THE TURKISH BURDEN

- Turkey is only getting back to normal after proteststhat in several cities grew into riots in which dozens of people were injured. The clashes did not take place between police and demonstrators; they took place between supporters of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), outraged that Ankara is not protecting the Kurds of Kobani, and members of the Islamist Free Cause Party (HUDAPAR), which is also made up largely of Kurds. How would you characterize what has happened?

- The Kobani protests occurred when Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtascalled on his supportersto take to the streets because ISIS terrorists are threatening to occupy the city ofKobaniin Syria. This city is important to Kurds for two reasons.

First, Kobani is a place where the autonomy proposed by Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan was made a reality. In 2012 the Syrian cities of Arfin, Kobani, andCizir, which are populated by Kurds, received the status of "democratic autonomy". The Kurdish political movement in Turkey has set itself the same goal. If ISIS seizes Kobani, then an entity that would have served as a model for autonomy in Turkey will disappear.

Second, Kobanialso has a symbolic meaning for Kurds connected with the creation of the PKK. It was in KobanithatOcalan once sought refuge from pursuing Turkish authorities.

As for the clashes between HUDAPAR and the PKK, their hatred for one another began in the 1990s. At that time the predecessors of HUDAPAR, Kurds who were followers of radical Islam, killed many leaders of the PKK. The latter responded by doing the same thing to HUDAPAR.

After 2002 Islamic militants of Kurdish descent declared the dissolution of military groups and the beginning of their political activity. Sincemembers of the HUDAPAR, as well as ISIS terrorists, are Sunni Islamic fundamentalists, supporters of the PKKaccused the party of supporting ISIS and began an attack.Forty people died as a result of the clashes; banks, schools, and other government property were damaged. Responsibility for what happened lies primarily with Demirtas, who called on his associatesto hold street protests.

- Some analysts believe that after these events the Turkish government's democratic initiatives to give minorities wide-ranging rights might be suspended or even terminated.These assumptions are somewhat supportedby the authorities' harsh reaction to demands that the prison conditions of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan be improved. What do you have to say about this?

- For Turkey the process of democratic initiative is so important that it cannot be terminated as the result ofprotests. Today the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) has the largest electorate in eastern and south-eastern regions populated by Kurds. The majority of the Kurdish population supports the peaceful route of democratic reforms.The support of this process by the people of Turkey as well will not allow the Turkish leadership to reject it. The government's position at talks to end the conflict with the rebelsis unambiguous, but the probability of achieving peace is not very high. If force turns out to be on the side of the rebel groups, then a peaceful resolution of the issue will be unlikely.It cannot be said that the Turkish government's chances at the talks with the PKK are all that high. Both sides try to demonstrate their power from time to time. This explains the street protests by the PKK's supporters. In a certain sense it is a warning, and if Kobani falls, hostilitiesagainst the Turkish army might be renewed. Turkey overcame this crisis by allowing armed Kurdish Peshmerga units to transit across its territory into Syria. However, the West's desire to equip the PKK and the Democratic Union Party (the Syrian branch of the PKK) with weapons to combat the growing threat of ISIS might negatively affect the course of talks between Turkish authorities and armed Kurdish militants. Turkey should be very careful in this process.

As for improving the prison conditions of Ocalan, that seems unlikely in the new future, I think. Parliamentary elections in Turkey are coming up in August 2015, and a measure like that will, on the one hand, lead to a loss of trust in the ruling party among the electorate, and, on the other hand, will give an important trump cardto the pre-election campaigns of the opposition parties. However, in the long-term, depending on the measures the Kurdish political movement might take (the disarmament and reintegration of Kurdish militants into society, for example), the conditions of Ocalan's imprisonment might be re-examined, perhaps even reduced to house arrest.

- News agencies close to ISIS, as well as the terrorist group's Twitter account, have spread threats directed against Turkey. In your opinion, how could ISIS take aim at Turkey after Iraq and Syria, thus posing a greater threat than the PKK?

- The appearance of ISIS is the result of US intervention in Iraq in 2003. The Americans were unable to build a functioning government in Iraq. The creation of a pro-Shiite government with American help excluded Sunnis from the organs of power and made them part of ISIS' social base. Due to all this the return of the former Iraq now looks unlikely. The belated military operations of the United States and other Western countries, which are limited to airstrikes, are the most important cause of ISIS' success. The West is trying to stop ISIS by using the Syrian wing of the PKK, the Democratic Union Party, as well as Kurdish Peshmerga from northern Iraq. At the moment ISIS has been stopped and almost driven out of Kobani.In this context the greater danger for Turkey is posed by militants of the PKK and its Syrian wing armed with heavy weaponry. Keeping recent events in mind, it can be said that a group of hawks who do not want peace with Turkey has formed in the PKK leadership. Taking into account that for the battle with ISIS the Kurds will now receive heavy weaponry, after ISIS Turkey will, with a high degree of probability, become their next target.

- One of the topics being discussed is Turkey's joining the Western coalition against ISIS. We know that Turkey has given the US four conditions for its joining the coalition: buffer zones, no-flight zones, training for the Syrian armed opposition, and, as a final goal, the overthrow of the Assad regime. How realistic is the acceptance of these conditions by the US, taking into account that the American government has already abandoned its hardline against Assad?

- In the context of the Arab Spring Turkey felt that it was completely backed by the West in its goal of overthrowing the Assad regime.With time, however, Turkey realized that it was left one on one with Assad.One of the chief reasons for Turkey's circumspect actions against ISIS lies in the fact that Turkey does not want to take action against this organization alone, as it did with Assad. There are now two million refugees from Iraq and Syria living in Turkey, on whom it has already spent four billion dollars. The real reason for Turkey's demands for the creation of buffer and no-fly zones is hidden in the factthat the international community exerts too little effort in aiding refugees. In this connection the creation of a buffer zone will help bring the UN into the offering of humanitarian aid, and Turkey's burden will be lessened. Turkey's attempts to break away from a pro-American foreign policy during the Syrian crisis alarmed the United States. However, since Turkey's non-participation in the anti-ISIS coalition makes that coalition insufficiently effective, the US decided to compromise, allowing Turkey to begin military training of the moderate Syrian opposition. As I see it, the United States will not play an active role in the issue of overthrowing Assad's regime.At the very beginning of the Syrian Civil War Assad warned the West that if he leaves, the country will be ruled by Al-Qa'eda militants. Today the rise of ISIS has fulfilled Assad's predictions, and makes him less dangerous in the eyes of the West. Turkey will in the end support the coalition, but most likely will not get all that it wanted in exchange.

- This past summer Armenian president Serzh Sargsyaninvited the president of Turkey to visit Armenia to participate in events timed to coincidewith the hundred-year anniversary of the so-called Armenian genocide. What do you think? Will the president of Turkey accept the invitation, and if he accepts it, will be the consequences of such a step?

- Prime Minister Ahmet Davutogluis the author of the "zero problems with the neighbours" policy, which includes smoothing out relations with Armenia. Davutoglu's foreign doctrine and a key aspect of his policy is "shake the hand they offer you." Despite Turkey's positive steps on the topic of Armenia, Armenia itself has acted more slowly on this issue.Turkey has extended a hand to Armenia, but it is still hanging in mid-air. Expecting well-intentioned measures from Armenia, Ankara is instead receiving direct accusations,which will have an accordingly negative effect on smoothing out relations between the two states. Judging by this, I consider it impossible that the Turkish president willvisitevents in Armenia dedicated to the hundred-year anniversary of the "Armenian genocide." On the other hand,this might enable Turkey to follow a more strict policy towards Armenia on the Nagornyy Karabakh issue.