FREEDOM OF ACTION

-Azerbaijan appears to be far more independent from Russia than many other former Soviet countries. Is the West ready to do something to maintain its positions in Azerbaijan in order not to lose them to Russia or any other regional force?

- None of us can of course be entirely independent, since we all have to interact with other countries and other groupings, but Azerbaijan's links with both the West and Russia seem to me to be respectably strong, and founded on objective realities. That is not so easily said of other countries in the Caucasus. Nor are the prospects for those parts of the Russian Federation in the Northern Caucasus reassuringly clear. So Azerbaijan has a freedom of action that ought to serve it well. I do not see why that country would wish to sacrifice it, or should be regarded as potentially ready to weaken its relationship with countries to its West for the sake of becoming more dependent on Russia or anyone else. But of course we live in a dangerous world, and it is up to other members of the Eastern Partnership also to work with Azerbaijan in developing their mutual relationships with the republic.

- How vulnerable are the other member states of the Eastern Partnership to such foreign influence?

- You did not ask about Ukraine and its possible Association Agreement with the EU, but the evident pressure from Moscow being put upon the Yanukovich government to reject it in favour of the Russian dominated Customs Union is clearly central to the future of the Eastern Partnership. Threatening remarks have also been addressed to Moldova, and to an existing member of the Customs Union - Belarus. It is not clear to me what Kazakhstan thinks of this, but it would be logical for Astana too to be cautious as to its implications. The EU, for its part, has no reason to accept the implied idea that who signs up to what grouping is a matter for confrontation, which is what Moscow seems to me to be suggesting. Indeed the EU is on record with Russia in wishing to pursue a free trade arrangement with that country as well, and has no interest in dividing our continent. Kiev's choice at Vilnius this November will be of critical importance, as will be the EU's determination to insist on Ukraine respecting the norms of political order inherent in making Association a realistic prospect.

- Does this mean that Russian actions before the summit will significantly weaken the European efforts of the member states in Vilnius?

- Russian actions have, you rightly suggest, made the integration of post -Soviet republics with the West more difficult than might otherwise have been the case. But I do not think that such Russian actions have been made more persuasive or even effective because of weak EU policies in the post-Soviet space. The EU's ability to articulate and advance a consistent policy is indeed made the less because of the complications of EU decision-making, but you could well argue too that pressure from Moscow on its neighbours has increased their desire to defend their own policies and hopes, and not to have them tied too closely to the perhaps changing ideas and values of another country, however powerful. This is, after all, a lengthy process of evolution, and forcing things into that mould will not help any of us in the end.

- Events showed that Russian tactics before the summit in Vilnius turned out to be the most effective with regard to Armenia, which agreed to join the Customs Union…

- Yerevan is more constrained in its options than Azerbaijan, and the failure so far to find a resolution of the Nagornyy Karabakh issue is at the root of that. I regret it.