ARMENIAN FRAUD REVISITED

The autumn session of the Milli Majlis, the parliament of the new convocation elected in early elections, commenced in Baku on September 23. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev delivered a programmatic speech at the inaugural session. He addressed numerous relevant and urgent issues, including the state of negotiations with Armenia regarding the long-awaited peace treaty.

The President of Azerbaijan's words were swiftly quoted by many news agencies: "From the moment we sent our initial draft to Armenia until today, there have been ten exchanges of comments. After several months, we naturally anticipated that Armenia would be more prompt and expeditious in providing us with its feedback. We had to wait 70 days before receiving their latest version. All unagreed provisions were omitted from their version of the peace treaty. Such a rudimentary and inadequate step was, to be frank, unexpected."

A Bit of History

Peace talks between Baku and Yerevan, initiated by Azerbaijan, commenced after the Second Garabagh War. In 2022, five principles of a peace treaty emerged and were made public:

- Mutual recognition of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international borders, and political independence;

- Mutual confirmation of the absence of territorial claims between States and a legal obligation not to make such claims in the future;

- Refraining from endangering each other's security in inter-State relations, from using threats and force against political independence and territorial integrity, and from other circumstances inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter;

- Delimitation and demarcation of the state border, establishment of diplomatic relations;

- Opening of transport and communications, establishment of other relevant communications, and cooperation in other areas of mutual interest.

Subsequently, a prolonged and confidential correspondence between the Foreign Ministries of Azerbaijan and Armenia began. Theoretically, this was understandable. A peace treaty after 30 years of war is not a document that can be signed hastily. It requires harmonisation and refinement. References to the November 2020 trilateral statement that was prepared and signed in record time do not always apply in this context.

Concurrently, numerous individuals who had previously characterised Nikol Pashinyan as a "dove of peace" proffered a rationale that was both compelling and plausible: the prevailing sentiment in Armenia is markedly "heated", and it is challenging for the Prime Minister to proclaim that "Artsakh" has been irrevocably lost to Armenia. It is often more straightforward to lose a war than to sign a document that formalises its results. This reasoning was also persuasive, particularly in light of the immediate aftermath of Armenia's capitulation in the 44-day war, the storming of the Armenian parliament, and the assault on Ararat Mirzoyan, who was then the vice-speaker.

Nevertheless, there were numerous indications that Yerevan was deliberately prolonging work on a peace treaty, unwilling to definitively conclude the conflict. And not only because it was more challenging for Pashinyan to relinquish his claim to Garabagh on paper than to lose the war.

Who Dreams of A Rematch?

The existence of revanchist sentiments in Armenia has been a matter of public record for some time. In his address to the inaugural session of the newly elected parliament, President Ilham Aliyev directly accused the Armenian government of pursuing such policies. The current campaign to remilitarise Armenia is a clear indication of the official policy pursued by the government of Yerevan. It is evident that both the erstwhile and the contemporary allies and arms sponsors bear a significant portion of the responsibility for this. Nevertheless, the ultimate decisions are still made in Yerevan.

One might engage in a lengthy discourse concerning Armenia's diminished military capabilities, including the loss of weaponry, heavy artillery, and other resources, as a consequence of the 44-day conflict and anti-terrorist operations that transpired in the autumn of 2023. It can be argued that Armenia is currently in a position where it is necessary to replenish its military resources and address deficiencies in its military orders in order to avoid a situation where it is left without an essential instrument of defence, such as an army. However, what are the practical consequences of this situation? It is possible to discern whether a country is preparing for offensive or defensive action through the observation of a number of indicators, as noted by experts, particularly those with experience in military intelligence.

Furthermore, Armenia is striving to ensure the continued functionality of the OSCE Minsk Group. It is important to recall that this structure was established with the objective of resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. If Yerevan is attempting to maintain the operational status of the structure, it suggests that they do not believe the conflict has reached a conclusion. This is also a highly informative and illustrative indicator.

