FROM COMPETITORS INTO PARTNERS

On the first day of December, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Turkey, which was given the highest status - a state visit. The visit took place in a complex international situation. Due to the events in Ukraine, Russia's relations with the United States, the European Union and NATO have sharply deteriorated. Turkey, as we know, is a reputable member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, Russian-Turkish relations have been rapidly developing in recent years, especially in the economic field. As for foreign policy issues, on many of them, it has been possible if not to combine approaches, at least to avoid a direct confrontation. Sometimes this was achieved with great difficulty. Suffice it to recall the civil war in Syria or the incident with the interception of the aircraft that was flying from Moscow to Damascus: it was forced to land in Turkey to check if it was carrying military or dual-use goods. Mutual efforts made it possible to resolve the situation and reduce tensions.

Once under sanctions and in international isolation from the leading Western countries, Moscow expectedly redirected the vector of its diplomatic efforts towards the so-called BRIC group (Brazil, China, India and South Africa) and major regional powers, among which Turkey occupies an important place by the scale of its economy, the power of its military and political influence.

In an interview with Anadolu news agency ahead of his visit, President Vladimir Putin qualified the policy of Turkey "as thoughtful and far-sighted with respect to anti-Russian sanctions: not only did Ankara not join them, on the contrary, it is ready to strengthen cooperation with Russia". "We highly value the independence of Turkey's decisions, including on issues of economic cooperation with Russia. Turkish partners did not sacrifice their own interests for the sake of someone else's political ambitions. I think that it's really a thoughtful and far-sighted calculation," the Russian president said.

Russia is Turkey's second (after Germany) trading partner. In turn, Turkey ranks seventh in Russian foreign trade. In 2013, the bilateral trade turnover amounted to 32.7bn dollars. The total volume of direct investment is small so far: Russian investment in Turkey amounts to 1.7bn and Turkish in Russia - 1bn dollars. About 4m Russians annually visit Turkey for tourism.

Respectful and trusting relations between the leaders of both countries leave a positive imprint on Russian-Turkish cooperation. Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have been on the Olympus of power for more than 10 years in Russia and Turkey respectively and have made visible progress in economic development, growth in the welfare of the population and strengthening of the geopolitical position of their countries. Both leaders face criticism over authoritarianism from the West, but consider it biased and resulting from reluctance to put up with the restoration by Russia and Turkey of their role as independent and influential players in international politics.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Ankara accompanied by 10 ministers. The state status of the visit suggested a number of official events, but the central one was the holding of the fifth meeting of the High Level Cooperation Council - a body set up to coordinate and deepen the Russian-Turkish strategic partnership. The Russian leader held face-to-face talks with his Turkish counterpart Erdogan. Moreover, as noted by observers, instead of the planned one hour, the conversation lasted almost three hours.

During President Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey, eight documents were signed. The agreements that were signed and the declared intentions of the parties should further deepen the strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia. But it should not be interpreted as Ankara's departure from Euro-Atlantic orientation. The independent position demonstrated by Turkey on many regional and global issues is within the boundaries defined by allied commitments. Therefore, the possibility of Turkey's accession to the EAEU, even in this abridged format, which is experiencing great inner tension, seems unlikely and was not articulated during Vladimir Putin's visit to Ankara. As for the "Shanghai Five", Ankara's interest in participating in this format, even as an observer, was previously voiced. The strengthening strategic Russian-Turkish partnership can ensure the favourable position of Moscow on the issue. The positive attitude of Turkic participants such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is also easily predictable. But it is obvious that the final word on this issue belongs to China, which does not consider it appropriate to extend the scope of the "Shanghai Five", limiting it to one-off invites to meetings for various interested countries. Turkey and Russia remain at opposite positions on the crisis in Syria and the Crimea, but declared the usefulness of continuing the dialogue and searching for a solution to conflicts in the non-confrontational manner.

As for the economic aspect of bilateral relations, Russia and Turkey at the highest level confirmed their intention to bring the volume of foreign economic cooperation to 100bn dollars. It was stated that preparations are under way for the implementation of large-scale energy projects, including the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power plant Akkuyu, the start of work on transition to national currency in mutual settlements and establishment of cooperation in space exploration. For example, in 2015, Russia is preparing to launch the Turkish satellite Turksat-4B and so on.

The biggest fuss in the world media was caused by Vladimir Putin's statement that the South Stream project is closed. In its stead, a memorandum of understanding was signed with the Turkish state pipeline company BOTAS, according to which both sides will consider building a gas pipeline with a capacity of 63bn cubic metres per year, passing under the Black Sea to Turkey. Deliveries through the existing offshore pipeline Blue Stream will be expanded from 16 to 19bn cubic metres, while the price of gas in the coming year will be reduced by 6 per cent. In the future, depending on the prevailing market conditions, the discount may be even greater. According to Miller, 14bn cubic metres of gas from the planned new offshore gas pipeline across the Black Sea to Turkey are intended for the local market, while the remaining 50bn cubic metres will be delivered to the border of Turkey and Greece, where it is planned to create a "gas hub" of European importance.

