SPECIAL STATUS

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said that he would bring to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law that grants Donetsk and Luhansk regions the right for "special status" within Ukraine. The reaction in Ukraine to this decision was mixed. There were those who believe that granting special status is effectively a capitulation, and those who see in this decision the possibility to end the war while saving the face. We asked Viktor SOKOLOV, vice president of the independent research Gorshenin Institute (Ukraine), about what the special status of a region can provide in a unitary country.

- What "special status on some territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions" is Kiev ready to grant to the separatist enclaves?

- The legal status of the agreement on ceasefire the sides to the conflict signed in Minsk on 5 September to grant the rebel regions a special status causes major doubts. An official representative of Ukraine signed the document on one side, but it is not clear whom the people who signed the document as the other side represented. First, the protocol has no abbreviations of DNR and LNR. Second, the composition of negotiators from Donetsk and Luhansk changed frequently. Another important aspect is that this document contains many wishes expressed by Russia and personally by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. One of such wishes was the federalisation of Ukraine. Decentralisation of Ukraine has been a long-term topic and this envisaged granting regions greater economic freedoms. Federalisation of Ukraine in the Russian interpretation means separation of a number of regions from Ukraine and subsequently Kiev and independent regions will negotiate new relations. The provision on decentralisation that is currently being implemented by the Ukrainian government is a formula for a compromise between Russia and Ukraine. It is not clear yet how this will be implemented legislatively. Not all Ukrainian political forces so far support the proposal of the government to pass this law. Its discussion will be very problematic. This can lead to logical questions of why some regions can receive a special status, but not others. Who is to be granted this special status? The entire regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, or only the occupied zone? Who is given special rights? Who will represent these regions? There are separatist units that are hostile to each other, there are field commanders, Russian citizens and so on.

It is important to note that as opposed to the situation with the Crimea, Russia is not interested in annexing Donetsk and Luhansk. Moscow wants these regions to remain within Ukraine. This is because Russia cannot afford to restore economically the Ukrainian regions ruined by way. By placing the social and economic burden of Donbass on Ukraine Moscow also wants some part of Ukraine to possess a veto on decisions made in Kiev. Russia wants the south-eastern Ukrainian regions to have an autonomous status and not be recognized as occupied. In this event it will be possible to block such decisions of Kiev as entering the EU or NATO. In other words, Russian-controlled territories within Ukraine. Another very important factor is that having received autonomy Donetsk and Luhansk regions will turn into a very convenient foothold for advancing separatism in the adjacent Ukrainian regions that are of much greater interest to Moscow. These are primarily Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya, Mykolayiv and Kherson regions. We are aware that work is actively under way there to spread separatism and separatist movements are supported. The Ukrainian government seeks to somehow oppose this. Regrettably, the content of the Minsk protocol was for a long time hidden from the public and the contradictions within it can lead to the creation in eastern Ukraine of a problem similar to Nagornyy Karabakh or Dniester Region. This will probably become a frozen conflict for many years, but the concluded ceasefire is very fragile.

- To all appearances, in the "special status" Kiev offers the separatists vertical relations?

- A clear mechanism of how these regions will be governed has not been prepared yet. It is likely that the Ukrainian authorities will seek to build vertical relations. This can lead to the situation where Kiev will channel funds for restoring the regions, but the regions will give nothing to the budget. I believe that the process of coordination will be extremely painful.

- Who will take the responsibility for granting the regions the "special status": president, parliament or will a national referendum be held?

- The issue of territorial makeup of Ukraine is outside the remit of the Verkhovna Rada. Nor will there be a national referendum because this will incite a negative response to the Poroshenko administration. Pseudo-referendums were held in conflict regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as in the Crimea, at gunpoint. President Poroshenko will hardly want to sign this document because he will have to take full responsibility for the possible consequences. It is most likely that he will try to bring to parliament the agreement on settlement, but MPs will not want to еxpose themselves and will thwart the bill. A new cycle of conflict will follow and military operations will resume.

Such cases have already occurred. For example, Russia wanted to impose on Moldova the so-called Kozak memorandum, a plan of resolving the Dniester conflict through federalizing Moldova. This document also envisaged autonomy for Dniester Region, demilitarisation of Moldova, deployment of Russian troops in Moldova and so on. The Kozak memorandum was signed, but its implementation was rejected. It is clear that the same scenario can unfold with the agreement on Donbass. The conflict moves to the frozen stage and depending on foreign policy choices of Kiev it is either activated or re-frozen. It is roughly the same as in the case of Nagornyy Karabakh, Abkhazia and others.

- In the end of August Poroshenko said that Ukraine was subjected to external aggression, but at the same time did not impose martial law as is done in such cases…

- Indeed, President Poroshenko had to impose martial law after declaring an aggression by Russia. On the other hand, Russia would have a trump card and nothing would stop it from officially deploying a large military contingent and leading an offense towards Kiev. Views in Ukraine were divided between the opponents and proponents of martial law. I believe that martial law had to be imposed in the conflict zone, especially given that certain elements of martial law were already introduced in the vicinity of Mariupol: restricted movement, curfew and so on. All of this had to be done in Luhansk and Donetsk. Unfortunately, there are few people in the Ukrainian government who are ready to make decisions on emergency situations. Furthermore, the situation on extraordinary parliamentary elections is not conducive to introducing martial law. Many politicians fear what the voters do in response to martial law.

- How will the parliamentary election affect the course of events? Judging from the comments of Ukrainian politicians, the election of the new Rada is almost a condition for restoring sovereignty over the east of the country?

- The problem is that the incumbent parliament does reflect the structure of Ukrainian society at all. The Party of Regions has 50 per cent of seats, while according to sociological surveys 2 per cent of the population support it. After the Maidan and Yanukovych's flight many MPs in parliament no longer represent anybody. Hence, we need a parliamentary election. On the other hand, do we need an election when a counterterrorism operation is under way? We have to note that in this situation Ukraine needs a working parliament. The incumbent Rada is not capable of making important political, economic or military decisions.

FYI

*Gorshenin Institute is an independent non-profit analytical and research centre that aims to study public and political processes in Ukraine and the world.