BRUSSELS ACCOUNT

The meeting on April 5 in Brussels, involving Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, has been dubbed "scandalous." High expectations were set for this meeting, not only in the "united Europe" capital of Paris, which had a discernible influence on these negotiations, but also in Yerevan. Conversely, Garabagh did not mask its skepticism, to say the least, regarding the unilateral approach of the European Union and the United States. But what transpired in reality?

Azerbaijan's Red Lines

From the outset, Baku articulated its disapproval of the Brussels rendezvous. Both Brussels and Washington were compelled to acknowledge Azerbaijan's stance. On the eve of the meeting, Secretary Blinken reached out to President Ilham Aliyev in an attempt to assure him that the meeting harboured no adversarial intentions. His efforts were unavailing. Furthermore, Blinken broached the subject of "human rights" during their dialogue. In retort, President Aliyev referenced the Assange trial, emphasizing that human rights issues should not serve as a pretext for meddling in the internal matters of sovereign nations.

Subsequently, President von der Leyen engaged with the President of Azerbaijan. She reiterated that the Brussels negotiations were not aimed against Azerbaijan. President Aliyev later summarized the "telephone diplomacy" efforts of the US and the EU during his meeting with Mevlut Cavusoglu, the former Turkish Foreign Minister and current head of the Turkish delegation to the NATO PA: "Despite recent assurances from senior officials of both the US and the EU, who initiated phone calls attempting to persuade us that this meeting was not targeting Azerbaijan, we are aware that it indeed targets Azerbaijan and cooperation in the South Caucasus."

It is noteworthy that Azerbaijan insisted on the cancellation of the meeting, criticizing it as overtly biased and imbalanced. Neither Washington nor Brussels acquiesced to this demand. However, the negotiations were tactfully managed to minimize offence to Baku. No "security pact" was publicly concluded, although Azerbaijani sources claim that such an agreement was anticipated and prepared for in Brussels. The meeting's participants carefully avoided discussing defence and security matters with the press.

Armenia was pledged $65 million from the US for development purposes, and the EU committed to providing an additional €270 million over four years. But was the potential fallout on the Azerbaijani side adequately mitigated? Baku contends that the one-sided meeting in Armenia could be interpreted as a green light to persist with provocative actions, particularly along the provisional border. This is especially concerning given that a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia has yet to be signed, rendering the situation a form of "diplomacy with a scent," so to speak. This is compounded by the heightened revanchist sentiments within Armenia.

The EU and the US were seemingly buoyed by Nikol Pashinyan's display of dissatisfaction with the Russian trajectory. The opportunity to lure away the Kremlin's erstwhile favoured stronghold from the Russian sphere appeared highly alluring to Washington and Brussels. Yet, they seemed to overlook a fundamental axiom: what is gained on one side may be lost on another. Alternatively, they might have assumed they possessed the authority to make decisions on behalf of the entire world.

Old Interests in New Realities

Post-Brussels, the European Union and the United States find themselves in a position where they must "salvage the situation" with respect to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is not a nation that meekly congregates in the "European reception room," awaiting patronising treatment, nor does it adhere to a passive strategy of "do not escalate." Instead, Baku staunchly and transparently advocates for its legitimate interests. Sources close to European structures, even before the onset of the Ukrainian conflict, acknowledged Azerbaijan's unique status among the Eastern Partnership programme's member nations. While the majority of participants in this programme are in need of Europe, that is, European financial support, Azerbaijan's relationship with Europe is reciprocal. Following the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, Europe has found itself in dire need of Azerbaijani energy resources.

The shift towards renewable energy has only amplified Azerbaijan's significance. Recall the initiatives to export "green hydrogen" to Europe. Azerbaijan serves as the gateway to Central Asia. Fostering markets and trade via the Trans-Caspian route offers a viable alternative for the region, reminiscent of the term "Transcaspian" used in Russia in the early twentieth century. The US and Europe have invested in projects and established positions in Azerbaijan over decades. It is improbable that they would now risk these long-standing efforts. Consequently, we can anticipate Western diplomats striving to mend relations and mitigate the fallout from past errors and oversights in Brussels.

