A SHAKY TRUCE

Back at the beginning of this year many analysts, including the author of this article, forecasted that the talks on a peace settlement in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict would hardly be likely to resume in the first six months. This was connected with the fact that Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora world-wide were preparing for the extensively marked centenary of  the so-called "1915 genocide" at the end of April in the hope that it would evoke a wave of sympathy from which they would be able to extract considerable propagandistic, political and economic dividends.

The Armenians thought international pressure would force Ankara to establish relations with Yerevan without taking any notice of Baku and then they would be able to resume the talks with Azerbaijan from a stronger position. These calculations misfired. The Turks decisively rejected the mythical "genocide" attributed to their ancestors and were unshakeable in their alliance with Azerbaijan. This was best demonstrated by the recent joint military exercises in Naxcivan. At the same time, local incidents have kept on occurring along the line of contact. The number of dead and wounded among the Armenian servicemen has considerably grown and exceeds our losses, which is direct evidence of the Azerbaijani army's increased combat readiness. At the present time, owing to the First European Games in Baku there are few breaches of the ceasefire agreement. The Olympic nature of this important, broad-scale sporting event presupposes maintaining the peace more strictly and it may be hoped that the reduction in tension will be a good prerequisite for resuming the negotiating process relating to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the summer or autumn.

The co-chairpersons of the OSCE [Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Minsk Group have taken advantage of the break in the negotiating process for a bit of "quiet diplomacy". They have met the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers several times and had consultations with representatives of the Minsk Group member-countries, Judging by the tweets for the media by the most open American co-chairman in the Minsk Group, James Warlick, new proposals are being drawn up for the meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents which is being proposed by representatives.  It is hard to believe that this is something completely new. It is mostly likely that this will simply be another interpretation and adaptation of the well-known "Madrid principles", on the basis of which efforts have long been applied to achieve a breakthrough in the peace settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

The absence of conceptually new approaches and proposals from the Minsk Group is hardly likely to result from a lack of imagination or professionalism on the part of mediating diplomats. The fact is that the framework of the possible compromise peace settlement is sufficiently narrow and dictated by the military political situation obtaining, the ratio of the forces of the confronting sides in the conflict, as well as the shared interests of the powers involved.

The "Madrid principles" that have been on the table up to the present time are in a certain sense a diplomatic formulation of a "draw". They propose taking the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to a stage when resumption of military operations is guaranteed to be ruled out, the occupied Azerbaijani districts are liberated according to the 5+2 formula and peaceful relations are renewed. To achieve this, it is proposed that the most disputed issue of the status of Nagornyy Karabakh should be left out of the equation. Instead, use of a "transitional status" is being proposed, which is de facto legalising the present self-governing situation of Nagornyy Karabakh, but does not presuppose direct subordination to Baku, and resuming the talks in peaceful circumstances.

The clauses in the "Madrid principles" relating to the procedure for determining the status of Nagornyy Karabakh have deliberately been formulated in a non-specific manner so that they would be acceptable to both the conflicting sides. Thus, in order to determine the status of Nagornyy Karabakh, it is proposed that the citizens themselves should be polled, but neither the circle of its participants nor the date for holding the "poll or referendum" is directly specified, but should be the subject of further accords. A few years ago, in a personal conversation with me and other Azerbaijani experts, the former chairman of the Minsk Group from the USA, Matt Breiz said that the mediators had used the method known in diplomatic terms as "constructive uncertainty", which helps to move the negotiating process forward.

Once he had agreed that the "Madrid principles" should be resumed, the Azerbaijani president went even further towards a mutually acceptable compromise. In an interview with the Russia-24 TV channel he publicly announced that, once the  occupied districts around Nagornyy Karabakh had been liberated, the latter would be given security guarantees, economic assistance and long-term (20-30 years) transitional status, which would be effective until agreement was successfully reached on a mutually acceptable permanent status.

In spite of such a precisely expressed policy standpoint, the propagandists from Yerevan and their "advocates" are accusing Baku of failing to agree to compromises and having an unconstructive approach, although in actual fact a long-term, lasting peace is being obstructed by the Armenians refusing to accept the "draw" proposed by the mediators and accepted by Azerbaijan. They want to register their  own victory, to tear up the agreement on the secession of Nagornyy Karabakh in a specific length of time (5-10 years) and, in addition, to retain control over part of the territories  of Lacin and even Kalbacar districts as some sort  of "land corridor" for communications with Armenia. We rejected this variant even at the time when Azerbaijan did not boast the current manifold demographic and economic superiority and mighty armed forces. It is absurd to expect Baku to accept it now. As a result, no progress is being made in achieving a peace settlement.

