A COMPLICATED TURKISH CALCULATION

Turkey, which declared its own entry into the war against the organization the "Islamic State" (IS) operating in Iraq and Syria, has appeared at the epicentre of a rapidly escalating situation in the Middle East. A number of mainly Kurdish populated cities in Turkey have been swept by protests whose participants are demanding military action from Ankara against radical Islamists who have seized Kurdish cities and villages on Syrian territory bordering Turkey.

Despite coalition air strikes on the positions of radical Islamists, IS already partially controls the Kurdish-populated city of Kobane. Approximately 160,000 residents of Kobane have already fled to Turkey. And by all appearances, it is Turkey whom the Kurds and the international coalition are assigning the task of ousting the radical Islamists from the areas they captured in the Kurdish regions of Syria. This points to the turmoil in Turkey itself. The protesters are angry that instead of conducting military operations against IS, which threaten the lives and safety of Syrian Kurds, Turkey is simply strengthening security along its own border and is not getting involved in the conflict.

Ankara's position not to take decisive action to protect Kobane does indeed raise several questions. Ever since the Turkish Parliament passed a provision authorising its armed forces to conduct cross-border operations in Syria and Iraq, many were certain that Ankara would immediately join the coalition military operations led by the USA. But until very recently, Ankara, despite pressure from Washington, refused to join the coalition. Ankara's change of position took place only after certain changes in the situation in the region.

First of all, Turkey succeeded in resolving a problem that had previously kept it from getting directly involved in the war against IS. After the freeing of 49 employees of the Turkish consulate who had been taken hostage by the Islamists in Mosul, Iraq, Ankara's hands were no longer tied. In addition, IS fighters were drawing near to the Turkish-Syrian border, resulting in the uncontrolled flow of Kurdish refugees into Turkey. Finally, Ankara could not remain indifferent to the incursion of IS fighters into the area of the Tomb of Suleyman Shah (grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire Osman I) in the Syrian province of Aleppo. This shrine to Turkish statehood is under the control of Ankara and is considered a Turkish enclave within Syria, according to a 1921 treaty (the document, signed between Turkey and France, defined the Turkish-Syrian border and remains in force to this day).

Meanwhile, by announcing its readiness to go to war against IS, Turkey is pursuing objectives related not only to the growing influence of radical Islamists on its border. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly said that air strikes alone are not enough to oust IS from its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, which is why it is necessary to conduct ground operations. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu for his part made it clear that Turkish ground operations against IS could only take place if the USA provided guarantees for the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. 

Thus, Ankara has given the resolution of the conflict in Syria on its terms as a precondition to any Turkish ground operations against IS in Syria. As such, Ankara's slowness to act on the issue of full-scale military deployment against the Islamic State is the very reason why the Turkish government is being criticized by the Kurdish movement.

However, the USA's position with regards to the war with IS poses a major challenge to the implementation of Erdogan's and Davutoglu's anti-Syrian plans. The US State Department made it clear to Ankara that the United States is now focused on the fight against IS, whereas support for the Syrian opposition has been put on the back burner. It is no coincidence that US President Barack Obama said that IS posed a greater threat to the world than the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

This is not the first time US-Turkish relations have been tested with respect to the situation in Syria. US Vice President Joseph Biden's recent statement, in which he accused Turkey along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE of sending hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tonnes of weapons to extremists fighting the Assad regime, is revealing. And even though Biden later apologised to Erdogan, the damage had been done…

Ankara, which has agreed to join coalition military operations against IS, is pursuing goals directly related to countering the growing threat of Kurdish separatism. Seeing the USA's interest in creating yet another Kurdish autonomous state in Syria similar to the one in Iraq, Ankara, having expressed its intention to join the international coalition against IS, seeks to curtail any possible negative fallout with regards to Turkey's interests and the Kurdish problem that could result from the West's latest anti-terrorism operation. 

Turkey's entry into the war against IS begs the question of how this may affect the future course of the situation in the region. Ankara's move, of course, increases the coalition's chances of success in countering the growing threat of radical Islamism in Iraq and Syria. The Turkish army is one of the strongest not only in the region, but in the whole world, and therefore we can assume [its involvement] would see the rapid retreat of IS militants from the areas it has seized. Moreover, it should be noted that the Turkish Armed Forces have extensive experience in fighting protracted guerrilla wars. They have spent many years destroying the bases of Kurdish terrorists in Turkey as well as in northern Iraq.

Thus, a Turkish ground operation against the Islamic State is inevitable. The only question is when President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu will decide to go ahead with its implementation. Judging by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu's statement that his country will not launch a military operation in Syria without the support of other members of the coalition, Ankara is prepared to bargain with the USA and the West. The goal is to protect Turkish interests as best possible in the post-conflict region in exchange for Ankara's expected contribution towards the defeat, or at the very least, substantial weakening of the Islamic State.