RETURN OF THE OLIGARCH

Georgia is abuzz with political excitement as Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and prominent figure of the Georgian Dream coalition, announces his re-entry into national politics.

In the waning days of the previous year, at the Georgian Dream coalition's congress, a Russian oligarch of Georgian descent effectively took the reins of the party, assuming the role of its honorary chairman. This strategic move is undoubtedly in anticipation of the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Georgia this year. Furthermore, under the new constitution, the president will now be elected by an Electoral College, half of which comprises parliament members, with the other half being elected separately.

Can we expect a surprising turn of events?

As expected, Ivanishvili's announcement has been widely discussed in the expert community. Is Georgia on the brink of a political shift, possibly even towards Moscow? What political changes will Ivanishvili's return bring? And who stands to benefit from his comeback?

Some might interpret this as a sign of Tbilisi's pivot towards Moscow, with Ivanishvili being a Kremlin ally. Notably, Georgia has recently made significant strides on the European track. The EU has called for stricter adherence to the sanctions regime against Russia from Tbilisi. However, it's important to remember that Georgia is not yet an EU member. Experts suggest that Georgia is unwilling to take unnecessary risks. The West's demand for Georgia to support the sanctions regime goes beyond mere compliance - they seek to establish a sort of second front against Russia. But Tbilisi still remembers how the West let them down during the five-day war in August 2008. At that time, the EU, in Heidi Tagliavini's infamous report, lacked the political will to determine who initiated the conflict.

Therefore, Tbilisi prefers a cautious approach, trying not to provoke Russians whenever possible. Diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tbilisi are non-existent and are unlikely to be restored until Georgia regains sovereignty over Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

The oversimplified narrative of pro-Russian Ivanishvili overthrowing pro-Western Saakashvili doesn't quite align with reality. It's worth noting that despite having Russian oligarch Kakha Bendukidze on Saakashvili's team and Nino Burjanadze as the speaker of parliament, nothing has fundamentally changed. The Georgian Dream has governed Georgia for a decade, and throughout this period, Tbilisi hasn't pivoted towards Moscow as much as expected. Recently, under the dreamers, Georgia achieved the status of an EU membership candidate, which is quite telling. Ivanishvili himself, at his party's congress, set the dreamers' goal as EU accession by 2030, by which time he believes the country will be on par with European nations in terms of economic development.

Kuromaku the Georgian way?

It's worth mentioning that Ivanishvili has previously exited and re-entered politics. This brings to mind Eduard Shevardnadze, former head of the USSR Foreign Ministry, who made a similar return to high-level politics. Meanwhile, several experts, primarily from Georgian opposition, believe that Ivanishvili never truly left Georgian politics. Although he didn't hold any official positions and kept a low profile, he continued to exert his influence over the dreamers behind the scenes.

Political machinations of this sort are not unique to any one country. In one of his books on Japan, Soviet international journalist Vladimir Tsvetov introduces the term kuromaku, which translates to the man behind a black curtain, or the puppeteer in traditional Japanese puppet theatre. In European political parlance, this would be the grey cardinal. According to Tsvetov, kuromaku in Japan were often individuals linked to the local mafia, the yakuza. A similar phenomenon was observed in Italy, where mafia bosses, particularly in the south and in Sicily, wielded significant political influence without holding any official positions.

However, Bidzina Ivanishvili is a different kind of player. While he is an oligarch, he is certainly not a mafia boss. Georgia has seen figures like Jaba Iosseliani, a bona fide criminal authority in major politics. Interestingly, under Saakashvili, who didn't always act with liberal or even legal methods, the criminal underworld in Georgia was effectively dismantled. Moreover, the actions of the members of the Georgian Dream party do not suggest the presence of a shadow leader. The failed impeachment of President Salome Zurabishvili last year serves as a case in point.

Back in 2013, many argued that the Georgian Dream was a rather diverse organisation. Its unity was largely driven by a shared disdain for Saakashvili, but such a factor cannot be everlasting.

In this context, the dreamers do not need a kuromaku or any similar figure. On the eve of critical elections, the Georgian Dream urgently needs a unifying figure, a leader whose authority is universally recognised. Bidzina Ivanishvili fits this role perfectly. If we were to draw parallels, it would not be with Japan or Italy of the seventies, but rather with Azerbaijan of the early nineties.

The Georgian Dream hasn't forgotten its victory in the 2013 elections, when few believed that Saakashvili's hold on power in Georgia could be challenged. And it wasn't about democracy, but about the preferences of voters. Will this success be replicated in 2024?

Political Wunderwaffe or a desperate manoeuvre?

There's a theory that Bidzina Ivanishvili is being positioned by the dreamers as a political Wunderwaffe, a miracle weapon capable of securing victory in the elections. It's no coincidence that Ivanishvili announced his return to Georgian politics just before the elections.

In 2013, Georgian society was growing weary of Mikhail Saakashvili's radical and rather painful reforms. While these reforms are often praised in the post-Soviet space, it became clear in 2013 that Saakashvili's reforms were not universally popular in Georgia itself. The country remained heavily dependent on Russia economically, and Bidzina Ivanishvili and his supporters effectively used the Russian card in the elections. Supporters of the Dream assured that Russia had issues not with Georgia, but with Saakashvili, and if Mishiko were to fall, relations with Moscow would normalise.

Let's set aside the naivety of those who believed that with replacing personalities in Georgia, Russia would immediately withdraw the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Hints that with Ivanishvili's victory, Georgia would resume the export of Georgian wine, mineral water, and agricultural products to Russia, and Russian tourists would return to Georgia, came true.

But now, Ivanishvili and his team lack such a political doping. Amid the ongoing Ukrainian war, sanctions, etc., ties with Russia have lost their former commercial appeal. And circumventing sanctions is a risky business. Especially today, when the status of a candidate seems imminent and the EU demands more principal position in terms of sanctions. According to the Georgian opposition, supporters of Saakashvili, Ivanishvili and his dreamers are apprehensive about their party's potential defeat in the upcoming elections. It's interesting to note that the opposition has been predicting the downfall of the Georgian Dream and the triumph of their own party, the United National Movement, with remarkable consistency, but so far these remain mere predictions and promises.

Azerbaijan's perspective on the Georgian elections

Azerbaijan has a vested interest in the ongoing developments in Georgia. Baku and Tbilisi share a robust strategic partnership, strong relations across various domains, and extensive cooperation. Azerbaijan's strategic export pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway traverse through Georgia.

Ever since the signing of the pipeline agreements, Azerbaijan has forged strong interstate relations with Georgia. These relations have now reached a stage of maturity where they remain unaffected by political upheavals. Azerbaijan has successfully fostered and promoted its partnership with Georgia during the presidencies of Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Saakashvili, as well as during the reign of the Georgian Dream.

Baku has adeptly sidestepped attempts to embroil Azerbaijan in Georgia's internal conflicts, which would inevitably make their relations a casualty of internal politics - a situation Baku is keen to avoid. Responsible Georgian politicians are equally uninterested in creating difficulties in relations with Azerbaijan. They are primarily concerned about customs duties, transit cargo transport, oil and gas prices, rather than internal political disputes, if any exist at all.