A SYRIAN-STYLE CONUNDRUM

The participants in the multilateral negotiations on a peaceful settlement to the situation in Syria made an honourable attempt to kickstart a serious diplomatic dialogue. Nineteen delegations - representatives of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (the Russian Federation, the United States, China, France and Great Britain), Germany and Italy, the heads of EU foreign ministries, the UN Secretary General's special envoy on Syria, and representatives of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Qatar, Iran, the UAE, Jordan and Oman - gathered in Vienna on 30 October.

As a result of these efforts a document emerged at the luxurious Imperial Hotel setting out the steps necessary to overcome the crisis. The essential points are these: Syria must remain a singular secular country, but both the government and the opposition must be a part of the negotiations, which presumes the formation of a caretaker government. A new constitution of the SAR [Syrian Arab Republic] must be created. The question of holding general elections under UN control will be drawn up separately. Supplies of humanitarian aid must be provided throughout Syria. All terrorists - the Islamic State group (IS) and other terrorist organizations, a list of which is expected to be agreed under UN control - must be destroyed. The participants in the Vienna talks will, together with the UN, endeavour to achieve a cease-fire throughout Syria while continuing the fight against the terrorists. The future of President Bashar al-Assad remains a source of contention.

Compared with the "torpid" Geneva-2 at the beginning of 2014, the results are obvious. The very fact that such a mixed bag of people - ideological and geopolitical rivals, suffice to mention just Iran and Saudi Arabia - came to Geneva shows that this was an occasion that was long overdue. The situation is, indeed, critical and has to be resolved. First of all, this tangle of differences cannot be solved by force of arms. Second, if the conflict continues, there will be an increase in the flow of refugees into Europe, which is already being choked by an intensification of nationalist emotions. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 704,000 migrants have entered the EU since the beginning of the year, and the Greek Foreign Ministry warns that another 300,000 - mainly women and children - could be "heading" for the Old World in the near future from camps in Jordan and Lebanon. This has led, for example, to a situation where German Chancellor Angela Merkel, surrounded by migrants, is rapidly losing her credibility - not just at home, but throughout the EU. France, which has perceptibly moved to one side and is also taking in migrants, is worried that her diplomacy has now been left on the sidelines.

One forms the impression that many of the sides involved in the events in Syria have their weak sides and reasons for seeking some kind of political settlement. For example, Turkey is worried by its domestic political situation and the Kurdish problem. Egypt fears a strengthening of Muslim Brotherhood. Iran is incurring casualties in Syria of which, incidentally, little is known except that a number of Iranian generals have been killed. However, the main players in Syria are the USA and Russia.

A month has passed since Russia began its air raids in Syria, and it has shown that despite the intensity and effectiveness of the Russian air strikes, al-Assad's army is too weak to wage an effective struggle against its enemies whoever they may be - terrorists or rebels. Even despite the super-precision of Russian intelligence, it is still not bombing the regular army with all its trappings. At the end of the day, IS has no basic identification markings or a central command, they can move around for as long as they like and hide and "pose" as other groups, local inhabitants and even the environment. They can cross the border - go, for example, to Iraq, rest up, regroup and come back again. One of the most intriguing arguments in the run-up to the Vienna meeting was whether Moscow would help Iraq fight against IS. It is not clear whether the Iraqi government had asked about this or not and there has been no official confirmation. In any event, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen made it clear that Iraq does not regard itself as Russia's military ally in the struggle against IS, and the joint centre for the struggle against IS in Baghdad, in which Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria are taking part, is exclusively for the purpose of exchanging information on questions of security. There is also talk of Russia bombing terrorists in Libya, where Russian drones are known to be active at the moment and Russian diplomats are busy associating with Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. 

Taking all these things into account, it is clear that Russia is afraid of getting bogged down in Syria, although it doesn't show it. Bashar al-Assad's sudden visit to Moscow was a kind of message to the West from the Kremlin. In order to touch base with the Syrian president, it wasn't necessary to arrange a meeting in the Russian capital, but Putin feels it is important to once again emphasize al-Assad's legitimacy and that he, and Russia which is standing behind him, can never be excluded from the search for a political settlement to the Syrian crisis. And that's how it worked out - it was the Russian and American foreign policy departments that announced to the world public the results of the meeting in Vienna. But at the same time it is important to remember that in Syria Moscow is not protecting Bashar al-Assad but its own interests. At this moment in time, the Kremlin's interests are with al-Assad staying in power. It was Putin himself who owned up to what Russia is doing when answering a question at the Valdai forum: "If a fight is inevitable, make sure you throw the first punch." But such tactics don't always work as Putin knows, so he doesn't want to cross the red line.

It's the same with the US - they clearly want to push on with their plans, but they are not at all obsessed with the idea of getting rid of al-Assad at all costs. Russia's direct intervention in the conflict has thrown Middle Eastern affairs into disarray and turned the Syrian conflict into a new direction, and now the US wants to leave itself as much room as possible to manoeuvre. The Wall Street Journal, quoting a source in the White House, literally a few hours before the start of the meeting in Vienna, wrote that the Obama administration was prepared to alter its position on al-Assad. As the US ambassador to Moscow, John Tefft, explained, the US believes that al-Assad cannot be part of a long-term future Syria, and it would appear that the key word in this sentence is "long-term". Indeed, at the Vienna meeting, Washington, as before, insisted that al-Assad must go but did not make it a necessary condition for future negotiations.

