"A WESTERN DREAM"

Armenia recently hosted joint military exercises with the United States, Eagle Partner 2024, running from July 15 to July 24. The exercises commenced with a solemn ceremony attended by Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikian and US Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Armenia Christine Quinn. In his address, Suren Papikian expressed his high regard for "the contributions of the US Army troops in Europe and Africa, along with the Kansas National Guard, which has partnered with Armenia for over two decades, as well as the servicemen from the RA Armed Forces Peacekeeping Brigade, representatives from the US Embassy, and staff from the Armenian Ministry of Defence who played vital roles in effectively planning these exercises." He emphasized that this collaboration is intended "to enhance interaction among the units involved in international peacekeeping missions within the framework of peacekeeping operations."

Shortly thereafter, US Undersecretary of State for Civil Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya responded to inquiries from Armenian journalists about whether she could confirm reports that a representative from the U.S. Army would be working within the Armenian Ministry of Defence: "I confirm this news. This is a long-awaited development; you can obtain further details from our ambassador and press service. We welcome the deepening of civilian and security cooperation between the U.S. and Armenia. This also signifies a historic transition to a new phase of strategic partnership in Armenian-American relations."

During those days, following the conclusion of the exercises, it was revealed that Armenia would receive military aid from the European Peace Foundation, which includes tents valued at 10 million euros.

"Non-lethal equipment," we assert, considering Armenia's remilitarisation

Baku has already communicated its stance on military assistance to Armenia through its Foreign Ministry. Indeed, the joint exercises held in Armenia with the United States focused on peacekeeping tactics. However, "interaction of units" can extend beyond peacekeeping operations. The U.S. representative in the Armenian Defence Ministry is officially termed "civilian," yet what specific functions will he actually perform? While tents alone do not constitute weapons, Azerbaijan rightly protests that the European Union is providing military aid to Armenia without waiting for a peace treaty or at least for Yerevan to relinquish its territorial claims against Azerbaijan and its intentions for military retribution. This concern is further exacerbated by the well-known principle surrounding military aid: any assistance—even if it involves something as mundane as washing soldiers' uniforms or other "purely non-lethal" support—effectively allows one to allocate resources that could be redirected toward lethal purposes.

In Azerbaijan, experts note another critical point. Military aid rarely constitutes genuine assistance. Ukraine stands as an exception rather than the norm. More often, such support serves merely as a gesture of political backing. The reactions to these gestures can be quite unpredictable, especially in a nation like Armenia, which has been frequently reminded by American-Armenian historian and diplomat Zhirair Libaridian: "We enjoy it this way—we appreciate illusions; we like to believe that a just solution, an ideal solution is a feasible solution. This is our strategy in life—to dream. But dreaming is not a strategy... People confuse their desires with what they are entitled to receive. No one is obliged to offer you anything. You receive what you can claim." In this context, the characteristics of the Armenian political mentality take on a different meaning. Any attention from the United States, France, or the European Union, any gesture of goodwill, and any step categorized as "military aid" is interpreted in Armenia as a green light for vengeful actions and the reoccupation of Azerbaijani territories.

Another concern lies in the fact that Western military assistance currently offers Armenia little hope for success, particularly in contrast to what Yerevan has received from Russia. Let’s be frank: decommissioned Bastion armoured personnel carriers, CAESAR SAU systems, and even tents do not equate to arms "gifts" worth billions of dollars; they are not transport planes that delivered ammunition from Russia to Armenia prior to and during the 44-day war, nor are they the Iskander operational-tactical missile system that was both paraded and used to strike Shusha. Baku understandably reacts to the very fact of military assistance to Armenia, especially since it lacks balanced cooperation with Azerbaijan.

From euphoria to disappointment?

A faction within the Armenian establishment remains captivated by the West. Nevertheless, there are those who rightly highlight that the aid received from Western nations thus far does not adequately resolve its challenges. After two lost military campaigns and $5 billion worth of weapon losses, ageing French armoured personnel carriers and SAU systems will not provide any notable advantage against Baku, which continues to enhance its military capabilities. These additions will not even allow Armenia to reach its military strength level as of September 26, 2020. However, "there is hope" that Western military assistance will expand.

