MOSCOW-YEREVAN-PARIS

The recent CIS summit in Moscow may be remembered in the South Caucasus, at least initially, for the "photo controversies." Armenia was deeply offended by the Kremlin's press office, which published an image of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan standing with his head bowed, akin to a schoolboy, before Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Following that, another photo emerged showing him again with his head down in front of the Azerbaijani flag. Armenia is convinced that this was a deliberate humiliation orchestrated by the Kremlin! 

Another notable image features Pashinyan in shorts and hotel slippers, perched on the windowsill of a Moscow hotel. This particular photo was certainly not released by the Kremlin. Similarly, a video circulated widely on social media depicts Pashinyan exiting the hotel as the staff lines up to bid farewell, shaking hands with everyone—an apparent display of his connection with the people and democracy. 

In all seriousness, many experts view the Moscow meeting of CIS leaders as a pivotal moment in the evolving relationship between Moscow and Yerevan, especially considering that the Armenian Prime Minister arrived in Russia directly from France, where he participated in the Francophonie summit. 

French Hopes and Disappointments

On the surface, the "honeymoon" between Paris and Yerevan appears to be ongoing. However, this perception is deceiving. In reality, there is a brewing disappointment in Armenia. While France is indeed supplying weapons to Armenia, the models in question are not among the most advanced currently in use. Some experts in Yerevan have characterized the French arms as "decommissioned," particularly in the case of the Bastion armoured personnel carriers, which were produced five decades ago and are regarded more as police equipment than military assets. While the CAESAR self-propelled howitzers that Armenia plans to procure are more recent models, their performance has been less than optimal in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. Ukrainian soldiers and officers have described them as unwieldy and temperamental, with even ordinary mud posing a significant challenge for them. 

The Armenian government is acutely aware of the circumstances surrounding the supply of weapons from Russia. Since the onset of the Ukrainian conflict, the supply of arms and military equipment has largely ceased. A comparison of the volume of military aid received from Russia and that from France reveals a significant discrepancy in favour of the former. Furthermore, Armenia has entered into two agreements for military assistance with Russia: one within the CSTO framework and another bilateral agreement. However, Armenia was unable to involve Russia in the second Garabagh war based on these agreements—neither in 2020 nor in 2023—especially since the hostilities occurred in territories recognized as Azerbaijani. 

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Russian military base in Gyumri, established in accordance with the aforementioned agreements, effectively secures the Turkish direction, thereby allowing Yerevan to allocate resources elsewhere. The weapons are supplied at the prevailing domestic Russian prices. It has recently been reported that Armenia has received a significant consignment of Smerch MLRS from Russia. Conversely, it is not only unfeasible to establish any formal agreements with France; such discussions are not even a possibility. Perhaps most discouraging is the apparent lack of political will or resolve on the part of France in supporting its allies. In Africa, the continent on which France once held colonial sway, the influence of the French government is rapidly diminishing. In the Middle East, all attempts to assert an active diplomatic role have faltered. Furthermore, Paris has been effectively sidelined from the "big game" in the Pacific. 

Armenia cannot ignore the harsh lessons learned from the swift withdrawal of the United States and its allies from Afghanistan. Pashinyan and his team likely do not wish to find themselves in a situation akin to that of Ashraf Ghani. There is also no certainty that their new friends in Washington and Paris will protect Yerevan from Russian wrath; Moscow has already begun to express its irritation openly. 

A "Stern Warning" or A "Black Mark"?

In mid-September, Armenia hosted then-French Foreign Minister Stéphane Sejournet, who made several disparaging remarks about Moscow. In response, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova characterized Sejournet's remarks as "unskilled and ill-considered." Furthermore, she stated that it was surprising that those considered allies and friends, including political leaders, officials, and public figures in Armenia, did not react to this situation. 

Pashinyan has taken notable actions that have caused irritation to both Moscow and Smolensk Square. Nevertheless, until recently, the Russian government had refrained from offering direct criticism of the Armenian leadership. While harsh appraisals have been predominantly conveyed through media outlets and Telegram messages, officials have asserted that bilateral relations remain stable and that existing concerns are being addressed. In light of these developments, the statement issued by Zakharova represents a notable shift in Moscow's stance. It appears that the Russian government has reached the conclusion that the Armenian Prime Minister has overplayed his hand. 

Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), made even more severe remarks regarding Yerevan's "flirtation" with Western nations. He addressed issues such as the European Union's observation mission and Western efforts to establish their own mediation, which would be independent of Russian involvement. The Armenian government did not offer a response to Bortnikov's remarks. However, it seems probable that they were observed and taken note of. At a minimum, the Russian government has issued a "stern warning," while at a maximum, it could result in a "black mark" being placed on the official's record. The current Prime Minister's foreign policy manoeuvrers have exasperated the Russian government. Concurrently, Russia has a plethora of avenues through which it can "correct" the situation in Armenia. Should it opt to do so, Pashinyan and his administration could find themselves in a tenuous position. 

Armenian Authorities Shifting Gears?

Prior to Bortnikov's noteworthy remarks and Pashinyan's presence at the summit, there were discernible indications that Yerevan was trying to mend its relations with Moscow. It is worth noting that Armenia's recently appointed Ambassador to Russia, Gurgen Arsenyan, held a meeting with Grigory Karasin, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs. During the course of the meeting, he articulated the following: "I have come to facilitate constructive engagement during this period of turbulence, with the objective of establishing Armenian-Russian relations that will prove mutually beneficial." 

While there is nothing particularly noteworthy about meeting with a committee head or expressing a desire to improve relations with Russia—such actions could even be seen as basic diplomatic courtesy—Karasin is a significant figure in this context. Prior to his appointment to the Federation Council, he served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and was reportedly responsible for overseeing South Caucasus affairs within the Foreign Ministry. It would appear that he continues to occupy a pivotal position within the Russian foreign policy apparatus with regard to the Caucasus region. It was he who previously announced the intention to open a consulate in Khankendi. 

In a noteworthy development, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan made an intriguing statement at the Warsaw Security Forum almost simultaneously with Arsenyan's meeting with Karasin. He made the following observation: "There is a growing chorus of voices in Armenia calling for the country's membership in the European Union. They have aspirations aligned with the European Union, yet express concern about how the EU will respond to these ambitions." 

It seems unlikely that Mirzoyan is unaware that the initial step in obtaining assurances from the European Union regarding prospective membership is to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This sentiment seems to be an attempt to prepare public opinion for a shift away from the West towards Russia. Despite our best efforts to engage with the European Union, we have not yet been able to secure a positive response.

The EAEU Intergovernmental Council convened in Yerevan with a Russian delegation led by Mikhail Mishustin, who has close ethnic ties to Armenia. If Yerevan seeks to enhance its relationship with Moscow, it would be logical for them to engage in discussions with him on matters of a sensitive nature, particularly those pertaining to economic issues. 

Furthermore, the CIS summit is imminent. In contrast to previous instances where Yerevan declined to participate or reduced its representation, this time it was fully engaged. Pashinyan even extended birthday greetings to Vladimir Putin before the summit commenced. 

While Armenian officials continue to make statements in favour of the West, their enthusiasm appears to be less pronounced than it was in the past. Notwithstanding, the Armenian government is hosting delegations from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the visits to which were scheduled prior to the issuance of warnings by Zakharova and Bortnikov. 

Armenia remains heavily reliant on Russia for a range of resources, including oil and gas supplies at domestic prices and Russian control over critical infrastructure. Given this economic dependence, it is imperative for Armenia to consider the implications of its economic relationships. 

In theory, one might expect that Armenia would be expected to pursue a systematic disentanglement of its economy and infrastructure from Russian influence, with the support of newly-forged Western alliances, with the objective of achieving stability before pursuing more profound Western alliances. Nevertheless, this scenario seems unlikely. Nikol Pashinyan may not entirely abandon his overtures toward the West, but he seems poised to take steps toward easing tensions with Russia. 

The pivotal question remains: to what extent will he be compelled to take action to relieve those tensions?