And the US did something else - in Vienna Secretary of State John Kerry spoke about the deployment in Syria of a small contingent of US special operations forces, which would allegedly number not more than 50 and would be in the northern part of the country and would "coordinate the efforts of the Syrian opposition on the ground". Besides this, extra American fighter bombers and attack aircraft would be sent to bases in Turkey. White House spokesman Eric Schultz said earlier that the US doesn't rule out carrying out "limited operations with its partners" under certain circumstances. Analysts believe that the Americans will concentrate on al-Rakka, which is regarded as the terrorists' centre in Syria, and on the town of Ramadi, the capital of the Iraqi province of Anbar. At the same time, the NBC TV channel asserts that the White House will soon announce plans for conducting special ground operations in Syria.

But surely the Americans aren't about to go full pelt into the region? On the social networks the Russians proceeded to mock Washington, which had prophesied a "second Afghanistan" for Moscow in the near future. [Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov stressed that a US military ground operation in Syria must be agreed with Damascus. The American media are saying that it is Barack Obama's national security advisors, irritated by the lack of serious success in these directions, who are persuading him to increase the contingent in Syria. However, no-one knows exactly how many American troops are already "under cover" in Syria and Iraq. Obama sanctioned the transfer of the first groups of special operations forces to Iraq in the summer of 2014 and today at least about 3,500 American servicemen are on "advisory operations" in northern Iraq.    

Meanwhile, Turkey has been making noises in the skies over Northern Syria, fearing that the successes of the Syrian Kurds will inspire the Kurds in Turkey. The Turkish Air Force, which has been striking at PKK positions in south-eastern Turkish provinces and northern Iraq since July, has now begun bombing Kurdish positions in northern Syria in the town of Tal-Abyad. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed that Ankara will take all possible measures to prevent Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Bearing in mind that there will soon be elections in Turkey, Ankara's reaction is perfectly understandable.  Will the US, which was happy in the summer when Kurdish militarized formations took back Tal-Abyad from IS and declared a new province there, understand this? The initiator was the Kurdish Democratic Political Union Party (PYD), which was founded in 2003 and has links with the Turkish PKK. The Kurdish National Council, consisting of a number of Syrian Kurdish parties set up in 2011 with the support of Massoud Barzani, is also operating in Syria. They regard the al-Assad government and foreign intervention differently. But the main thing for them in this question is their own interests, and so any agreements are possible. For their part, the Americans are using the Kurds to achieve their own interests - the US regards the PKK as a terrorist organization, but the Kurds in Syria and Iraq are seen as Washington's allies. Other parties pursuing their own interests - the EU and Russia - are also keeping pace on this question.

So, the main sticking points in establishing peace in Syria are the "personal interests" of each of the parties and the lack of reliable information. This is mostly shown by the multifaced Syrian opposition which, with mind-bending rapidity changes its names and its leaders and is constantly forming various alliances, coalitions, armies, and so on with imposing and similar names. The Free Syrian Army and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces are now withdrawing into the shadows and people are now talking more about a "Syrian Arab Coalition". It is being noted that Russia has handed its partners a list of "names of virtually all the opposition groups with whom it is in contact or is prepared to contact and which could be invited to some kind of inter-Syrian meetings". Although in the past the Russian president's press secretary, Dmitriy Peskov, has said that Moscow is actively seeking representatives of the moderate Syrian opposition who could be brought into the struggle against terrorism in the country, it has been unable to find them. At literally the same time, the Russian president's special envoy for the Middle East and Africa, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, claimed that Moscow is in contact with the Syrian opposition on a regular basis, something which the representatives of some groups have denied. Either Putin doesn't know what the Foreign Ministry is doing, or Russia and the truth have become confused among the Syrian opposition, which is no wonder. For its part, the US loves to divide the opposition into radical and moderate, although again no-one knows where and by whom the criteria for defining moderation in such cases was drawn up (clearly themselves). For example, can you regard the Jabhat al-Nusra group, which became isolated from al-Qa'eda with the support of al-Baghdadi, who later announced the creation of IS, as moderate? After all, Jabhat al-Nusra is fighting against al-Assad and IS and against other opposition groups.

The negotiators have promised to arrange their next meeting no later than two weeks after the Vienna meeting. Whether it is held at all and in what format is extremely important for the future of Syria. At this moment in time the plans of the 19 diplomats seem encouraging, but not very realistic. Even if you put the question of al-Assad's future to one side, so long as there is no clearly formed opposition in Syria - with one name, one centre and common leaders - nothing else makes sense and the personal struggle between Russia and the US against IS will continue to be more like a struggle against each other. And no negotiations in luxurious European hotels will convince the world otherwise.