The recent visit by a delegation led by Delphine Pronk, Chairperson of the EU Council's Political and Security Committee, accompanied by Permanent Representatives/Ambassadors from several member states, marks a significant but certainly not final instance of such diplomatic outreach. Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, remarked on Network X: "We engaged in a thorough and detailed dialogue with the permanent representatives/ambassadors of the EU countries, members of the EU Political and Security Committee. My gratitude extends to the committee's chairperson, Deputy Political Director Delphine Pronk, for facilitating the meeting." It appears that the time has come to "gather stones" towards Brussels.

This development alone spells troubling news for Yerevan, and it is not an isolated incident.

Yerevan-Brussels: Aspirations and Disillusions

In Armenia, public sentiment has seen noteworthy shifts. Prior to the meeting, there was palpable excitement. The prospect of high-ranking officials from the United States and the European Union engaging with the Armenian Prime Minister was cause for celebration. Previously, Nikol Pashinyan had sought any opportunity to engage with influential figures at summits, aiming to present cursory interactions as substantive meetings. However, did the negotiations in Brussels fulfill Armenia's expectations?

The financial aid pledged was considerably less than Yerevan's projections. Armenia did not receive any formal security assurances. Critics of Pashinyan, predominantly aligned with the pro-Russian faction, have vocally condemned the meeting's outcomes. Former Armenian Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan shared some intriguing data: "...I discovered that Pashinyan purportedly triumphed in Brussels. In 2024, we are set to receive 67.5 million euros from the EU (270 divided by 4), an additional $65 million from the US, and $7 million for the Armenians of Garabagh. In contrast, the financial influx from Russia in 2024 will amount to $14bn (remittances - $5bn, exports - $8bn, and fuel subsidies - $1bn). The Western contribution is a mere 1% of what we receive from Russia."

Russia, meanwhile, makes no effort to conceal its displeasure. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, through spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, have expressed their disapproval of the Brussels meeting. Armenia, considering its extensive economic and military reliance on Russia, would be wise to heed such admonitions.

Is a decisive moment imminent?

To date, the Russian Federation has confined itself to verbal cautions directed at Yerevan. Moscow has yet to exert tangible pressure. Armenia, for its part, has avoided any irreversible actions. No treaties with Moscow have been abrogated. The Russian border guards continue to oversee Armenia's frontiers with Iran and Russia. The combined formations of ground and air defence forces remain intact. Nikol Pashinyan has not ventured to challenge Russia's influence over Armenian economic and infrastructural assets, which include the railway, gas networks, electrical grid, and mobile communications.

Indeed, France has indicated intentions to introduce a group of businessmen to Armenia. However, similar initiatives in the past have failed to attract investors to the small, economically challenged, and geographically constrained Armenia. It is doubtful that future endeavours will fare differently. Regardless of Pashinyan's political naivety or the presence of Soros-affiliated individuals in his administration, they must recognize the imprudence of antagonizing the "Russian bear." The West, despite its grandiose pledges, evidently lacks the resolve to extend substantial support to Armenia or to integrate it fully.

The United States and the European Union have a history of forsaking their allies. The cases of Ukraine and Georgia are particularly telling. Georgian analysts caution the Armenian Prime Minister against over-reliance on Western assurances.

It seems an opportune moment for the Armenian leadership to revisit the premonition of Gevorg Mirzayan, a Russian political analyst of Armenian descent, articulated before the 44-day conflict. He posited that "should Armenia distance itself from Russia, the repercussions for Moscow would be unpleasant and problematic, yet not critical. For Armenia, however, such a move would spell disaster."

Amidst these considerations, the latest official announcements are being interpreted anew. The Armenian prime minister's office is not dismissing the possibility of his attendance at the EAEU summit. Moscow is signalling the likelihood of an impending encounter between Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Such a meeting could potentially redefine the outcomes of the Brussels discussions.