Author: Kanan ROVSHANOGHLU
On May 19, the eighth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi, perished in a helicopter crash while en route back to Iran following the inauguration ceremony of the Khudaferin and Giz Galasi HPPs on the Araz River. The helicopter met its demise in the rugged terrain of the Dizmar forest, situated between the towns of Varzaghan and Julfa in East Azerbaijan Province, Iran.
Rescue teams discovered the remains of the president and his entourage eighteen hours subsequent to the crash. A slew of conspiracy theories that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the crash and in the days that followed were refuted by official sources in Tehran. A dossier compiled by the Iranian Army General Staff shortly after the mishap affirmed that the presidential helicopter was strictly adhering to the prescribed flight path without any deviation. A mere ninety seconds prior to the crash, the presidential aircraft established communication with two other helicopters. Investigators found no evidence of bullet impacts or explosive devices aboard the downed aircraft. Upon impact, the helicopter was engulfed in flames. Its wreckage was retrieved by local search squads around 5 a.m. the following day with the aid of drones. The General Staff's report further highlighted the absence of any anomalous occurrences in the radio exchanges between the air traffic controllers and the helicopter's crew.
The inquiry concluded that there was no basis to suggest a terrorist assault. However, it unveiled other concerns: the deterioration of the presidential aircraft, its subpar technical condition, and the inadequate security protocols for the nation's leader.
Who will be the next president?
In the wake of Ebrahim Raisi's demise, Iran declared the need for extraordinary presidential elections. The nation's constitution mandates that these elections occur within fifty days following the death of the head of state or if, for any reason, he is incapacitated. During this interval, the vice-president assumes governance. Currently, this role is filled by Mohammad Mokhber.
The date for the impending presidential election has been scheduled for 28 June 2024. As per Iranian legislation, the Interim President also participates in the election organising committee, which, besides him, comprises the Speaker of Parliament and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The electoral timetable stipulates that candidate registration commencing on 30 May will span five days. Subsequently, the Constitutional Guardians Council will scrutinise the applicants' credentials and endorse those who qualify. The definitive roster of candidates will be publicised on 11 June, marking the commencement of a 15-day campaigning period.
A multitude of contenders
It is noteworthy that the presidential election is garnering significant attention not only within Iran but also internationally. One contributing factor is the advanced age and frail health of the current supreme leader. Commonly held beliefs posit that the Iranian president is the frontrunner for the role of the paramount leader. While Iranian statutes do not explicitly address this scenario, the present supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, transitioned to his current position in 1989 from the presidency. Nonetheless, under the prevailing political climate, there is scant justification to anticipate such a development, particularly in the absence of legal provisions. Yet, the mere existence of this perspective allows for the interpretation of the forthcoming presidential elections as a potential stepping stone to the apex leadership role, especially given the presence of clerics among the aspirants.
Although the candidate line-up remains unconfirmed, the names of prospective contenders are already circulating in the political discourse. These individuals are, to varying extents, already deemed candidates. The ultimate decision, however, rests with the twelve-member Council of Guardians of the Constitution. As per established protocol, half of the council is appointed by the supreme leader, with the remainder selected by the Supreme Court. This arrangement suggests that the next president will likely emerge from conservative ranks. However, this is merely conjectural, as the election of a unifying figure to foster national cohesion cannot be ruled out.
At present, the Council of Guardians of the Constitution is engrossed in the evaluation of candidate applications. Let us examine some of the names under consideration.
Despite not formally announcing his candidacy, 68-year-old Vice President and Acting President Mohammad Mokhber's actions hint at his presidential ambitions. For instance, during a dialogue with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, he asserted that Iran's diplomatic relations with neighbouring states would persist unchanged. This confident proclamation regarding the nation's future political trajectory by an individual whose tenure is limited to forty days has been interpreted as a presidential bid. Mokhber is renowned for his allegiance and proximity to the supreme leader, paralleling the modesty of the late President Raisi. He has long managed the Imam's Decree Implementation Fund (Setad), a cornerstone of Iran's economic might, and has supervised the allocation of substantial public funds. Mokhber's election, a figure who favours discretion, hinges on the endorsement of Khamenei or the conservative elite.
Another presidential hopeful is Mohammad Baghir Ghalibaf, the incumbent Speaker of Parliament. Born in 1961 in the city of Torkab, adjacent to Mashhad and Turkmenistan, he has served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including a tenure as the organisation's air force commander, and holds the rank of retired general. Since 2000, he has been an active participant in civic and political affairs. His resume includes stints as the head of Iranian police from 2000 to 2005 and as Tehran's mayor from 2005 to 2017. Ghalibaf has presided over the Iranian Majlis (parliament) as its speaker since 2020.