In light of these circumstances, the postponement of the peace treaty signing acquires a distinct significance. Yerevan is not merely attempting to negotiate more favourable peace terms for itself (although, in light of the double defeat, it has become evident that diplomatic manoeuvres will not transform defeat into victory or even a draw). Armenia is employing a range of tactics to impede the signing of the peace treaty, with the objective of maintaining its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh in written form. This strategy has been effectively utilized by Armenia since the early 1990s. It was due to Yerevan's actions that four UN Security Council resolutions on Garabagh remained on paper.

Yerevan's New Move

Following a period of more than two months during which the Armenian Foreign Ministry has been engaged in deliberations, a version of the peace treaty has been sent to Baku which excludes the provisions that could not be agreed upon with Azerbaijan. Armenia is now insisting on the immediate signing of this abbreviated version of the treaty.

It is not simply the case that the country seeking to sign the treaty "as soon as possible" takes 70 days to consider the final package of proposals and then "resolves the issue" by simply removing from the treaty those provisions on which agreement cannot be reached. Indeed, this is a common diplomatic technique whereby controversial language is removed from a document and only that which is acceptable to one party is retained. Nevertheless, this approach is typically employed in the drafting of communiqué statements following meetings or in the formulation of declarations from broad forums. In the context of a peace treaty, it is imperative to achieve an agreement that encompasses all parties, rather than attempting to circumvent controversial formulations. Otherwise, a peace treaty risks becoming a mere collection of good intentions.

Moreover, the question of the Constitution remains unresolved. The Basic Law of Armenia states that: "The Armenian people, basing their actions on the fundamental principles of Armenian statehood and the national goals set forth in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia, honouring the pledge of their freedom-loving ancestors to restore sovereign statehood, committed to its strengthening and development for the sake of freedom, the common good, and civil harmony for posterity, reaffirming their loyalty to universal values, adopt the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia." The text of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia goes on to make the following declaration: "The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR, representing the unified will of the Armenian people, aware of its obligation to the Armenian people in fulfilling their aspirations and restoring historical justice, based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and internationally recognized norms of international law, The implementation of the right of nations to free self-determination is based on the joint resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh of December 1, 1989 'On the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh'… In other words, with such a wording, i.e., "constitutional norm", there is absolutely no sense in signing a peace treaty with Armenia. It is likely that the document will be rejected by the Constitutional Court of Armenia. In light of the Zurich Protocols, it is plausible that the Constitutional Court of Armenia may arrive at a similar conclusion: despite having signed the peace treaty, the Court may assert that the right to demand the return of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and ensure their right to self-determination remains reserved.

Indeed, Yerevan may announce that Azerbaijan, by signing a peace treaty with Armenia, has essentially acknowledged its purported rights to Nagorno-Karabakh.

As observed by experts from Azerbaijan and other countries, Armenia's pursuit of a basic peace treaty represents a conventional strategy for Yerevan. Throughout the 30-year conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has persistently sought to impose agreements on Azerbaijan under various pretexts, thereby limiting Baku's options while retaining Armenia's room for manoeuvre. In other words, it represents a potential opportunity for initiating new territorial claims. Yerevan has previously attempted similar manoeuvres, even prior to the 2018 coup.

Yerevan is actively engaging with both long-standing and newly formed alliances with the objective of exerting pressure on Baku to sign the document in its current, unfinalised form. Nevertheless, this strategy has not yielded the desired outcome. The government of Baku has thus far declined to sign the proposed treaty. Primarily, the strategy initiated by Pashinyan was readily discerned by Azerbaijan. Moreover, the concept was not particularly novel. Secondly, the issues at stake are of such crucial and fundamental importance to Azerbaijan that it is unlikely that they will be set aside or postponed. Baku is seeking a functional peace treaty, not merely rhetorical flourishes on paper. Most crucially, Azerbaijan is unwilling to compromise its fundamental interests in order to gain the approval of external actors. If Yerevan has not considered this, it is a shortcoming on their part.