BLOWN ROUND

Experts note another rise in tension along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Following a prolonged period of silence, the Armenian armed forces again shelled the positions of the Azerbaijani army in July—specifically towards Kalbajar—and did so using heavy weaponry. A few days later, in Tovuz, the site of battles four years ago, Armenia launched a reconnaissance helicopter to gather information. The drone was neutralized, prompting the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry to issue a special statement: "Such provocations by Armenia are not new; they form a persistent pattern. The military exercises conducted by the United States in Armenia, the provision of lethal weapons to Armenia by France, and the military aid supplied to Armenia by the European Union under the European Peace Fund amounting to 10 million euros at a preliminary stage encourage such provocations by the occupying Armenia and indicate preparations for yet another war against Azerbaijan." The Azerbaijani military department warned that if these provocative actions continue, appropriate response measures will be taken in self-defense, utilizing all means available in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, "all responsibility for escalating the situation in the region will lie with the military-political leadership of Armenia and its supporters."

Harsh statements and warnings about potential consequences have been made before. However, this time experts are particularly alarmed by the fact that the border tensions coincided with the disruption of yet another round of high-level talks.

Large-scale consequences of the failed meeting

On July 18, a representative summit of the European Political Community convened in Oxfordshire near London. Ironically, the summit was hosted by a country that set the precedent for leaving the EU. Nevertheless, this new format, already tested in Prague and Granada, appears promising: such summits bring together not only leaders of EU member states but also heads of important international organizations and leaders of countries that do not intend to join the EU but actively cooperate with Europe.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had a very full agenda at this forum. He held a total of 12 bilateral and multilateral meetings with European leaders, including NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz—this is not an exhaustive list. Experts believe that Azerbaijan remains an important partner for European countries, particularly in ensuring energy security. Despite all discussions about "energy transition," reducing emissions, and the necessity of moving away from fossil fuels, Europe’s demand for oil and gas supplies from Azerbaijan is set to increase in the near future. It is not surprising that both the rise in Azerbaijani gas exports and potential gas supplies to Ukraine after Russian hydrocarbon transit agreements expire are currently on the agenda.

It should be noted that a meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer was also planned at the summit. However, it was disrupted due to Armenia's refusal to participate. A few days after the London summit, while addressing participants at the Second Global Media Forum in Shusha on Unmasking False Narratives: Combating Disinformation, President Aliyev assessed Pashinyan's "diplomatic manoeuvrer." He recalled that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had organized a similar meeting in Munich four months earlier, adding: "The same proposal came from the British government. It was planned for the British Prime Minister to attend and then leave (leaving the two of us). However, Prime Minister Pashinyan refused. Question: If he doesn't want to talk to me, what sort of peace agreement can we discuss? If he didn't want to engage with the British Prime Minister, then why did he visit London and Oxfordshire?"

Negotiating Trap

Perhaps uncovering details about the negotiations will help clarify the reasons behind the Armenian Prime Minister's stance. Speaking at the Shusha Global Media Forum, Ilham Aliyev noted that 80-90 percent of the text for the peace agreement is already agreed upon. He also highlighted points where Armenia continues to hold firm. According to Ilham Aliyev, "Armenia must relinquish its reservations and all terminology related to the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh, which would pave the way for normalisation." However, two issues remain that need resolution: "Firstly, Armenia must respond positively to our proposal for a joint Armenian and Azerbaijani appeal to the OSCE to dissolve the Minsk Group." He added, "If Armenia wants to maintain the Minsk Group de jure, it will remain intact; however, this implies that Armenia's territorial claims against Azerbaijan still exist. This is a very serious factor—it serves as a litmus test," emphasized the President of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, he reminded everyone about the necessity of amending the Armenian Constitution: "The Armenian Constitution contains references to the Declaration of Independence that clearly pose a territorial threat to Azerbaijan by advocating for unification of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Thus, as long as this clause exists, a peace agreement is impossible." According to him, the Constitution takes precedence over any peace agreement: "We do not want to find ourselves in a situation where one day they change their minds and we have to repeat what we did last September."

Azerbaijan, which has restored its territorial integrity through military-political means, seeks not only to solidify its victory on paper but also ensure its permanence. The entire "legal file," from recognized borders to UN Security Council resolutions, was compiled back in the early nineties. Baku aims to turn a new page in this conflict and sign a peace treaty that does not become a diplomatic time bomb.

By the same logic, Azerbaijan insists on dismantling the OSCE Minsk Group. This group was established as a mechanism for resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, after over 25 years of operation, it has made no progress at all. Today, its existence is unnecessary.

Why does Yerevan cling to it? In the immediate aftermath of the 44-day war—when Russian troops were still stationed on parts of Garabagh—Armenia seriously hoped for a return to pre-war proposals. They were also counting on reviving the Kazan document, which Azerbaijan had rejected at its inception. However, now their attempt to preserve the Minsk Group serves as an indirect yet telling sign: it reveals that Armenia has not abandoned its aspirations for revenge and seeks to keep the conflict active, thereby maintaining mechanisms for political bargaining with external players.

This situation places Nikol Pashinyan in a very ambiguous position.

You can't give in; you can't refuse

Negotiations between Baku and Yerevan have been ongoing for 30 years; however, for a quarter-century Armenia approached them as if it were victorious—believing it had secured a military victory. This perception was further reinforced by mediators persuading official Baku to "accept realities," take into account "the results of bullet voting," and make significant concessions to Armenia. Meanwhile, no pressure was exerted on Yerevan regarding the liberation of Azerbaijani territories. Moreover, Armenia was confident that if Azerbaijan's representatives were too insistent during negotiations, they could easily "repeat their success" by seizing additional territory. Serzh Sargsyan articulated such threats from the Council of Europe platform. And indeed, Nikol Pashinyan initiated "a new war for new territories," but suffered a catastrophic defeat.

As a result, today Armenia must negotiate from an entirely different standpoint. The subject of bargaining over occupied Azerbaijani lands no longer exists. The question regarding Garabagh's status has also vanished for obvious reasons. The most compelling factor is that military advantage firmly lies with Azerbaijan. The representatives from Yerevan are simply not prepared for this new negotiating environment. This is their reality. Nevertheless, Yerevan has not relinquished its revenge plans. In negotiations with Azerbaijan, they consistently attempt to introduce terms that they believe would facilitate this vengeance. Initially, they demanded "international security guarantees" for Armenians in Garabagh; then they sought "security guarantees" for their return. Currently, they are clinging desperately to both the OSCE Minsk Group and references within their constitution regarding Garabagh's annexation.

Theoretically, Yerevan could still hope that mediators and moderators of the peace process—whether from Russia, the United States, or the European Union—might attempt to manoeuvrer and compel Azerbaijan into signing an agreement favourable to Armenia. However, they miscalculated. Nikol Pashinyan had no chance of returning from Oxfordshire with a diplomatic victory; thus he simply opted to avoid meeting altogether.

However, running away from negotiations will not shield him from reality—not just political reality but military reality as well.