TURKISH MOTIFS

The political struggle in Turkey is heating up in the run-up to the election of the 12th President scheduled for 10 August. This election is going to be a significant event in the context of Ankara's increased role in international politics.

For the first time, the election of the President of Turkey will be carried out on a nationwide basis, as previously the head of state was elected by the parliament. In addition, the new president will hold office for five years instead of seven, as was the case earlier. The term of office of incumbent President Abdullah Gul ends on 28 August. It is not yet known whether Gul will run for the presidency again. The opposition including its leading forces - the Republican People's Party and the Nationalist Movement Party  - is likely to nominate several candidates. But it seems that the main candidate for the position of the head of state will be Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current Prime Minister of Turkey and leader of the Justice and Development Party ([Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) AKP). That he has a considerably high chance of becoming the president was corroborated by the outcome of the municipal elections held at the end of March, in which the ruling party won 45.5 per cent of votes. The elections to the municipal authorities showed that despite all the recent political scandals, protests and riots in a number of Turkish cities, the AKP and its leader remain the most popular political force in the country.

Having satisfied himself that he enjoys a sufficiently high degree of popular support, Erdogan shows willingness to continue the fight with his opponents which increasingly use social networks as a weapon of struggle. Blaming Twitter, YouTube and Facebook for undermining stability in Turkey, the Prime Minister said that the first of these social networks evades taxes and promised to "deal with the matter."

The dismissal of 150 officials from various government agencies in connection with illegal wiretapping is another action carried out by the government. In fact, this decision was made in response to information promulgated by Turkish media that the prosecution agencies were listening to telephone conversations of about 7,000 people representing the Turkish political class, including members of Erdogan's family.

The Turkish Prime Minister is confident that behind wiretapping and destabilisation of the situation in the country in general is the Hizmet movement led by US-based Islamic preacher Fethullah Gulen. Meanwhile, Erdogan has made it clear that he believes that Gulen was instigated by the United States. The official Ankara demands from Washington the immediate extradition of the preacher. The Americans, however, are in no hurry to meet this demand. US Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone said that his country would only agree to extradite Gulen if Ankara proves his guilt.

The differences between Turkey and the United States on the "issue of Gulen" are only part of the many growing contradictions between Turkey and the West. Domestic policy of Erdogan's government was subjected to harsh criticism at a recent meeting of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee in Brussels. Referring to such measures of the Turkish cabinet as broadening of powers of the Ministry of Justice at the expense of weakening the influence of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, "purge of the police and judicial system of the country," and restricting access to the Internet, EU officials again "doubted Turkey's commitment to European values and standards."

However, the fundamental reasons for the "doubts" of Brussels are obvious - the West is dissatisfied with Ankara's growing role in the world and regional politics. In the West, not everyone is happy with the fact that, as a result of successful economic reforms carried out by the AKP, Turkey has found itself among the world leaders in terms of its economy growth rate.

An article of Yigit Bulut, Adviser to Prime Minister Erdogan, recently published in the Turkish daily newspaper Star, is noteworthy in this respect. Bulut predicts that Europe will lose its role in the new world balance while Turkey will minimise its strategic relations with the EU which uses Ankara to its own interests. It is appropriate to note here that in September last year, this same adviser recommended that the Government of Turkey should abandon attempts to gain membership in the EU and give priority to the eastern vector of foreign policy.

This kind of judgment only reinforces assumptions about the possibility of fast changes in Turkish foreign policy priorities as Ankara increasingly positions itself as a self-sufficient force in the entire Eurasian space. Tendencies towards eventual transition of Turkish foreign policy to a different quality are quite obvious, though not yet conclusive.

Erdogan is aware of the prospects opening up before him and increasingly often levels criticism at the US and Western centres. In particular, he openly alludes to the "fifth column" in Turkey that disquiets the life of the state. As shown by the results of the municipal elections and various opinion polls, the majority of the Turkish population is generally sympathetic with anti-Western sentiments of the JDP government. That Euroscepticism of the Turks has been greatly enhanced by policies of the EU proper, which effectively closed its doors to Turkey, is another issue.

Erdogan's signals towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the pro-Russian Customs Union should be considered in the context of a possible change in Ankara's foreign policy priorities too. It is not by chance that Russian President Vladimir Putin was among the first to congratulate the Turkish Prime Minister with another electoral success. The prospects for strategic rapprochement are beginning to emerge before Moscow and Ankara, both of which are equally rejected by the West as full-fledged players in the international arena. Apparently, they have not been undermined even by the recent events in Ukraine and Crimea.

Interestingly, Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Mevlut Cavusoglu accused Brussels of "unleashing a civil war in Ukraine." At the PACE session, the AKP members represented in the Assembly voted against the resolution which deprived the Russian delegation of its voting rights in this organisation and its representation in all of its governing bodies. However, this does not negate the fact that Turkey's official position on the events in Crimea coincides with that of the EU.

According to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, his country supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and does not recognise the results of the referendum in Crimea. But the fact remains - Ankara essentially has taken no real anti-Russian steps in the circumstances of development of the most acute crisis in Ukraine. It may be recalled that Turkey demonstrated similar behaviour towards Russia - that of general loyalty - during the August war in Georgia five years ago. Such an approach adopted by Ankara, of course, does not link up with the interests and policies of the West at the Eurasian crossroads.

In particular, the hopes of the western centres and new Ukrainian authorities that Turkey will close the straits to Russia's Black Sea Fleet after the transition of Crimea under Russian control have completely failed. According to the Ukrainian press, two large amphibious ships of the Russian Navy - Saratov and Yamal - recently passed through the straits into the Mediterranean. The Kiev Times newspaper made an unequivocal conclusion that "the deterioration of the situation in eastern Ukraine has not aroused increased interest on the part of the authorities and the military command of Turkey."

As suggested by well-known US analyst Jim Willie, the year of 2014 is going to be crucial for the United States and the entire West because now it is the time when the Eurasian axis Russia-China-India begins to form, which could potentially be joined by Turkey too. In this regard, Erdogan's attempts to get closer with the military, which have just recently been accused of anti-government conspiracies, are of particular interest. Of late, the judicial authorities in Turkey set free a number of the defendants in the sensational case on Ergenekon which, according to the world's media, advocated Ankara's departure from pro-American policy. It is possible that under conditions of domestic political struggle, the AKP government considers disgraced generals as potential allies, both to consolidate its position in Turkey's political arena and to ensure greater stability of the new, much more independent foreign policy, which is inevitable for the country aiming at strengthening its role as a great power at least within the space of the adjacent regions.