19 December 2024

Thursday, 12:21

ANTI-WESTERN SCO?

The Astana summit demonstrated that the organisation does not intend to become a bloc of countries resisting external influence.

Author:

15.07.2024

Recently, Kazakhstan chaired the regular meeting of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Astana.

In its more than two decades of history, the SCO has rarely attracted such attention. It has been largely regarded as a forum for discussion. Or alternatively, it may be conceived of as a formal regional structure focused on discussing economic topics, in which Russia and China share spheres of influence. However, this summit has generated a particular level of interest. In addition, the summit brought together leaders who are commonly referred to as geostrategic rivals and even adversaries of the West, namely the leaders of Russia, China, and Iran.

 

Expanding Organisation

The expansion of the SCO has resulted in a change to the organisation's original mandate, as the "SCO family" has grown over the past seven years. The organisation was previously focused on matters of border security and safety, as well as the development of other mechanisms designed to foster trust between Russia, China and post-Soviet Central Asia.

The significant expansion of the organisation with the accession of Pakistan and India (2017), as well as Iran and Belarus (2023, 2024), has also resulted in an expansion of the SCO's agenda. The SCO now encompasses South Asia, the Middle East and parts of Eastern Europe.

Concurrently, the member states view Central Asia as the SCO's core region. This is evident in the organisation's official discourse and can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance its growth in the West Asian direction.

It is also noteworthy that Belarus's full membership has the potential to pave the way for other European countries to become part of the SCO. Minsk was the inaugural member to formally become part of the organisation. The fact that no European countries are currently willing to join this association does not preclude the possibility of such a development in the future. With regard to Belarus, the sanctions imposed on Minsk by the European Union (2022) have resulted in the SCO becoming the sole non-Soviet multilateral structure through which the country can enhance its economic strength and diversify the geography of its political and economic ties.

Conversely, the ascendancy of the SCO demonstrates that neither Moscow nor Beijing will ever be truly isolated on the international stage, despite Western sanctions against Russia and China's increasingly tense relations with Europe and the United States.

           

SCO as a Sphere of Chinese Interests

A common oversight among analysts is the failure to recognise that Beijing's interest in the SCO stems from its perception of the organisation as a pioneering multilateral cooperation platform, one that aligns closely with China's foreign policy priorities. Indeed, the SCO is regarded as a crucial instrument for the realisation of these priorities.

The considerable number of Chinese research centres that have been established with government funding to study the organisation is an indication of the importance of the SCO in China's foreign policy. While Russia played an important role in the organisation's early days, China has subsequently become a significantly more influential member. As China becomes increasingly powerful and ambitious, it is simultaneously strengthening its authority. In contrast, Russia is experiencing a loss of influence, with its position being ceded to China.

The SCO has demonstrated its suitability as a conduit for China's preferred mode of diplomacy, namely the cultivation of bilateral ties. This is exemplified by the multitude of agreements and arrangements that have been reached with Kazakhstan, not only in previous years but also during the recent visit. Furthermore, Beijing's support for Astana's bid to join BRICS, where Beijing is also attempting to assume a leading role, serves to corroborate this assertion.

Nevertheless, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing has a significant impact on the agenda of the SCO. It is not fortuitous that the discussions between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the periphery of the summit meeting have generated such considerable interest.

Particular attention was paid to matters of security. In particular, the establishment of a novel pan-Eurasian security apparatus based on the SCO. Consequently, the Russian leader reaffirmed his recent proposition regarding the establishment of "a new architectural framework for cooperation, indivisible security and development in Eurasia, designed to supersede the obsolete Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models, which bestowed unilateral advantages solely upon individual states."

In the view of Xi Jinping, it is incumbent upon SCO members to reinforce their unity and collectively resist external interference in the context of the tangible challenges posed by intervention and division.

 

Towards a New Security System

Additionally, the Kazakh President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who presided over the summit, also addressed the subject of the prospective new security system. In his words, the "big family" of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation must "strengthen unity, jointly resist external interference and firmly hold the fate of our countries, peace and development of the region in their hands" in the face of the "real challenges of interference and division."

Concurrently, the President of Kazakhstan extended an invitation to the heads of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Qatar, and a representative of the UAE leadership to join the "big family" of the SCO. All of these countries engage in close interactions with the members of the Shanghai Organisation. It was therefore intended that their participation in the meeting would serve to "complete" the SCO agenda and facilitate the integration of representatives of the Economic Cooperation Organisation and the Organisation of Turkic States, which are part of the political space common to the SCO, into the discussion of topics.

It is also noteworthy that the meeting between the Turkish and Russian Presidents, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, which took place on the margins of the summit, was one of the most extensively covered topics by the media of various countries. This is an understandable position to take. It is notable that the Turkish leader was the sole representative of NATO to attend the meeting with the leaders of several countries with which the alliance is currently experiencing diplomatic tensions.

Conversely, the Turkish leader is well-known for his independent political stance and commitment to advancing the interests of his country. Consequently, his negotiations on Russian-Turkish relations, his objective of increasing mutual trade turnover to $100 billion despite Western sanctions and his aspiration to resolve the Ukrainian crisis exclusively through peaceful negotiations served to reinforce Erdogan's reputation as a leader who does not align the interests of his country with those of the military-political bloc in which it participates.

 

Azerbaijani Interest

Of particular interest are the meetings and negotiations held at the forum by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. Of particular interest were the meetings and negotiations held with the heads of Türkiye and Russia, as well as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these meetings were those held with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The outcome of these discussions was the adoption of the "Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the People's Republic of China," which marked a significant qualitative advancement in the bilateral relationship.

In accordance with the text of the declaration, the parties undertook to provide mutual support in matters of fundamental importance, including the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Furthermore, the support in question should be unconditional and not contingent on the parties' relations with other countries.

A distinctive feature of the document is its extensive coverage of economic cooperation. Furthermore, the specific sectors within the framework of which the implementation will occur are specified.

A further item on the agenda of the Azerbaijani President's visit to Astana was a meeting with President Tokayev of Kazakhstan, during which the bilateral interaction between the two countries was to be discussed.

During the discussions with the Russian head of state, the parties engaged in a comprehensive exchange of views on the potential for collaboration in the energy sector. Additionally, the parties engaged in discussions pertaining to industrial collaboration, transportation, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, and the organization of production in Azerbaijan by various Russian automobile companies.

Both countries have expressed interest in pursuing collaborative initiatives in these domains. Russia is afforded the opportunity to manufacture its products in collaboration with Azerbaijan, with the subsequent sale of these products to third-party markets occurring without the concern of sanctions. For Azerbaijan, this represents an opportunity to develop the non-oil sector of its economy.

The meeting of the presidents of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ilham Aliyev, and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, confirmed that strengthening trilateral cooperation will not only contribute to the prosperity of the peoples of the three countries, but will also serve to strengthen regional and global peace and stability. It was resolved that subsequent meetings should be held on an alternating basis in Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Pakistan.

Despite the critical stance adopted by numerous leading countries, particularly in the West, towards the SCO and the desire to portray the organisation as a political counterpoint to the West, the summit demonstrated that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation does not aspire to become a bloc of countries resisting the influence of the United States, NATO or the European Union. It is a more prudent strategy to maintain an open door to cooperation while ensuring the security of one's own interests. In the contemporary era, this approach is both efficacious, advantageous and secure.



RECOMMEND:

78