THERE IS NO TIME TO LOSE

- Unfortunately, we have to start our conversation with a sad and tragic event. A terrorist act was carried out by IS ("Islamic State") militants in the city of Suruc, Sanliurfa Province, which killed dozens of people who were on a humanitarian mission to the Syrian town of Kobani (repeatedly retaken by IS militants and Kurdish fighters controlled by the PYD). As you know, anti-government demonstrations broke out following the terrorist attacks in Istanbul and other cities. Can we say that after these events the struggle between the IS and the Kurdish armed groups in Syria has spilled over to Turkey, and the chaos and internal strife in the Middle East have swept the country?

- Most of the IS personnel are Iraqi Sunnis and persons who came from the United States, Europe, the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia to join them. A huge increase in the number of militants was also due the influx of Turkish citizens, in particular, from among the inhabitants of Adiyaman, Bingol, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Kirsehir, Konya, Ankara and Istanbul. The fact that most of the recruits are radical Islamists of Kurdish origin gives an indication of the nature of future conflicts. The Kurds have divided into radical Islamists, who advocate the establishment of an independent Kurdish Islamic state, and secularists, who demanded the formation of an independent Kurdish state in the 1980s but today lean towards the idea of autonomy.

Now the IS has more than 3,000 fighters from among the inhabitants of inner Anatolia and Konya, which further increases the risk of the conflict between radical Kurdish Islamists and Kurdish secularists spreading through the entire territory of Turkey. Therefore, there is a need to develop a new and effective strategy for countering the IS.

Against the background of the existing Middle East crisis, the current tough foreign-policy vector of Turkey must be transformed into a pragmatic and flexible foreign policy. Turkey should take a strong-willed position to unite the efforts of coalition partners to combat threats emanating from the IS. In other words, Ankara should develop a completely new strategy to combat the IS, which will be the "road map" for coalition forces.

Another threat comes from the "Kurdish issue" that can affect the balance of internal forces in Turkey. The resulting break in the negotiation process and growing pressure on the PYD exerted by the IS may enhance the threat of the Kurdistan Workers' Party  (PKK) against Turkey.

- The terrorist attack in Suruc took place amid uncertainty that had arisen in the coalition negotiation process after the general election on 7 June. What is your attitude to this in general? What do you think about the continuation of attacks and the escalation of tension, what are your assumptions about the feasibility of early elections in the current situation?

- During the election the Nationalist Movement Party [Turkish: Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP)] and Peoples' Democratic Party [Turkish: Halklarin Demokratik Partisi (HDP)] stated their refusal to form a government with the ruling Justice and Development Party [Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)]. Nonetheless, there are expectations within the AKP that a coalition government with the MHP will be formed. If the AKP and the MHP do reach an agreement, it will most probably be a "pre-election government".

However, it looks most likely that a coalition will be formed between the AKP and the Republican People's Party [Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)]. It should be noted that the CHP has not been the ruling party for many years, so it is anticipated to be more sympathetic with the possibility of forming a coalition government. The CHP's separation from conservative Kemalists before the election ensured that the party remained in the social democratic mainstream. A social-democratic CHP may be a more manageable subject of the government, and at least it will not build its policy on antagonism with the policy of the AKP.

One way or another, the explosion in Suruc has reaffirmed the need for the formation of a government in Turkey. The country's political parties should speed up the negotiation process on forming a coalition government. However, this blast may weaken the likelihood of early elections as Turkey is currently being managed by the interim government.

The holding of re-elections may negatively affect the situation in the country, taking into account the number of pressing issues. In addition, Turkey's neighbours are not living through the best of times and experience difficulties of civil wars, while the IS, PYD and PKK are pitting their strength against each other in the region.

The new government will be primarily engaged in solving problems with neighbouring countries. This rehabilitation process may take more than two years. If the coalition is not formed after all, Turkey may lose precious time for conducting early elections, which ultimately may cause problems with public safety in the country.

