CONSTITUTIONAL PASSIONS

The longest journey starts with a single step. In the peace process between Baku and Yerevan, that step seems to have already been taken. The 44-day war in 2020 and the anti-terrorist operations of September 19-20, 2023, have removed one of the biggest obstacles to peace: the territorial dispute. Azerbaijan has reclaimed the occupied lands and restored its territorial integrity, thus eliminating the need to address the withdrawal of Armenian troops in negotiations.

In the heated aftermath of the 44-day war, Armenia agreed to withdraw its troops from Agdam, Kalbajar, and parts of the Lachin districts. Following the anti-terrorist raids, the leader of the illegal junta, Samvel Shahramanian, issued a decree for its self-dissolution. During talks in Prague, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a document recognizing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity according to the Alma-Ata Declaration. Recently, Baku and Yerevan also agreed on the return of four villages in the Gazakh region.

However, the peace process has stalled once again, and a quick resolution is not in sight. The issue now centres around changes to the Armenian constitution.

Ilham Aliyev's Constitutional Ultimatum

Azerbaijan's President, Ilham Aliyev, highlighted this problem, stating, "Our position is based on international legal norms. We have never had territorial claims against any country, including Armenia. They were the ones with territorial claims against us, as stated in their declaration of independence and subsequently in their constitution. Their ideology, politics, and public discourse frequently voice territorial claims against Türkiye. Their society, from a young age, is taught to view Azerbaijanis and Turks as enemies, poisoned by nationalists and war criminals. They must address these issues. Concluding a peace treaty with Armenia while their constitution remains unchanged is impossible. This is not interference in their internal affairs; it concerns us. We cannot make peace with a country that has territorial claims against us."

Aliyev also noted the existence of revanchist sentiments in Armenian society, emphasizing the need to abandon such ideas. "These ideas exist not only among the opposition but also within the ruling group. All these issues must be clarified and regulated," he stressed.

To clarify, the preamble to the Armenian Constitution references the declaration of independence adopted on August 23, 1990. This document mentions the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR on December 1, 1989, about Miatsum, or reunification of Armenia with Garabagh. Official Yerevan had no legal right to annex part of Azerbaijan's territory without Baku's consent, neither then nor now. Yet, this norm remains legally binding.

Despite this legal "bomb" in their declaration of independence, Armenia signed the Alma-Ata Declaration on December 21, 1991, agreeing to recognize and respect existing borders. However, the Supreme Council of Armenia added ten reservations, including claims to Azerbaijani Garabagh, suggesting that Garabagh had the right to join the CIS as an "independent state." These reservations held no international legal force. Notably, by early March 1992, both Azerbaijan and Armenia were admitted to the UN within borders that did not reflect Armenia's "reservations" or claims to Garabagh. Since spring 1993, the UN Security Council has adopted four "Garabagh" resolutions.

In Armenia, these provocative norms and formulations still hold legal force, posing a significant danger to the peace treaty's future.

Constitution vs. Peace

Experts, including in Azerbaijan, warn that the peace treaty, even if refined by diplomats, must be submitted to the Armenian Constitutional Court and ratified by the parliament. At this stage, the treaty could be declared "inconsistent with the Armenian constitution."

Experts also recall the 2010 Zurich protocols between Armenia and Türkiye, where Armenia's Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian signed a document pledging to recognize existing regional borders and establish a joint commission of historians with Türkiye. The Armenian Constitutional Court ruled that Armenia could still claim six vilayets of Eastern Anatolia and promote the "Armenian genocide of 1915" thesis despite signing the protocols.

It is conceivable that the Constitutional Court might allow the peace treaty's ratification while asserting that it does not prevent Armenia from demanding "the return and self-determination of Garabagh Armenians and international security guarantees for them."

Pashinyan's signature on the Prague declaration recognizing post-Soviet borders is not a reliable guarantee either. After signing the Alma-Ata Declaration in 1991, Armenia continued to claim Garabagh, turning the conflict into a full-scale war, committing episodes of genocide, and occupying 20% of Azerbaijan's territory. The ten reservations to the Alma-Ata Declaration remain in effect.

Over time, Armenia could have enacted numerous provocative laws, by-laws, and service instructions that also prescribe claims to Azerbaijani territories.

Given this context, Azerbaijan's concerns are understandable. As long as these dangerous formulations remain in the Armenian constitution, any document signed with Yerevan will not constitute a full-fledged peace treaty. Yerevan could nullify it at any time, relying on its constitution. Baku's readiness and determination to press Yerevan on constitutional reforms are unsurprising.

Fears and Hopes in Yerevan

In Armenia, discussions about constitutional reforms seemed to emerge but then quieted down, which is understandable. Diplomats cynically note that in resolving long-standing conflicts, the process initially appears quick and successful. Diplomats and top leaders meet, exchange protocol smiles, promise to work towards lasting peace, and make some grand gestures. But when it comes time to make cardinal and irreversible decisions, the peacemaking enthusiasm often wanes. It was easier for Nikol Pashinyan to lose the war and blame individual commanders, Turkey's aid to Azerbaijan, "Syrian militants," and mythical "Russian betrayal" than to sign a document ending "miatsum." This responsibility lies with him and is an irreversible step.

Pashinyan may fear an explosion of public outrage, especially since constitutional changes require a referendum involving campaigning. Armenia's prime minister has already faced protests after the November 2020 surrender, led by Archbishop Baghrat Galstanyan, and ongoing protests since the transfer of four villages to Azerbaijan. Pashinyan likely wishes to avoid unnecessary public irritation, negotiating as if with a gun to his head – not an Azerbaijani one, but from Yerevan's revanchists.

Although the leaders of the ousted Garabagh clan, former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, play the primary role in the revanchist front, Azerbaijan's president accuses the current Armenian authorities of holding similar ideas. Pashinyan's political history includes an unsuccessful attempt at revenge: the 15,000-strong Armenian Armed Forces group in Garabagh with hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, MLRSs, and artillery was not maintained just in case, nor due to a lack of infrastructure for withdrawal. Yerevan's attempts to purchase offensive weapons, like Caesar howitzers, indicate the existence of revanchist sentiments within Armenia's ruling group.

Political analysts view changes to Armenia's constitution as a litmus test for Yerevan's commitment to peace. If Armenia genuinely seeks peace, it will remove territorial claims from its constitution. Continued persistence suggests Armenia does not want peace, and Pashinyan's team aims to maintain a "legal field" for revenge.

Contrary to Yerevan's hopes, Azerbaijan is not under a tight deadline and will not seek to sign a treaty with Armenia before November 2024 at the cost of unacceptable political concessions. Armenia will need to change its constitution, even if reluctantly.