TRUCE WITH HOPE

There is finally some encouraging news coming from the Middle East. Israel and Lebanon have reached an agreement on a truce. The document is extensive and comprises 13 points. Generally, as with any truce, the agreements stipulate that Hezbollah will not shell northern Israel from Lebanese territory, while Israel will withdraw its troops from that area in approximately a month. 

Every conflict eventually concludes with negotiations, and the long-standing confrontation in southern Lebanon is entering a new phase. However, how the current agreements will unfold in the future remains uncertain. 

Post-War Negotiations

The agreement reached encompasses a wide range of issues. Specifically, Hezbollah and other armed groups in Lebanon have committed to refraining from any offensive actions against Israel. In exchange, Tel Aviv promises not to conduct offensive military operations against targets in Lebanon. 

In southern Lebanon, the right to bear arms and use force is reserved solely for the country's official security services. All unauthorized military infrastructure, including weapons workshops and equipped military positions, must be dismantled, and weapons are to be confiscated. A joint committee acceptable to both sides will be established to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the agreement's terms. Israel and Lebanon will report any alleged violations of the agreement to this committee and UN peacekeeping forces. 

According to the plans, Lebanon will deploy its troops and security forces in the south, while Israel will withdraw its forces from the area. Additionally, the US will facilitate indirect talks between Israel and Lebanon to define a recognized land border. Most experts believe that if the agreement is implemented successfully, Israel can celebrate a diplomatic victory, as Benjamin Netanyahu would have secured the country's northern border after all. 

From its founding, Israel has been tasked with securing its territory. Palestinian and pro-Palestinian circles often overlook this fact; it was the Arab side that did not recognize the proposed partition of Palestine back in 1946. Subsequently, Arab nations intermittently attempted to wage war against Israel under the slogan "Let's throw the Zionists into the sea." However, these wars consistently ended in defeat and territorial losses for them. In contrast, Tel Aviv has consistently focused on securing its borders. Egypt and Jordan were among the first countries to reach agreements with Israel, which has also actively pursued diplomatic relations with geographically proximate but non-contiguous nations. 

Lebanon and Syria were among those with which agreements remained elusive. The new truce brings hope that progress can be made on this front. 

Army VS Secret Service

The signing of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon under these conditions is noteworthy because the actions of the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF) have faced substantial criticism since the conflict's outset, both domestically and internationally. This criticism has not resulted from alleged harsh behaviour or violations of international humanitarian law but rather from perceived ineffectiveness: the public expected a "victory march" or a spectacular "blitzkrieg," which did not occur. 

It is essential to note that there is a deep-seated reverence toward ordinary soldiers and officers. Conversely, it has become somewhat socially acceptable to critique higher military command. Interestingly, many Israelis are surprised to learn that military operations carried out by figures such as Ariel Sharon are now studied in leading military academies worldwide. 

Throughout the conflict, Israeli security services have once again demonstrated their capabilities. They successfully executed Operation Pager, during which Hezbollah's then-spiritual leader, Sheikh Nasrallah—known as the "Mojahedin of the Armenian Quarter"—had heard rumours that Israel possessed the technical ability to hack into smartphones remotely and read messages. Consequently, he ordered his fighters to switch to pagers, which were popular in the 1990s but had largely fallen out of use with the rise of cell phones. When Hezbollah sought to procure several thousand pagers for its members, they were "framed" by a supplier who sold devices embedded with explosives. Activating these explosives was a technical matter; the primary goal was not merely to kill pager owners but rather to sever internal communications among Hezbollah members. 

As a result, Israeli forces began targeting high-ranking members of Hezbollah. The general public scarcely had time to remember those who succeeded Sheikh Nasrallah after he was killed in an airstrike on Hezbollah's headquarters in Beirut. 

Decisions are made by people

Theoretically, the "pyramid principle" should apply here. According to this principle, it is futile to eliminate the top tier of a sufficiently large organization because it will quickly regenerate from lower ranks. At first glance, Hezbollah appeared to comply fully with this principle by nominating new leaders from within its ranks. However, as Israel continued its targeted operations against these leaders, unease seemed to grow within Hezbollah’s ranks. Despite claims of willingness to sacrifice for a holy war, fewer individuals were willing to take on dangerous leadership positions than might have been expected. This reluctance may explain their preference for agreeing to a truce on terms that were far from favourable for themselves. 

Hezbollah's leadership could not ignore that Israel had significantly damaged their infrastructure during the conflict. A warehouse of anti-ship missiles located in a Beirut suburb was targeted; strikes were conducted on command centres and weapons depots, culminating in Israel's destruction of Hezbollah's financial centre. Under such conditions, continuing to fight became increasingly risky for them. 

Perhaps this capitulation somewhat resembles Iraq's defeat in the 1991 war, known as Desert Storm. The public anticipated spectacular tank battles and ground warfare in Baghdad and other cities; however, American tactics proved quite different as they relied heavily on airstrikes—resulting in Iraq's surrender without waiting for the war it had long prepared for. 

The events of April 2016 in Garabagh followed a similar scenario when Azerbaijan employed Israeli-made kamikaze drones for the first time in combat situations. Armenian strategists also lamented: if their infantry had engaged directly, they would have demonstrated their capabilities! 

Now a similar scenario appears to be unfolding in Lebanon, where Hezbollah has signed a peace agreement with Israel without waiting for major land combat or street battles. Theoretically, this does not yet equate to defeat or capitulation; however, Israelis have every reason to view the agreement as an asset. The pressing question remains how precisely it will be implemented.

Proxy War

Even at first glance, numerous pitfalls exist within this agreement. Lebanon's security forces are notably weak and may struggle to manage Hezbollah if it attempts to undermine the terms of the accord. It remains unclear what form the supervisory committee—trusted by both sides—will take. 

Another important consideration is that Hezbollah is not merely a Lebanese Shiite group radicalized against Israel; it functions as one of Iran's proxy armies. How diligently this agreement will be observed depends significantly on Tehran as well as on Israel or Lebanese authorities. 

Iran has its own calculations regarding this situation. On one hand, they continue making harsh accusations against what they term the "Zionist regime." Meanwhile, Israel has consistently targeted Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon in response to missile strikes launched by Iran against Israeli territories—though penetrating Israeli air defences remains a complex challenge for Iran. Notably, neither Israel nor Iran has sought to escalate these exchanges into a major conflict; neither side desires an all-out war at this juncture. Furthermore, Iran has recently inaugurated a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, with hopes pinned on possible normalization of Iran's external relations.

There is no consensus within Iranian leadership regarding strategy toward Israel. Maintaining a status quo characterized by "neither peace nor war" cannot persist indefinitely; this situation was manageable when conflicts were largely rhetorical rather than kinetic.

As long as pragmatists hold influential positions within Tehran's power structure, it can be expected that escalation along the Lebanese-Israeli border will be avoided. However, should conservatives gain prominence—in a scenario that could unfold even before upcoming elections—they might exploit their proxies to disrupt this agreement as part of a political manoeuvrer against Iranian pragmatists.

In such a case, Hezbollah’s defeat would become almost inevitable.