement to build a nuclear power plant in Saudi Arabia in exchange for the notorious Arab-Israeli reconciliation. However, the bloody events of October 7 put any prospects in this direction on the back burner, at least in the near future.

The new stage of Arab-Israeli reconciliation was to split the existing political forces in Palestine. Thus, the Fatah Movement and its leader Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, were approved as parties to the process, while other political groups, including Hamas, remained outside it. Meanwhile, Abbas himself was not happy with the American venture, which offered no radical solution to the Palestinian problem. But his ability to manoeuvre in the ongoing events was rather limited.

On September 28, Riyadh recognised the Abbas administration and Palestine as part of the Arab-Israeli peace process, appointing its ambassador in Amman also to Ramallah. On the same day, Israeli Tourism Minister Haim Katz attended a two-day event in Saudi Arabia to mark the UN World Tourism Day.

But just ten days later, a surprise Hamas attack on Israel changed everything, putting the IMEC transport project on hold. At least for the foreseeable future.

What's changing?

Now it is clear that the US remains the main protector and guarantor of the security of Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Washington's military and financial support at the outbreak of hostilities, as well as the deployment of the American navy off the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, showed that the US was the main, or the only power capable of shielding Israel from possible threats. From the very first days of the conflict, the rest of Washington's partners in the region took this fact for granted.

In recent years, the Israeli government has had views significantly different from those of Washington on a number of regional issues, trying to sign large-scale infrastructure agreements with China, and sometimes even putting pressure on the White House. But now it is more dependent on the US. Even the Saudi authorities, who until a few months ago defied and turned their backs on the US, getting closer to Beijing and ignoring Biden's requests to increase oil exports, feel a greater need for Washington after October 7. Thus, Riyadh sent an official request for Patriot air defence systems to prevent Yemeni Houthis from firing rockets at Israel. In other words, the US has become the only state capable of defending the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf in a major war.

Interestingly, at this stage of the confrontation, the US declared Iran its main regional rival. The war in Gaza was not limited to clashes between Israel and Hamas. Hezbollah, a group operating in Lebanon and known for its proximity to Iran, was also involved in organising attacks on the Israeli army. More than 70 of its supporters have so far been killed in those clashes.

Apart from launching rocket attacks against Israel, the Houthis went further by seizing a cargo ship in the Red Sea that they claimed belonged to the Jewish State. The incident demonstrates the existence of serious risks for the US and its allies in the Red Sea. For example, American military bases in the region have been the targets of successive attacks by Islamist armed groups operating in Iraq and Syria. Despite the insignificant damage they incurred, the fact that the US military bases are under threat seriously hampers their operations. As a result, President Biden warned the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei against attacks on the American facilities. Plus, during his recent meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in San Francisco, Biden even asked the latter to mediate between Washington and Tehran to curb the anti-American actions of Iranian proxy groups.

What's going to change?

Apparently, we are going to see significant changes in the region regardless of the outcome of the Israeli-Hamas war. First of all, the political confrontation at the global level has deepened. Now the borders of global confrontation pass through the Middle East. On one side of the front line is Europe, the US and their allies in situ, i.e., Israel and the Gulf states, while the other side is represented by Iran, China, Russia and the countries supporting them. The deliberately demonstrative reference to Iran as an enemy of the US and its allies, as well as a symbolic black mark sent to Tehran through the Chinese leader, can be interpreted as Washington laying out the contours of a new front line in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the change of the government in post-war Israel seems inevitable. Thus, last month, the Israeli Channel 13 reported about the alleged discussions between ministers and deputies of Israel's ruling Likud party regarding the resignation of Benjamin Netanyahu and the appointment of a fellow party member as the new head of the government. Remarkably, the source claims that these discussions are taking place not only within the party, but also with the opposition, which indicates the significance of the matter.

The US media also reported on secret consultations in the White House on the issue of an Israeli government after Netanyahu and specifically his possible successor.

Thus, if before the war the mass protests against the judicial reform approved by the Israeli government were a kind of warning to the Netanyahu cabinet, the current situation shows the failure of the radical policy of the right-wing prime minister, which can only lead to chaos. In this sense, Washington's influence on the new Israeli government after Netanyahu will increase.

In short, Hamas's war with Israel has identified the Middle East as another region of the new Cold War. At the same time, regional competition between the great powers will intensify. The US-China rivalry will become more demonstrative. To preserve its reputation in the Arab Islamic world, Washington will insist more on a plan for a one-time settlement of the Palestinian conflict by taking real steps. The same is not true for the political-ideological divide and polarisation among Muslim countries, which will deepen.