AVOID "UKRAINIAN SCENARIO"

The main intrigue in the 30 November parliamentary election in Moldova was the struggle between political forces represented by the ruling pro-European alliance (Alliance for European Integration) and opposition left-wing parties that are viewed as advocates of integration into Russia. The Socialists, (PSRM led by Igor Dodon) came first with 20.51 per cent (25 seats) and surprised everyone because Vox Populi polls and the Centre for Sociological Research suggested that they would not make it higher than third position, and even predicted that they would fail to pass the six-per-cent threshold. Coming second was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPM) led by Vlad Filat (20.16 per cent, 23 seats), and the Communist Party (PCRM) led by Vladimir Voronin (17.48 per cent, 21 seats) came third. Marian Lupu's Democratic Party (DPM) took fourth position (15.80 per cent, 19 seats), and Mihai Ghimpu's Liberal Party (PL) came fifth (9.67 per cent, 13 seats). It is noteworthy that 41 incumbent members are making it into Moldova's new parliament.

The turnout was more than 55 per cent (the required minimum being 33.3 per cent), well below than in the 2010 election when more than 65 per cent of voters came to the polls. However, perhaps the reason was preliminary online voter registration. For example, media say that not all Moldovan citizens who live in Russia managed to vote. According to official data, more than 700,000 Moldovans are in Russia, but only 15,000 ballots were sent to Russia.

We cannot say that the political situation in Moldova has changed significantly after the election. In fact, the percentage difference between the parties was not that big. In addition, despite the seemingly fairly clear division into "pro-European" and "Eurasian" parties, it is quite hard to clearly identify the preferences of the majority of political forces.

The Socialists were in the lead, but this means absolutely nothing, because they would not have got half of the votes in parliament even together with the Communists, and it was doubtful from the outset that they were ready to unite. After all, PSRM detached from the PCRM, as a result of which these two political forces are now rather rivals. Moldovan media recall that it was thanks to the Socialists that it was possible to overcome the political crisis and elect President Nicolae Timofti in March 2012, although the Communists had sought an early election. Communist leader Vladimir Voronin flatly ruled out the possibility of a coalition with the Socialists. Internal conflicts, an incomprehensible foreign policy orientation (the PCRM leader likes to recall that it was at his initiative that 2003 saw the beginning of the process of integration into Europe, albeit he, of course, is Eurasian in spirit), and a party life very distant from ideals of communism took many votes away from the leftists, especially as compared to the level in the year 2001. Against the background of moderate Moldovan Communists, demands put forward by the Socialists sound pretty tough now - they have announced their intention to initiate a referendum on Moldova joining the Customs Union and on termination of the Association Agreement with the European Union. "The Party of Socialists has taken the clear position that it will not enter into a coalition with the pro-European parties," Igor Dodon said. The Socialists also seek a 20-per-cent increase in pensions, and fairly transparently hint at their ability to agree on a reduction in the price of Russian gas, and are talking about the need for a rapid resolution of problems in agriculture. After Chisinau signed an agreement on association and free trade with the EU this summer, Russia closed its market to local farmers, which, understandably, had a negative impact on them.

Another "not quite ally" of the Communists and Socialists is the party Patria (Motherland), which the Chamber of Appeals decided to bar from standing in the election literally just a few days before voting day for breaking rules of funding. The leader of the party - Russian businessman of Moldovan origin, Renato Usatii, urged his supporters to vote not for the Socialists, but for his party anyway, which equivalently meant a waste of votes, while Motherland sought 10 to 12 per cent (according to some data, 20 per cent) of votes and could make company for the Communists and the Socialists in parliament.

However, this did not happen, and the heads of the pro-European parties, which made it into the new parliament - Vlad Filat (Liberal Democratic Party), Marian Lupu (DMP) and Mihai Ghimpu (PL) - agreed to form a ruling majority. The pro-European parties are, of course, more united, but the election results suggest that they, too, are still losing the liking of the population because of several high-profile corruption scandals. The Moldovan information and analysis portal AVA.MD says that the authorities in the country are highly dependent on oligarchs and big capital which dictate their own rules of the game to society. Obvious are also the different approaches to the country's foreign policy. The Liberal Democrats call for accession to the EU and NATO by 2020, the Liberals advocate the same thing but do not want to wait at all, while the Democrats are not that categorical - they call for ties with Russia not to be broken. In addition, the Democrats have already said that they will not support the idea of Chisinau joining NATO. According to Lupu, his party's main goal is to strengthen the country's sovereignty and internal unity.

Thus, it is clear that Moldova will continue its policy of integration into Europe, but how sharply and quickly will this happen? How quickly and efficiently will Brussels be ready to lend a helping hand to Chisinau, which, for example, the influential German publication Deutsche Welle calls for? Opponents of the Liberals and Democrats also expect them to resume attempts to join Moldova to Romania and expect the republic to reject its non-aligned status. In this case, if Moldova decides to join NATO, what action will be taken by Russia, which actually has quite a lot of levers of pressure on Chisinau? First, Moldova is completely dependent on gas and electricity supplies from Russia. Second, Russia is threatening to deport home Moldovan guest workers, of whom, according to various estimates, there are more than half a million. Third, there are the unrecognized Dniester Moldovan republic and a very pro-Russian Gagauzia. Albeit, in a political sense, Moscow does not particularly have anyone in Chisinau to rely on, apart from the Socialists (which is actually debatable as well). After all, during their rather lengthy stay in power, the Communists did not get particularly close to the Kremlin.

The reason, of course, is also that any political force in Moldova has to adapt. After all, the country is fairly clearly divided: into citizens who want to be part of a united Europe and who have Romanian passports and often travel to the EU to work and spend their holiday there, and citizens who almost permanently work in Russia in order to help their families back in Moldova. Another thing is that neither Europe nor Russia is currently in a position to offer Chisinau anything significant. In Romania, there is a political and economic crisis, Europe is more busy with Ukraine and it is actually not planning to expand in the near future at all. It is more advantageous for Brussels to retain its influence over Chisinau, but not to take on its shoulders responsibility for the social and economic sectors of Europe's poorest country. Russia is immersing deeper and deeper into the abyss of economic crisis triggered by the Western sanctions over Ukraine and falling oil prices.

As early as next year there will be local elections held, which will probably show what those 30 to 35 per cent of Moldovan voters - who sociologists say have not made up their mind yet - think. For Chisinau, the most important thing now is to avoid the Ukrainian scenario, because there are all prerequisites for it.