Nonetheless, difficulties persist. Firstly, Armenia's close ally, French President Emmanuel Macron, finds himself in a complicated situation. His party faced defeats in both the European Parliament elections and domestic parliamentary elections. While Macron remains in office, he no longer possesses the same freedom of action as before. Although Paris states that relations with Armenia will remain unchanged, such declarations imply that there is still a significant risk of revision.

Joe Biden, who brought "the most pro-Armenian administration" to the White House and was the first American president to recognize the events of 1915 as "the Armenian genocide," has withdrawn from his presidential race. Even if Kamala Harris emerges victorious in the election, political changes are likely ahead—including on matters concerning Armenia.

The leadership within the European Union is also undergoing transitions. However, Ursula von der Leyen, who angered Yerevan by traveling to Baku and signing a memorandum on gas supply cooperation, has retained her position as President of the European Commission. Yet, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell is departing. Such personnel changes leave those in Yerevan who lean towards Western alignment anxiously scanning news feeds: what lies ahead? Will Western support for Armenia increase or diminish?

Finally, there is an expectation from Western nations for more tangible actions from Yerevan's leadership to distance itself from Russia—a development yet to materialize.

Wherever we are, Russia is with us!

Discussions surrounding Nikol Pashinyan's efforts to extricate Armenia from Russian influence and pivot towards the West began back in spring 2018 when his "kebab revolution" emerged victorious. However, between 2018 and 2022, Pashinyan and his team did not undertake any genuinely anti-Russian measures. On the contrary, during this period, another Russian military base was established in Armenia—in Zangezur; Armenian sappers were sent to join Russian military operations in Syria; negotiations commenced for constructing a Russian base in Berd...

Public discontent towards Moscow began surfacing in Yerevan—specifically at 26 Baghramyan Street—after Russia started delaying shipments of promised ammunition to Armenia. From mid-2021 onward, Moscow prepared for war in Ukraine while restraining weapon supplies. Furthermore, neither Azerbaijan nor Türkiye had any intentions of attacking Armenia—something Russia understood very well.

Amid sanctions against Russia, Armenia feels increasingly uncomfortable as "the Kremlin's outpost" and prefers being regarded as part of the West's team—especially now when it actively assists Russia in circumventing these sanctions while risking falling under them itself.

At the same time, Yerevan shows no inclination towards taking truly radical anti-Russian actions. For instance, Armenia has not officially declared its willingness to withdraw from the CSTO nor questioned its membership in the EAEU—of which it currently holds the chairmanship. Joint land forces and air defense units with Russia remain intact, while the Russian base in Gyumri and its "additional locations," including at Erebuni airport, continue to operate. Additionally, there have been increasing instances where Russian nationals among so-called "relocants" are arrested in Armenia at Russia's request—these individuals include not only deserters or those evading conscription; they also encompass individuals such as teachers wanted for "spreading false information about the Russian army."

One must not overlook Armenia's significant reliance on Russia economically. Russian state corporations and oligarchs own railways, cellular networks, energy and gas systems, as well as leading industries... Armenia imports oil and gas and rough diamonds from Russia at domestic prices, generating billions of dollars in additional revenue for its budget.

All these factors compel us to reassess the dynamics occurring between Moscow and Yerevan differently. It is true that today Russian diplomats such as Zakharova or Galuzin issue stern remarks regarding Armenia; however, the Kremlin has yet to exert significant pressure on Yerevan. This is largely because despite its colourful façade and seemingly pro-Western posture, Armenia has not approached any red lines.

In this context, it comes as no surprise that rumours have surfaced suggesting Nikol Pashinyan may end his flirtation with the West come autumn and once again "fall" into Russia's embrace—because neither he nor the nation known as "Armenia" has anywhere else to turn.