STRAINED CONSERVATIVE FRONT

On June 28th, Iranians will head to the polls to elect their next president. The preparations and excitement leading up to this fourteenth extraordinary presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been impressive. This election campaign stands out from previous ones due to its swift start and dynamic nature, which can be attributed to several factors.

First and foremost, the newly elected president may be responsible for organizing the election for the position of the country's highest authority, the Leader of the Revolution and Supreme Leader of Iran. The importance of this factor has led to intensified discussions about potential candidates, as the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is advanced in age and faces health concerns. The president will oversee the election and the process of transferring supreme power to the new religious leader.

It is worth noting that the only election for Iran's Supreme Leader took place in 1989, with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei assuming the role. The transitional president plays a significant role in Iranian politics. Interestingly, Ebrahim Raisi, who became president in 2021, was among the potential successors to Khamenei. However, his death has resulted in a rather unconventional presidential race with many surprises, and competition between government factions appears to be escalating.

Filtering of Applicants

The struggle among applicants began even before the registration period, which was from May 30th to June 3rd. According to Iran's constitution and laws, the Interior Ministry and the twelve-member Council of Guardians of the Constitution are responsible for reviewing applications and registering suitable candidates by June 12th. The presidential election will take place on June 28th, following a two-week campaign starting on June 12th. It is known that more than 170 people applied, but only 80 had their documents accepted by the Interior Ministry commission, as their qualifications met the necessary criteria.

Mud-slinging Among Applicants

The "war of kompromat" between potential candidates started in early June, even before the final decision on June 10th. A conflict between two relatively new faces in Iranian politics has attracted attention, indicating the presence of serious forces backing them. This "showdown" is unusual, as it was previously observed only between traditional politicians and former election participants.

At the centre of this conflict are Vahid Haqqaniyan, a powerful and enigmatic figure from the office of the Supreme Leader, and Mehrdad Bazrpash, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development. The strained relationship between these two figures became apparent when a video featuring Haqqaniyan's activities in the Supreme Leader's administration was released, hinting at his proximity to the country's top leadership.

The Tasnim news agency, known for its ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), criticized the use of Ali Khamenei's name in the video. Haqqaniyan responded by accusing political groups of using the media as a tool and hinting at the IRGC's support for Tasnim. He also mentioned messages to the IRGC regarding embezzlement of public funds by media outlets, including from the military budget, indirectly accusing the IRGC as the masterminds behind the reactionary article against him.

However, the story did not end there. A day later, an extensive analysis of the presidential candidates was published in the Vatan-e Emruz newspaper, allegedly owned by Bazrpash, which did not include Haqqaniyan's name among the potential candidates. In response, Khabar Online, a website connected to the reformist wing of the Iranian political establishment, published a lengthy piece criticizing Bazrpash.

The article emphasized Bazrpash's rapid rise through the ranks and his affiliation with the fundamentalist extremist wing. It mentioned that during his years at Sharif University, Bazrpash joined Basij circles and took an active part in the activities of the conservative wing. Thanks to his father's good relations with then-Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he became one of Ahmadinejad's advisers and later served in various positions, including as managing director of Saipa and chairman of the National Youth Organisation.

After serving as an adviser during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second term and as a member of parliament from 2012 to 2016, Bazrpash was appointed chairman of Iran's Court of Accounts from 2020 to 2022. He joined President Raisi's team after the death of his predecessor, Minister of Roads and Urban Development Rustam Ghasemi.

Now, Bazrpash is running for president alongside his former bosses and patrons, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mohammad Ghalibaf, and conservative Saeed Jalili. The mutual accusations in articles suggest that Bazrpash has the support of the IRGC, which wields significant power in the conservative wing. Interestingly, the IRGC prefers to support younger candidates like Bazrpash over its former generals and veterans.

Bazrpash's appeal in the eyes of the IRGC leadership is likely due to the fact that he has not previously participated in elections, has not been involved in serious corruption and political scandals, and is young and easily manipulated by the IRGC.

Incidentally, 62-year-old Vahid Haqqaniyan, now in conflict with Bazrpash, is also from the IRGC. He fought in the Iran-Iraq war, held various positions in the Revolutionary Guards army, and was closely associated with the Supreme Leader. In 2018, Haqqaniyan was included in US sanctions lists, after which he went into the shadows and no longer appeared in public. His decision to participate in the presidential election came as a surprise to Iran.

Another distinctive feature of Haqqaniyan is his friendly relations with Ali Khamenei's son, Mojtaba Khamenei, whose personality has received increasing attention in Western media. Both men previously held high positions in the IRGC, are on good terms with Mojtaba, and have faced criticism in recent years. This suggests that Mojtaba has serious rivals within the IRGC who are undermining his nominees and presenting a united front against his candidacy for the presidency.

The Rest of the Lucky Ones

In addition to Bazrpash and Haqqaniyan, who were predicted by the Iranian media to be endorsed as candidates, other nominees include Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the incumbent speaker of parliament, retired general and mayor of Tehran; Ali Larijani, former speaker of parliament, former foreign minister and IRGC general; Ishaq Jahangiri, former vice president and minister in the administrations of reformist presidents; Saeed Jalili, conservative politician, head of Iran's nuclear negotiating delegation and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council; Alirza Zakani, conservative Tehran Mayor; Abdul Nasser Hemmati, reformist wing representative and former chairman of the Central Bank; Mohammad Shariatmadari, former vice president; Mustafa Pourmohammadi, former interior minister and head of the State Control Service; Ali Nikzad, General Secretary of the Mubariz Society of Militant Clerics, former deputy speaker of parliament; and Masoud Pezeshkian, former deputy speaker of parliament.

It is likely that Haqqaniyan and Bazrpash were penalised for not adhering to the religious leader's call for "moral politics" by engaging in a compromise war. This also indicates that competition within the conservative flank will intensify in the future.

In Conclusion

The Iranian Constitution allows any reliable, pious citizen with good managerial ability and experience who believes in the principles of the Islamic republic and the official religion to run for president. The Council of Guardians of the Constitution, appointed by the Supreme Leader and the judiciary, is responsible for analysing candidates and making the final decision. A candidate must be between 40 and 75 years old and hold a master's degree or religious education. After a thorough selection process, the presidential candidates will face the national vote, with the person receiving the highest number of votes becoming the president of Iran. The role of Iran's military, religious, and political elites in the presidential election is significant, and recent divisions within the conservative wing have been noted. The first pre-election conflict between representatives of these circles indicates tension in the presidential race, particularly among conservatives. In the current situation, Said Jalili may have slightly higher chances of winning.