A SLAVIC-TURKIC ALLIANCE

- There is a lot going on involving our countries in the South Caucasus and some people are even predicting a change in the geopolitical situation. How does Russia regard Azerbaijan at this current stage?

- Russia sees Azerbaijan, first and foremost, as a friendly people with whom we have lived together for a long period of time and with whom we continue to live in the context of the global world. There is an Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia and a huge Russian community in Azerbaijan. I have met members of the Russian community and, generally speaking, they are happy. There is a growing Russian sector here in education and there is no prejudice against the Russian language. This is our main springboard for the future, and we believe that the future lies with major regional associations, of which the most progressive is the European Union. One can only admire what they have achieved. But we shouldn't just admire, envy and fret from the outside. We should do something similar ourselves. The project we are developing now is called the Eurasian Union. One of the reasons for the crisis in Ukraine is the US' desire to sabotage this Eurasian Union. That's quite obvious.

I believe that the purpose of the Eurasian Union, from the economic point of view, is to provide economic growth from within, and that means providing stability in the face of global economic crises. But in terms of civilizations, whereas the western European Union is, first and foremost, a Romano-Germanic and Protestant-Catholic civilization, so the Eurasian Union is a de facto Slavic-Turkic and Orthodox-Islamic civilization.

I arrived in Baku from Turkey where they are looking closely at the Eurasian Union and studying the prospects of cooperation and future entry. With the crisis going on in Ukraine, this may not be a pressing matter, but when it is over it will, no doubt, become more relevant.

I believe that if one compares Turkey and Azerbaijan in terms of civilizations, then Azerbaijan is, of course, closer to Russia. But from an economic point of view, Turkey's interests lie more with the Eurasian Union. This is because of the structure of its economy. Azerbaijan mainly sells its oil and gas, and to do this it doesn't have to be a member of economic alliances. Oil and gas will always be in demand. But if it wants to develop the non-oil sectors of its economy - and this is, of course, mainly agriculture - Azerbaijan will also need to become a member of a major regional union, and for Azerbaijan the only realistic one is the Eurasian.

But, it seems to me that Turkey will be joining the Eurasian Union even earlier because it is extremely interested and the sectors of its economy demand maximum participation in regional alliances. It is obvious to Turkey today that the European Union is a closed book. If Turkey became a member of this union this would not be of great benefit either to Ankara or Moscow, and not just in the economic sense, but politically, too. In what way, specifically? Well, if Turkey became a member of the Eurasian Union, it would be a big boost to its influence. It would in effect become the second member economically after Russia, and the other smaller ones always rally round the second one. In this sense Turkey would as it were be at the head of all the other member-states and a kind of balance to Russia for adopting decisions. And this is also of benefit to us, not just from the economic point of view. The Eurasian Union is currently perceived as Russia plus somebody else. But if Turkey and, say Ukraine, joined then taken together they would all become bigger than Russia. And this creates a healthier atmosphere for taking decisions. I believe that Ukraine will mot probably join once it has past this crisis stage.

We hope that things will develop in this direction and that some time after this Azerbaijan and, perhaps, Georgia will also become members of this alliance. We believe that Iran, too, might join this alliance at some time, but only after there are changes there and the country is rid of UN sanctions.

- Is Turkey not perceived as a rival to Russia among the former Soviet countries from the point of view of influence on the Turkic-speaking countries, such as Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries?

- This situation is perceived as a potential rivalry, but perhaps not one of vital importance. Our relations with Turkey show how possible it is to work together as much as possible in areas which are beneficial, at the same time putting contentious matters to one side. As you know, our countries have directly opposing positions on Syria. And look how good relations are between Russia and Turkey on economic aspects or even on the Georgian conflict. Turkey effectively chased the American ships out of the Black Sea in 2008, drawing on the Montreux Convention, which the Americans wanted to consign to general oblivion. Or take Turkey's position on the Crimean Tatars. Turkey virtually recognized Russia's authority in Crimea and is having active consultations with the Russian authorities in order to resolve the problem of the Crimean Tatars. Here, our interests - Russia's - coincide with Turkey's.

I think we are seeing the gradual formation of a Moscow-Baku-Ankara geopolitical axis, at the same time we are nor rejecting a Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis.

- Azerbaijan, a country that is itself suffering from separatism, is in favour of Ukraine's territorial integrity. At the same time, Baku does not support the sanctions against Russia, proceeding from the logic of why the same attitude is not being taken towards Armenia, which has occupied 20 per cent of Azerbaijani lands. How does Moscow regard Baku's position here?

