ANKARA THE UNCONQUERABLE

In 2023, we could observe the growth of complications in Türkiye's relations with the West. Thus, Ankara continUSthe fight against the Washington-backed Kurdish terrorist organisations in northern Syria and Iraq. It is also not happy with the EU policy towards Türkiye to block the latter's admission to the union.

The US, Kurds and Turkish strike

Following a car bombing oUSde the Turkish Interior Ministry in early October, Türkiye stepped up its anti-terrorism measures. Two policemen were wounded in the attack. Ankara immediately announced a large-scale anti-terrorist operation inside the country. About 1,000 people were detained in a matter of days. In addition, Ankara stated that all areas in Iraq and Syria controlled by terrorist groUS including the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the People's Self-Defence Units (YPG) under its control, are legitimate military targets of Türkiye.

In October-December 2023, the Turkish army hit dozens of such targets. Terrorists were subject to powerful airstrikes after yet another treacherous attack on Turkish army positions on December 22, resulting in the death of 12 Turkish soldiers.

On December 23-24, Turkish National Defence Minister Yaşar Güler personally led a military operation that destroyed 29 PKK facilities (including shelters and oil storage facilities) in northern Iraq and Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Türkiye would oppose the PKK's presence at its southern borders at all costs. What is notable about this statement is that the "hit squads" were labelled as "imperialist subcontractor".

This is a clear indication of the continued US support for Kurdish terrorist organisations, which sees the PKK and YPG as an important instrument of US policy in the Syrian and Iraqi fronts of the greater Middle East crisis.

Therefore, we can call the escalation of Turkish-American contradictions a new phase of crisis between the two nations since October 2023. Earlier this month, one of the Turkish drones carrying out airstrikes against terrorists in Hasakah, Syria was shot down by a US F-16 fighter jet while flying close to the positions of US troops stationed in the area. Although the Turkish Defence Ministry did not officially confirm the ownership of the downed drone, the world media described the incident as the first one when the US shot down an aircraft of its NATO ally.

In addition to the supply of arms, that is, direct US military assistance to Kurdish groUS both sides are also involved in joint military exercises. One of them took place in the first half of December. Turkish Defence Minister Güler stated that US military exercises with PKK militants were unacceptable.

Enhancing the battle against Kurdish terrorism necessitates the modernisation of Türkiye's F-16 fleet. However, Washington is not only slow to do this but also to approve Ankara's reqUS for the latest models of these American fighter jets. According to Yaşar Güler, Türkiye and the US have concluded technical negotiations on Ankara's modernisation and acqUStion of F-16s. Yet, Washington verbally ties this issue to Türkiye's willingness to endorse Sweden's NATO membership application. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and State Department spokesman Matthew Miller were quite clear on this matter, citing the stance of "some" Congress members who demand Türkiye's approval of Sweden's NATO membership as a prereqUSte for the F-16 supply.

The relationship between Türkiye and the United States, at a truly allied level, is also hampered by US sanctions against Ankara in retaliation for its military-technical cooperation with Russia. Consequently, Türkiye frequently brings up the issue of lifting US restrictive measures. "Allies should fully comprehend Türkiye's global and regional roles and promptly abandon restrictive practices. A robust Türkiye and its formidable army signify a strong NATO and an effective counter-terrorism effort," Güler stated.

Undeniably, the US's willingness to perceive Türkiye as a "strong" ally will be crucial in overcoming the longstanding alienation between Ankara and Washington. This issue also pertains to Türkiye's relations with the European component of the West.

Brussel's mistake

The EU continues to hinder Türkiye's European integration. Türkiye applied for EU membership as far back as 1987, but only received candidate status in 1999. However, the negotiation process on this matter was suspended in June 2018. Since then, Türkiye has repeatedly indicated that it may completely abandon European integration. President Erdogan periodically asserts that Türkiye is "self-sufficient enough" to manage without the EU.

In late November 2023, Brussels proposed to Ankara to resume high-level dialogue within the Association Council framework. However, it also highlighted a range of issues impeding Turkish integration, as well as the EU's own "expectations" in this regard. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell emphasised the need to "maintain calm in the Eastern Mediterranean", cooperation between Türkiye and the EU "to prevent the evasion of European sanctions against Russia", and "creating a favourable climate for the resumption of negotiations on Cyprus".

Earlier, the European Commission (EC) released a report on the EU enlargement process as of 2023, stating, among other things, that Türkiye should "take decisive steps to significantly improve coherence with the EU's common foreign and security policy". Notably, the European Parliament's 2022 report on Türkiye's European integration processes points to "the absence of a major change of course by the Turkish government", given that "Türkiye's EU accession process cannot be resumed under the current circumstances".

The conclusion from such assessments is clear: despite Ankara's "shortcomings" in domestic politics, the key factor in the EU's rejection of Türkiye is its foreign policy. The crux of which is the significant strengthening of Türkiye's role on the global stage over the last couple of decades, its consistent defence of its stance on almost all topical international issues which leaves Brussels no chance to dictate its will to Ankara. Hence, the EU's constant search for various technical and procedural excuses to delay negotiations on Türkiye's accession to the organisation.

This information was confirmed during the EU summit in Brussels on December 14-15. At the summit, European leaders agreed to review the EC report on Türkiye at the next scheduled summit on March 21-22, 2024. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed Ankara's dissatisfaction in a phone call with European Commissioner Oliver Varghei, emphasising that the EU should take a more reasonable and fair stance towards Türkiye. The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement highlighting the concern over postponing the consideration of the report on Türkiye-EU relations prepared by the European Commission and Josep Borrell.

Meanwhile, during the December EU summit, it was decided to commence accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant Georgia candidate status. Additionally, Brussels pledged to revisit the issue of starting accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March. These decisions regarding other countries raised concerns about the EU's sincerity in its approach towards Türkiye. President Erdogan stated that while these countries have been granted opportunities, Türkiye, with its strategic and economic potential, has been hindered by political obstacles. Erdogan emphasised that Türkiye meets the criteria for EU membership even more than some countries already in the EU. He called for the EU to rectify this mistake after years of waiting.

The question of whether the EU will correct this mistake regarding Türkiye remains rhetorical. Even with Hungary assuming the EU presidency in the second half of 2024, it may not necessarily lead to a correction. Türkiye and Hungary share friendly and allied relations, as demonstrated by Erdogan's visit to Budapest. During the visit, a bilateral agreement on priority strategic partnership between Ankara and Budapest was signed. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Turkish President Erdogan expressed their intention to develop allied relations to succeed together in the 21st century.

Orbán emphasized that Türkiye is crucial for Hungary's security, as Ankara helps in transmitting Russian gas that flows to Hungary. Furthermore, according to an agreement between Hungarian energy company MVM and Türkiye's Botaş, Hungary will begin purchasing gas directly from Türkiye in 2024.

Upon returning from Budapest, Erdogan expressed his expectations for progress in negotiations with the EU during Hungary's presidency. He believes that Türkiye's accession to the EU will be discussed in a new context and that new steps will be taken.

However, it remains uncertain whether EU policymakers will tolerate Hungary's actions, as Prime Minister Orbán has strongly defended his country's national interests and has become somewhat isolated within the EU. A definitive answer to this question will only be obtained at the end of 2024.