EURO-ATLANTIC EDGES CLOSER

At the NATO summit in Wales Georgia received the package of "enhanced cooperation" with the North Atlantic alliance. This confirmed the Euro-Atlantic choice of Tbilisi and this factor will have an increased impact on the South Caucasus and the post-Soviet geopolitics.

"Enhanced cooperation" envisages access for Georgia to the intelligence data and stronger cooperation with NATO in the defence sphere, including participation in military drills, creating in Georgia a NATO centre for training servicemen and admission of Georgia into the ranks of the Rapid Deployment Forces. Meanwhile the alliance once more decided not to extend to Tbilisi the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and only re-affirmed the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest summit that "Georgia will become a NATO member". In the current approach of the alliance the emphasis is on "instruments necessary to bring Georgia closer to possible membership".

Despite the refusal of NATO to offer MAP to Georgia, Tbilisi believes that the summit was a "very important achievement". According to Georgian Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze, "Georgia became even closer to the alliance". Georgian Defence Minister Irakli Alasania said that his country is being promoted "to the NATO top league".

The Georgian side of course did not even count on receiving MAP at the Newport summit. At the very least because nobody promised this to them. Following the August 2008 war, which ended with the effective separation from Georgia of the rebel autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia the West gave up on the idea of speeding up strategic dialogue with Tbilisi on alliance membership. From this moment the pressing aspect in Georgia's relations with NATO became the use of the integration process with the alliance to reform the defence system of the country, rather than bringing closer the moment of admission into the organization.

The decision of the Newport summit of NATO on granting Georgia the package of "enhanced cooperation" is undoubtedly connected with the deterioration of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West in the post-Soviet space, which is mostly related to the events in Ukraine. But does this mean that NATO actually intends to admit Georgia as its member in the foreseeable future? This is where lies the main intrigue of the confrontation between the leading centres of power in the world, which touches on security interests of both Georgia and the entire region.

They say that facts are stubborn things. They show that the West, including its main military and political actor, NATO, pushed Georgia and Ukraine to the express Euro-Atlantic lane, but at the decisive moment proved unable to protect their territorial integrity and security. Where is the guarantee that NATO will be able to ensure security of its regional ally in the event that a decision is made to admit Georgia into the alliance and Moscow, inevitably, increases its pressure on Tbilisi?

Taking into account the inadmissibility of a direct military clash with Russia, NATO does not specify concrete dates for the admission of Georgia into the alliance. However, one by one the West is taking new steps towards boosting military and political cooperation with Georgia. The two important visits of Pentagon officials to Tbilisi in recent days show this.

First James Amos, the US Marine Corps general, visited Georgia. He discussed with the Georgian leadership "prospects for deepening cooperation in the sphere of defence" and issues of regional security.

Immediately after the NATO summit US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel visited Georgia. The Pentagon's leader did not go into details of possible dates for Georgia's admission into NATO. He only stated that "Georgian membership in NATO is what we strive for and this process is very important". However, the US intention that Hagel express to boost military cooperation with Tbilisi, including the supplies to Georgia of the UH-60 Black Hawk military helicopters, point that Washington plans to steadily expand its presence in this South Caucasus country that confirmed its Euro-Atlantic choice. To this end, the USA continues to demand that Russia withdraw its troops from the border with Georgia and the territory of the rebel Georgian autonomies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as that Moscow revoke its recognition of independence of these self-declared states. The statement by Hagel that "actions of Russia in Georgia and Ukraine present a long-term challenge that Washington and its allies take very seriously" shows that the USA is ready for the struggle to dominate in the South Caucasus and in the European part of the post-Soviet space.

Meanwhile, it is clear that the Georgian leadership, namely members of the Georgian Dream movement President Giorgi Margvelashvili and Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili, seek to minimize as much as possible the impact of the Russian pressure on the Euro-Atlantic course of Tbilisi. The commencement of "stronger cooperation" with NATO does not mean at all that Georgia intends to jeopardize the budding improvement in relations with Moscow. As a case in point, the Georgian president stated that the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country must not hinder development of ties with Russia.

The position of Margvelashvili and Gharibashvili on Ukraine also demonstrates the unwillingness of Tbilisi to worsen relations with Moscow that broke down after the August war and somewhat revived when the Georgian Dream coalition came to power. Naturally, Georgia condemns the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and actions of separatists in Ukraine's east, but during the entire duration of the Ukrainian crisis it did not take a single strong step that could actually result in worse relations with Moscow. As a result, the stabilization, if relative, of Russian-Georgian relations has chances to continue as evidences by the expanded bilateral cooperation in the transport and energy spheres.

Yet, there are no grounds for a strategic breakthrough in the Russian-Georgian political dialogue as long as Russia supports separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia, however, is not ready to change its position and views its support for the rebel autonomies as the most effective lever for influence on the Euro-Atlantically oriented Georgia. Undoubtedly, Russia is holding back extra resources of pressure, which may pose new problems for Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event that Georgia's admission into NATO becomes inevitable. Considering this, Tbilisi faces a task that is hard but possible: to prevent the use of Georgia as a polygon or bait in the interests of the major world powers in the significantly deteriorated and confrontational conditions in the post-Soviet space.