Some Azerbaijani and foreign observers were quick to express concern that the new plans of Gazprom and BOTAS may increase competition with the TANAP and TAP projects being implemented by Azerbaijan to deliver gas from the Shah Deniz-2 [Sah Daniz] field to the Turkish and European markets. To avoid such competition and not to encounter Russian interests in Central Europe, Azerbaijan once refused the NABUCCO option and chose the southern direction. Now circumstances have forced to Russian Gazprom to eye this direction too.

It should be recognized that there are grounds for concern there, but they should not be exaggerated, of course. Firstly, Russia has just signed a memorandum of understanding, while Azerbaijan has passed all legal-contractual and financial stages while the planned volumes of gas have been contracted. Secondly, in the present tense financial situation under sanctions, it will not be easy for Gazprom, which has already taken too many loans, to find 20 and possibly more billions of dollars for this new project. After all, the Russian gas giant recently signed a huge contract with China to supply gas from new fields in Siberia, and 50bn still need to be found for its development and for the construction of a pipeline stretching for several thousand kilometres. Third, neither Azerbaijan nor Russia are interested in the collapse of prices for their own raw materials as a result of mindless competition and may agree on a mutually acceptable course of action even before the start of gas supplies. After all, both suppliers are already present in Turkey and have repeatedly stated their readiness for partnership on third markets. By the way, this partnership can help the parties overcome the limitations of the Third Energy Package, which prohibits the same company from supplying, transporting and distributing gas on the EU market.

Tripartite cooperation between Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan can have not only a synergistic effect, but also help solve complex geopolitical issues, in particular, the crisis in the South Caucasus region, primarily the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. It is noteworthy that shortly before the meeting with Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Erdogan called his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev. As you know, Turkey has taken over the presidency of G20 and next year's summit will be held in Antalya. Inviting President Ilham Aliyev to the event, Erdogan informed him about the upcoming Russian-Turkish negotiations.

Although it was not officially reported that Erdogan and Putin discussed the topic of the Karabakh conflict settlement, it is impossible to ignore this problem, which involves the two powers that have a common border with the conflict zone. Russian analysts clearly indicate that Armenia's joining the Eurasian Union with Russia requires the prompt opening of its borders closed because of the conflict with Azerbaijan. Otherwise, all Russian investments in this country will be locked up, or at least ineffective. Turkey is interested in peace and stability in the Caucasus, where it would be able to implement its own interests in a partnership with Russia and allied Azerbaijan. The lack of progress in resolving the Karabakh conflict increases the risk of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia resuming, and that, given the appropriate allied relations and commitments of Russia and Turkey, may draw these powers into a military and political confrontation against their own will. Therefore, concerted action between Moscow and Ankara could have a positive impact on the dynamics of the negotiation process on the peaceful settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

Almost at the same time as the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkey, President Ilham Aliyev gave an extensive interview to Russia 24, which confirmed his intention to develop a comprehensive strategic Russian-Azerbaijani partnership. Therefore, Baku not only feels no jealousy, but welcomes the deepening of Russian-Turkish cooperation. After all, as a fraternal, allied state with Turkey and partner of Russia, Azerbaijan will only benefit from this.

It is hard to say this for Armenia, which is an underling of Russia, but a traditional enemy of Turkey, has no diplomatic relations with it and its border with that country remains closed as a result of the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. In Yerevan, the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Ankara and the deepening of Russian-Turkish strategic partnership caused panic parallels with the situation of the early last century. The then agreement between Lenin and Ataturk stopped the exorbitant and unreasonable territorial ambitions of the Armenians. Now they fear that history will repeat itself and Ankara and Moscow will reach agreement on the issue of enforcing the well-known UN Security Council resolutions that oblige the parties to make peace and call for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, the return of refugees and opening of communications. Baku has repeatedly declared its readiness to fulfill these resolutions in full. If Russia joins these requirements, it will be very difficult for the Armenians to avoid implementing them.

Georgia, unlike the Armenians, has excellent relations with Turkey but is in conflict with Russia, which deteriorated after Moscow signed a military agreement with Abkhazia. However, the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia as a whole can have a positive impact on the military-political atmosphere in the region and enhance the potential and benefits of mutual trust and cooperation.

Azerbaijan advantageously differs from both Armenia and Georgia, because not only does it have close relations with Ankara and Moscow, in addition it has considerable financial resources, professionals and businessmen who orient themselves very well in both Turkey and Russia. Therefore, we can act as a partner of Turkey in the implementation of projects in Russia and together with Russia's partners in the implementation of the latter's projects in Turkey.