Ghalibaf, a conservative figure, is also recognised for his affiliation with the IRGC. He has previously vied for the presidency on multiple occasions without success. Following Ebrahim Raisi's passing, Ghalibaf's name resurfaced among the list of presidential candidates. Ultimately, the political faction to which Ghalibaf belongs will determine his fate.
It is pertinent to mention that under current Iranian legislation, both Ghalibaf and Mokhber are ineligible for the presidency due to their roles on the Council for Organising Transitional Elections. They may only pursue the presidency upon relinquishing their council positions.
Another potential nominee is Ali Larijani. Hailing from the village of Larijan in the Amol district of northern Mazandaran province, he was born in 1958 in Najaf, Iraq. His father was a distinguished theologian of his era. Larijani received his early religious education and later specialised in Western philosophy at the university level. His military service includes time in the IRGC, where he attained the rank of retired brigadier general. Larijani's governmental experience is extensive, encompassing roles such as foreign minister, speaker of parliament, and security adviser to the supreme leader. His brother, Sadiq Larijani, has led the Supreme Court and currently chairs the Political Expediency Council. Should the nation's religious authorities signal their approval, Ali Larijani could emerge as a primary candidate for the presidency.
Saeed Jalili, the erstwhile Secretary of the Security Council and chief of the Iranian nuclear negotiation team, stands as a prominent figure within the conservative faction. A native of Mashhad, born in 1965, he pursued political science and earned his doctorate with a thesis on the foreign policy of the Prophet Muhammad. His participation in the Iran-Iraq conflict resulted in the loss of a leg. Subsequently, he embarked on an academic career, teaching at university while concurrently serving in the Iranian Foreign Ministry and within the administration of Ali Khamenei. Presently, Jalili holds a position on the Council for Determining Political Viability. His political journey mirrors that of Ghalibaf, having sought the presidency on multiple occasions without success. Following Raisi's demise, Jalili's name has once again surfaced as a potential presidential aspirant.
The invocation of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's name as a candidate is primarily propelled by his advocates. The sentiment towards him in preceding elections suggests that regaining the public's confidence will pose a challenge for the erstwhile leader.
"External" candidates
The candidacy of two clergymen from Qom entered the discourse among the contenders. However, both subsequently retracted their presidential aspirations. It is intriguing to note that they are listed as potential candidates for the role of the ruling jurist (waliye faqih), the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, the state's paramount figure. Their lack of prior public service renders them "outsider" candidates, or more aptly, emissaries of the religious establishment.
The first is Ayatollah Alirza Arafi, born in 1959 within Yazd Province, a distinguished faqih. His appointments include leadership roles at Al-Mustafa International University, the Research Centre for Religious Sciences in Qom, Iran, and the International Centre for Islamic Sciences. Since 2019, he has been a member of the Council of Guardians of the Iranian Constitution, tasked with reviewing Iran's laws and sanctioning election candidates. Additionally, Arafi is part of the Council of Experts (Khubregan), responsible for electing the nation's supreme leader.
The second "third-party" contender is Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri. His birthplace is Qom, where he arrived in 1962. Since 2015, he has been a Council of Experts member and presides over the Institute of Islamic Sciences and Culture. His educational contributions include teaching.
Both individuals have publicly declined candidacy. This gesture can be interpreted in two ways: as representatives of the religious hierarchy, their candidacy hinges on the endorsement of the country's senior leadership. Alternatively, their disavowal may be perceived as a subtle bid for consideration for Iran's highest echelon of leadership.
What's next?
In response to the aircraft tragedy, during an IRGC assembly on the evening of 19 May, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conveyed reassurance to the populace, affirming that there was no reason for alarm or disorder, as the state's operations would persist uninterrupted.
Within the framework of Iran's political system, the president is regarded as the second-most influential figure after the supreme leader, the revolution's vanguard. The supreme leader also delineates the state's political trajectory. Consequently, Ebrahim Raisi's passing will not precipitate alterations in Iran's governance or its international stance.
Nevertheless, the swift emergence of presidential hopefuls post-Raisi's passing and the heightened scrutiny it has attracted underscore the Iranian political elite's vested interest in the nation's forthcoming leadership, particularly the identity of the next supreme leader. The selection of not merely a president but a steward to guide the country through this challenging epoch augments the probability of a member from Iran's conservative religious echelon ascending to this pivotal role.
The robust backing for the current Iranian regime and its capacity for rapid mobilisation were exemplified by the throngs, numbering in the millions, that attended Ebrahim Raisi's funeral in Mashhad. Ali Khamenei explicitly referenced this demonstration of support in his post-funeral address.
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