- If the coalition government is formed anyway, what impact will it have on Turkey's foreign policy strategy?

- Unfortunately, the current Turkish foreign policy cannot be called successful. If the coalition is created, the AKP will certainly not control the country's foreign policy. This means that a foreign minister may be appointed from among members of parliament with the diplomatic experience who is not a member of the AKP. In other words, it will be a diplomat who will break with the romantic aura of the current Middle East policy and lead Turkey towards building pragmatic neighbourly relations.

- After the parliamentary elections, legislative bodies of each party (except MHP) include Turkish citizens of Armenian descent. In addition, the CHP which is the most likely candidate, along with the AKP, for a prospective coalition comprises members supporting the process of normalization of relations with Armenia. How will all this affect the position of Turkey on the "Armenian question" if the coalition is formed?

- The presence of Turkish citizens of Armenian descent in the National Assembly of the country is good news in terms of the development of democracy and the growth of representative capacity. Otherwise, there is a possibility that citizens of Armenian descent may slip under the control of foreign Armenian diaspora. I assume that in dealing with the Armenia issue, a future government will take into account the interests of Azerbaijan.

- Iran and the United States have signed a historic agreement. What impact will it have on the whole region and, in particular, on relations with Turkey?

- The main reason for easing of relations between Iran and the United States is the IS. However, now that the Middle East has been turned into a bloody mess, the potential of the two countries that could in any way affect and change the course of events in the region has weakened considerably. These are Israel and Turkey.

From the very beginning, Israel assumed a position opposite to any kind of negotiation and normalization of relations between Iran and the United States. And despite its powerful lobby in the USA, it was unable to make President Obama change his mind on the "Iranian issue". Meanwhile, though Turkey played the role of a mediator between the West and Iran at one time, it was subsequently sidelined from the process of nuclear settlement.

I think the most important factor in strengthening the role of Iran in the region is the uncontrolled actions of the Islamic State. Iran actively resists the IS, especially after the operation in Tikrit, and sides with the US on this issue. In the meantime, Israel is convinced that the instability in Syria and Iraq does not represent a threat to its national security and continues to remain silent on the issue of the IS. Turkey, in turn, believes that the confrontation between the IS and the PYD, and the resulting transfer of PKK militants to Syria through Turkey, are not a direct threat to national security. Such a position hampers the development of effective measures to counter the IS.

The United States is confident that the rapprochement with Iran will facilitate the control of the country, while Iran is not capable to resist the actions of the IS single-handedly. In this regard, let us not forget about the fact that an uncontrolled exit withdrawal of US troops from the region during President Bush's term in office created a vacuum, which is one of the factors contributing to the formation of the IS. While supporting the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Iran, Turkey must concurrently support the forces of anti-IS coalition so as not to allow Iran to use the advantages of the vacuum created in the Middle East.

- And finally, it would be interesting to know your opinion on the current anti-Chinese atmosphere in Turkey, which originated during the month of Ramadan. Although officials who are ethnic Uigurs were forbidden to fast in China, the observance of religious traditions and the freedom of conscience were not restricted for the rest of the Muslims. Photo and video materials, which supposedly reflected the atrocities of the Chinese towards their fellow Uigur citizens and were disseminated by the Turkish media, have been recognized as false. In your opinion, who is going to benefit from the intensity of emotions around this problem on the eve of President Erdogan's visit to China?

- First, it is to be understood that it is impossible to solve the "Uigur issue" by attacking Koreans that were mistook for Chinese in Turkish cities. Eastern Turkistan is an autonomous region within China. To ensure favourable conditions for the stay of Turkic Muslims on this territory, Turkey needs to develop high-quality economic and social relations with them. Otherwise, the street protests in Turkey can strengthen the influence of Al-Qa'eda, the IS and similar organizations on Turkic Uigurs. It is very important to note that the weakening of mutual trust as a result of the riots may significantly worsen relations between countries. Such provocative actions may weaken relations between Turkey and China.