HOPES DIE LAST

It has been precisely one year since Hamas militants infiltrated Israel, breaching the country's security barrier and thereby inaugurating a new chapter of conflict in the Middle East. The Hamas assault is regarded as the most catastrophic assault ever to be perpetrated against the Jewish state. To date, the following statistics illustrate the grim outcome of the military operation: The conflict resulted in the deaths of 1,200 Israelis and 250 injuries, as well as the deaths of over 42,000 Palestinians and 100,000 injuries in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Meanwhile, hostilities persist. 

On October 1, the Israeli military commenced hostilities against Lebanon, resulting in over two thousand fatalities and thousands more injuries. It is important to note that the conflict with Lebanon commenced as early as October 8th of the previous year, the day following the Hamas attack on Israel. This was marked by artillery strikes on the border region by Hezbollah and the Lebanese branch of Hamas. The events that transpired in September of this year can thus be regarded as constituting its active phase. 

On September 17, communication devices utilized by Hezbollah members in Lebanon were rendered inoperable, followed by the subsequent disruption of wireless communication systems the following day. A total of 37 individuals were killed, with approximately 4,000 sustaining injuries. Subsequently, the Israeli Air Force commenced bombing operations against Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, on September 27. From the perspective of the Israeli government, this operation can be considered a success. The bombs struck a bunker where Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrullah was located, along with several high-ranking commanders of the group and General Abbas Nilfurshan of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. All of the individuals were killed. Subsequently, the Israeli military commenced an offensive against Lebanese territory from the northeast and north. 

Furthermore, the initial skirmishes occurred along the Lebanese-Israeli border, where Hezbollah combatants engaged in armed conflict with the Israeli military. In a statement released by the Israeli government, it was declared that the objective of the "limited" ground operation in Lebanon is to displace Hezbollah from the Litani River and establish a buffer zone along the northern border. However, based on the results of the initial days of fighting and the strong resistance from Hezbollah forces, achieving this goal will be very challenging. 

A New Middle East?

Conflicts in the Middle East—including Israeli army operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and strikes on territories in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—can be described as the implementation of the "New Middle East" plan announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 

As former Hamas chairman Khalid Mashal stated earlier, the October 2023 attack on Israel had the specific objective of "returning Israel to ground zero." In other words, it aimed to derail the US-initiated Arab-Israeli reconciliation process. Otherwise, for instance, the IMEC trade corridor project between India, the Middle East, and Europe would have been launched. There also would have been significant progress in the reconciliation process between Israel and Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. Today, there is no discussion of reconciliation against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Gaza. Saudi Arabia, which has led this process, has already declared the futility of any efforts in this direction until the war concludes. 

Finding itself in such an unfavourable situation, the Israeli Government has undertaken an even riskier course of action, apparently deciding to redraw the existing political and military landscape of the Middle East. This interpretation encompasses Israel's fighting in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, along with another round of tensions with Iran. In other words, Netanyahu's fortunate Hamas attack provided him with an opportunity to realize his long-standing plans. 

The Israeli prime minister's presentation of two maps during his address to the UN General Assembly serves as evidence for this assertion. On one map, a portion of the Middle East—including Egypt, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain—was coloured green with the inscription "the Blessed," indicating these nations' participation in reconciliation efforts with Israel. On the second map, current territories of Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon—where Israel is currently engaged in conflict—were coloured black and labelled "the Cursed." It appears Netanyahu is specifically aiming to win against those deemed "cursed" and prepare Israel's envisioned map of the Middle East.

The list of countries in the Middle East deemed "cursed" by Israel is undeniably led by Iran. This may explain Tel Aviv's attempts last year to draw Iran and its primary armed ally in the region, Hezbollah, into conflict. The bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus and an assassination attempt on Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran served a similar purpose. 

However, Tehran demonstrated considerable restraint to avoid direct confrontation with Israel. Indeed, it responded to the embassy attack and assassination of Haniyeh (and later to the assassinations of Hassan Nasrullah and Ahmad Nilfurshi) with a series of strikes on Israeli territory. Nevertheless, these actions have not yet resulted in a large-scale war. 

The ultimate aim of Netanyahu's government appears to be achieving a new political-military configuration by neutralizing Iran and its supporting forces in the region. 

Significant Risks

Tehran is certainly aware of the Israeli government's plans for a large-scale reshaping of the region, which explains Iranian authorities' calm demeanour following Israeli attacks. They are acutely aware of the risks associated with facing Israel alone in a major conflict—not least due to the numerous regional rivals and adversaries. 

Tehran's primary tactical manoeuvrer over the past year has been to push Tel Aviv—particularly the Netanyahu government—into a protracted war. On one hand, if successful, this would compel increased pressure from the international community on Israel for its actions in Gaza and Lebanon that violate human rights conventions and rules of warfare. On the other hand, ongoing guerrilla warfare would exhaust the Israeli army while inflicting significant losses. Indeed, by the end of last year, the Israeli army had yet to overpower Hamas's guerrilla capabilities to gain full control over the Gaza Strip. 

Furthermore, according to Iranian strategy, Hamas would be joined by Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite groups who would periodically shell Israeli territory to weaken its military strength and infrastructure. 

Iran conducted its second rocket attack on 1 October (the first occurred on 3 April). From Iran, 181 missiles—some being hypersonic Fattah-1 missiles—were launched simultaneously at Israel. Many missiles were intercepted by air defence systems deployed on US ships in Iraq and the Mediterranean Sea; some were halted by Israeli air defence systems as well. However, several did reach Israeli territory. This event is considered a significant warning to Israel. 

Ultimately, it was anticipated that these measures would prompt increased pressure from both the US and European Union on Israel to conclude hostilities. Generally speaking, this has proven accurate. Following setbacks in Gaza and growing international pressure—alongside challenges suggesting a continuation of conflict—the Netanyahu government was compelled to initiate military operations against Hezbollah in the West Bank in August and in Lebanon in September. In other words, much of the burden from this protracted war in Gaza and Lebanon has fallen upon Israel; hence its pursuit of a "final battle with the damned." 

However, Iran's calculated policy and successful armed resistance in Palestine and Lebanon could thwart Netanyahu's plans. Additionally, Kamala Harris's victory in the US presidential election may also enhance pressure on him to terminate hostilities. Ultimately, everything will depend on each side's political manoeuvrers. 

A Vacancy To Fill

It should be noted that even a theoretical removal of Iran from the political landscape of the Middle East does not guarantee long-awaited peace for the region. Without a fundamental resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sustainable peace remains elusive. In historical context, Iran's actions and those of its allied forces only cover a span of forty years—a period during which half has been occupied by active confrontation. The Palestinian issue has long surpassed its century mark; throughout that time—even before Iran's emergence on the global political stage—the region experienced recurring armed conflicts time and again. Thus, future stages of this conflict may well witness new states stepping up to fill Iran's vacated role. Türkiye's activities in this regard are currently drawing attention; official Ankara seeks to emerge amid intensifying pressure on Tehran. 

Interestingly, Türkiye was absent from both green and black maps presented by the Israeli prime minister during his UN address. Yet at a recent opening ceremony for Turkey's parliament session, President Erdogan remarked that "Now they will be laying claim to our native lands between the Tigris and Euphrates. They are openly discussing it while posing before maps." 

Clearly, this statement aimed to engage Turkish public attention regarding their country's new regional policy. Presently, Türkiye positions itself as a primary state in the region claiming authority over territories that Iran may potentially vacate—key among them being Palestine and Lebanon. This suggests that competition for influence in the region will persist for many years ahead."