- We take Azerbaijan's position on board very positively. We realize that since Azerbaijan is fighting for her territorial integrity, it simply finds it hard to accept that Crimea is Russian. Back in 1990 the Crimean parliament passed a resolution to secede from Ukraine, which was not adopted. Incidentally, unlike Karabakh, there was no ethnic cleansing in Crimea. The population was the same. There was no fighting. Therefore, the situation with Crimea is fundamentally different from Nagornyy Karabakh.

We embraced Azerbaijan's position with gratitude and we were very glad to receive the speech by Mr Samad Seyidov who, with a precise knowledge of the situation in PACE [Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe], said that if Russia leaves all you MPs will be dissolved. And that's right. I was in PACE for four years and I can say that even in the European Parliament they are raising the question: "Why do we need PACE, which is dealing with the same problems as we are? Let's dissolve them and make a consultative group for inter-action with parliaments." PACE, essentially, plays the role of a mediator in relations between the EU and Russia.

 - There has clearly been a cooling of relations between Azerbaijan and the US and, on the other hand, an intensification of the dialogue between Baku and Moscow. At the same time, Russia has not always been clear about its attitude to the Karabakh problem. For instance, immediately after the voting in PACE a report was shown on Russian state television about so-called non-recognized republics, and the first clip was about Karabakh.

- The improvement in Azerbaijani-Russian relations runs deep and is marked, first and foremost, by the friendly, fraternal relations between our peoples and great economic interests.  We need to create more opportunities in the economy and to cooperate more, that's quite obvious. Quite a few problems remain which need to be resolved, and that's what [Russian and Azerbaijani presidents] Putin and Aliyev are doing.

As regards relations between Azerbaijan and the US, that's another matter. The Americans were downright arrogant in the way they tried to set up colour revolutions everywhere, including Azerbaijan. And it's not a question of human rights, but that the Azerbaijani leaders very cleverly could see a stepping up here of pro-American revolutionary groups and quietly isolated them. The Americans, naturally, are extremely unhappy that their structures are being pruned and they are not being given the opportunity to prepare rebellions. So the situation here is quite different.

They began to prepare colour revolutions everywhere at once; they carried them out in Ukraine and have started preparing them in Russia, China and Turkey. [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan also understands that if there is an attempt at a colour revolution in Russia, then the same attempt will be organized in Turkey, too. He doesn't just feel sorry for Putin; he is most likely even providing him with strong support through secret channels. One part of this support is the Turkish Stream agreement.

- What about Moscow's attitude to Azerbaijan's main problem?

- If you are talking about the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, Russia's position stems from the fact that one needs to try and solve this problem by peaceful means. We have always been in favour of negotiations. Before this two routes had been considered in Azerbaijan: military and peaceful. But both became deadlocked because the military route means undermining investments in the Azerbaijani economy and undermining economic growth, and it is rapid economic growth that has made the Azerbaijani economy number one in the South Caucasus and has generally created this huge predominance of strength compared with Armenia.

And the peaceful route has become deadlocked because in the Minsk group the USA, France and Russia are the countries in which Armenia's diasporas are the strongest in the world. This has a huge influence.

Now we have a situation where the correlation of forces between Azerbaijan and Armenia has radically changed and the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict needs to be interpreted in accordance with this new situation. But the peaceful and military routes have been closed, and there is no third way. So, realistically speaking, this process should proceed outside the Minsk group - a peaceful route, but outside the Minsk group, in which the USA blocks everything. The conditions have already been shaped for a temporary, great historic compromise - temporary, because this is not a final decision, but still a big decision. The gist of it, I think, should be that Armenia must hand over to Azerbaijan the seven districts around Nagornyy Karabakh, and in response Azerbaijan and Turkey should lift the economic blockade of Armenia. This would improve the situation considerably and create fundamentally new conditions.

- However, Armenia is hardly likely to do this because it has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and therefore it is against declining the services of the Minsk group. Could Russia exert an influence?

- I believe that Armenia is considering this option more and more. Although they can, of course, be intractable, I am confident they are considering this more and more. These sorts of things will probably proceed outside the Minsk group, and possibly within the framework of a large regional association. Incidentally, here we come back to the Eurasian Union, in the framework of which it would be possible to achieve such a solution. I would stress - this is not guaranteed, and. no-one should take my words to mean that Moscow is proposing that Azerbaijan joins the Eurasian Union, and then in exchange for this the country would receive the seven districts around Nagornyy Karabakh. That's not the way our diplomacy works. But it is right that Armenia and Azerbaijan should be a part of some kind of large regional association. By the way, if they were in the European Union I think this problem would also be gradually resolved.