LAST CHANCE DEAL

Peace in the Middle East, often discussed within the region and beyond, increasingly resembles a desert mirage. The closer one approaches, the more elusive it becomes.

The recent attack by Iran on Israel has undeniably altered the regional dynamics. This is acknowledged in both Iran and Israel, as well as internationally. The head of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Bagheri, stated unequivocally: "The situation in the region has changed after Iran's retaliatory and punitive actions against critical Israeli bases," adding that this has had "strategic consequences in the regional and international arenas." Observers, quite justifiably, have suggested that the Iranian actions had more of a public relations component than tangible outcomes. Should Israel have suffered a truly devastating blow, Tel Aviv's response would likely not have been delayed.

Hezbollah is on the front flank

In recent times, pro-Iranian Hezbollah has markedly intensified its incursions into Israel, extending attacks from 10 to 30 kilometres by targeting military bases near the town of Safed on April 22. Israeli sources contend that the group aims to strike both military and civilian targets in cities and towns, triggering air raid sirens and eliciting a substantial response from Tel Aviv. In attacking these targets, Hezbollah demonstrates its capability to fulfil its objectives and drain the resources of the Israeli army.

It is noteworthy that despite Israeli countermeasures actively targeting Hezbollah facilities in Lebanon and Syria, the group remains a formidable threat to Israel. Experts from the Middle East Institute report that the majority of Hezbollah's arsenal is located not in Lebanon, where its central headquarters and leadership reside, but in Syria. Its armoured fleet is said to consist predominantly of older Soviet-era T-54/T-55 and T-72 tanks. Moreover, Hezbollah possesses over 13 types of air defence systems. The group is estimated to have up to 150,000 missiles of varying ranges, including 65,000 capable of reaching up to 200 kilometres and 5,000 exceeding that range. This represents a significant challenge to Israel's security.

To perhaps convey its readiness to counter any threats from Lebanon and Syria, the Israeli army conducted exercises in the country's north. Participants included the largest reserve division, the navy, the air force, as well as police and rescue services.

The Postponed War

A display of strength does not guarantee its use. The United States, at least, continues to advise Israel against hastily initiating a military operation in Rafah. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has expressed that the United States "is convinced that a major military operation in Rafah would pose a danger to civilians."

Prior to the announcement of the operation plans, reports surfaced suggesting that Israel had forwent a large-scale counterstrike on Iran due to pressure from the US and other international allies. Initially, Israeli officials purportedly considered bombing multiple military sites within Iranian territory. However, such an assault on Iran could provoke a perilous counterattack, potentially pushing the entire Middle East to the precipice of a significant regional conflict. Presently, not only local but also global actors are striving to avert this scenario, recognizing the risk of escalating the situation to the brink of a worldwide war.

Meanwhile, Tehran grapples with a conundrum. On one side, refraining from substantial strikes against Israel is proving increasingly challenging, as this approach undermines Tehran's standing among radical factions and could jeopardize its aspirations for regional hegemony. Over the past three decades, Iran has cultivated a network of armed proxies throughout the Middle East, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, including Hamas and the allied Islamic Jihad in Palestine. These groups have long served as Tehran's primary means of exerting regional influence. A lack of decisive action could be perceived by its proxies as a sign of weakness.

Conversely, a conflict with Israel, which enjoys robust backing, could inflict severe military and political repercussions on Iran itself, particularly given the current socio-economic climate, which would likely not garner support from the Iranian populace.

Many Iranians have vociferously criticised the Islamic Republic's long-standing strategy of diverting funds to favoured regional proxies to extend its influence in the Middle East. They attribute this policy as a principal cause of the nation's prevailing economic woes, exacerbated by crippling U.S. sanctions and mismanagement.

Nonetheless, Iran, wary of being ensnared in the conflict between Israel and Hamas, remains obliged to furnish as much support as possible to its proxies to intensify pressure on Israel.

Bluffing and Blackmailing

Iran, facing formidable adversaries, leverages its nuclear program as a potential deterrent, despite the substantial economic toll of Western sanctions. It also serves as a bargaining tool with the US. The US refrains from needlessly provoking Tehran and maintains communication, thereby mitigating direct confrontation to some extent.

In an effort to de-escalate tensions with the United States, Iran has scaled back its stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium. UN reports indicate that Iran has slowed the production of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity.

It is established that uranium enriched beyond 20 percent is considered highly enriched and suitable for weaponisation.

On April 18, General Ahmad Haqtalab, commander of the Nuclear Safety and Security Division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, signalled Tehran's willingness to revise its doctrine should Israel threaten strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Evidently, for Iran, "nuclear blackmail" remains an effective component of its deterrence strategy against adversaries.

Yet, Iran's tactics appear to extend beyond mere blackmail. Employing the rationale that "all means are justifiable in pursuit of its goals," Tehran has reportedly commenced the withdrawal of its military personnel from bases in southern Syria, as per Arab media. It is speculated that they are being supplanted by Hezbollah fighters and pro-Iranian factions from Iraq.

Simultaneously, there is speculation that Tehran is intentionally disseminating information about the redeployment from Syria to flush out "traitors" within its ranks.

On April 25, the Saudi broadcaster Al Arabiya disclosed that Iranian officers convened a clandestine meeting with representatives of allied armed groups in eastern Syria. Reportedly, they proposed financial incentives for information leading to the identification of agents and spies among their ranks. However, the veracity of this claim remains unconfirmed.

No change in Gaza, but hopeful

A pivotal situation has arisen in the southern Gaza Strip, prompting key figures in the Palestinian political process, Fatah and Hamas, to deliberate on Palestine's future. The news of Fatah and Hamas delegations travelling to China for reconciliation talks indicates that the dialogue has progressed from theory to practice. China is regarded by both parties as a favourable mediator. This marks the first visit by a Hamas representative to Beijing since the war's inception.

Concurrently, a consultative assembly addressing the Gaza Strip's situation took place in Riyadh, attended by the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan, an adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, and the Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Discussions centred on settlement methods and the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, alongside truce prospects in the conflict zone. The Persian monarchies are evidently reluctant to have all pivotal decisions about Palestine's future made in China, despite their positive disposition towards it.

Simultaneously, Egyptian efforts to mediate a satisfactory resolution to the conflict between Israel and Hamas have significantly intensified. Various media outlets quickly inferred that Israel's security apparatus and a substantial portion of its political framework are in favour of Cairo's ceasefire proposal. It appears that only the hesitation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is obstructing a swift agreement, potentially achievable "within days."

The deal's distinct feature is that Hamas, in its initial phase, does not seek an outright cessation of hostilities but signals its capacity to release between 20 to 40 hostages. Consequently, Israel proposes an additional day of truce for each subsequent release by Hamas. There is a prevailing concern in Tel Aviv that if the IDF initiates operations in Rafah, the opportunity to free the hostages could be irrevocably lost. Israeli security officials regard this deal as the "last chance" for the hostages' return.