The Armenians are known for their persistence and consider themselves unsurpassed masters of bargaining. But at the present time President Serzh Sargsyan and his associate, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, are not in any state to propose anything intelligible at the talks. They are stupidly dragging their feet in the hope of putting off the decisions that appear disadvantageous to them. As a chess player (I remind you that Sargsyan remains the president of the Armenia's Chess Federation), he is contemplating the unavoidable move, finding himself in a zugzwang [chess move where the player is compelled to move] position. But time is passing, and the little flag on his clock may go down, i.e. war might break out in which strength is on Baku's side. And this would mean defeat for the Armenians. In order to avoid making concessions, but to evade military complications as well, Sargsyan and his team are attempting as far as they can to consolidate the existing status quo, and with the help of the great powers, to make Azerbaijan give up its legal right to liberate the occupied territories by force. 

The attempt to achieve this by concluding some kind of "framework" agreement on a settlement of the conflict forced through by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, failed a few years ago after the meeting in Kazan. 

Now the Armenians are pedalling the "indefinite" nature of the "Ceasefire Agreement" concluded back on 12 May 1994 by the Armenian and Azerbaijani defence ministers with the involvement of Russia. But neither in the text of the "Bishkek protocol" nor in the above-mentioned agreement is there any mention of its indefinite nature. In this matter, the media and the politicians in Yerevan have put too much trust in the verbal tight-rope walking of the former Russian co-chairman of the Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimov, who has long behaved like an Armenian lawyer. Besides the date that the ceasefire came into effect (12 May 1994) only a 10-day period was stipulated in the agreement for talks and the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of the armed conflict. Consequently, in spite of the Armenians' assertions, the agreement was a temporary one and not an indefinite one, which David Shakhnazaryan who was the Armenian councillor of state at that time, frankly admitted in his recent interview to lin.am. So, it can quite definitely be asserted that, since 22 May 1994, the truce has been maintained exclusively as an act of good will by the sides in order to continue the talks on a peace settlement.

It is common knowledge that they did not manage to conclude a treaty on the cessation of the armed conflict in 10 days, or in 10 weeks, months and even 10 years because the Armenians have refused to withdraw their troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories in spite of the unambiguous resolutions (Nos 822, 853, 874 and 884) by the UN Security Council. If the talks are not extricated from the impasse, Baku has every right to declare the ceasefire agreement null and void and to set about liberating its occupied territories by force. Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly stated this directly, but the armed forces which are growing stronger day by day are the weighty materialisation of his warnings. It would be good if the Armenians and the powers protecting them perceived the signals sent correctly and did not engage in calming themselves down regarding the possibility of an armed solution to the conflict.

Unfortunately, the most authoritative world military political (NATO) and political economic (EU) structures, instead of occupying a position corresponding to international law, are continuing to issue meaningless statements, which in actual fact instil in the Armenians confidence that their actions are being tolerated. Thus, the deputy assistant NATO secretary general in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, James Appathurai, recently stated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation envisages the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict exclusively by peaceful means, after expressing concern over the worsening situation on the line of contact. The president of the Council of Europe, Donald Tusk expressed himself roughly in much the same vein in an interview to a small group of journalists from the "Eastern Partnership" countries, asserting that "this problem (Nagornyy Karabakh) needs to be resolved through dialogue. This is the only method we use. Some politicians expect that the European Union will help militarily. But we have to be realistic about the fact that this is impossible. We should seek a solution through dialogue."

Mr Tusk is an experienced politician, a former prime minister of Poland.    Now, as president of the European Union he is well aware that no-one in Brussels will demand military intervention in Nagornyy Karabakh. For even in the event of Dnestr Republic or South Ossetian conflicts, in the settlement of which the European Union is directly involved, Brussels did not decide to send even police forces, as was the case with Kosovo. But Baku has the right to insist that the European Union should unambiguously express its condemnation of Yerevan's reluctance to honour the well-known UN Security Council resolutions demanding that the Armenians withdraw their armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Donald Tusk could have spoken about the acceptability of participation in the "Eastern Partnership" programme and the obtaining of financial assistance by a country (Armenia) occupying the territory of another party to the programme (Azerbaijan). Unfortunately, instead of expressing a clear and lawful standpoint, he limited himself to the stream-lined recommendations about the need for dialogue.

For the moment the mediators in the Minsk Group, the leaders of different countries and the heads of international organisations are continuing to make general statements that a new wave of tension is unavoidable if it is impossible to start meaningful talks on a settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. At some point, the sporadic clashes and exchanges of fire can turn into large-scale military confrontations, and the international structures will have to act in an urgent manner.

The Armenian leadership which has taken its country into economic stagnation and socio-demographic degradation, is fully capable of trying to extricate itself from the approaching unavoidable catastrophe by unleashing a fresh military venture. In an interview with Tert.am, Armenia's First Deputy Defence Minister David Tonoyan shared his "expectations" that purportedly Azerbaijan-instigated active military clashes would occur once the First European Games had finished in Baku. His concluding words were that "the security zones" around Nagornyy Karabakh were no longer sufficient for the Armenian side in conditions of a gathering arms race, that it was good to expose the aggressive intentions. So, the powers which traditionally provide the Armenians with their patronage would do well to think how to save this people from the evil will of their own criminal oligarchic leadership.