THE "SLEEPING CELLS" OF ISLAMIC STATE

The difficult economic situation in Russia caused by the fall in oil prices and bilateral sanctions in its confrontation with the West has created a number of problems in the country. One of them is the deterioration of the crime situation.

Although the vast majority of crimes are committed on domestic and property grounds, it must be admitted that not only does the risk of terrorist acts still remain on the agenda, it is also growing due to the open threats against Russia from the so-called Islamic State (IS), which has occupied large areas of Iraq and Syria. After Russia began bombing Syria in September last year, Islamic State declared jihad on it and later a video appeared on the Internet promising to drown Russia in a "sea of blood". Just recently, a new video was posted. Against the background of footage showing a suicide bomber blowing up a car in Dagestan, threats of massive terrorist attacks in Russia were made once again. The militants spoke in Russian.

According to various sources, from 2,500 to 5,000 (figure of the CIS Antiterrorist Centre) Russian citizens, mainly natives of the North Caucasus republics, are currently fighting for Islamic State. However, judging by numerous statements, the law enforcement are seriously concerned not so much about the probable homecoming of militants fighting in Syria as the active work of IS recruiters within Russia itself. For one militant who left, there are dozens or hundreds of sympathizers, experts say. They are called "sleeping cells" that can be very easily mobilized by jihadists in a certain period.

Recruiters work not separately, but are integrated in a stable entity with cells in the North Caucasus, the Volga region, Siberia and the Far East. Usually, three different networks interact, said the director of the Institute of International Studies, Andrey Kazantsev.

First, recruitment is carried out through the Internet. According to the General Prosecutor's Office, recently more than 8,000 sites calling for jihad were closed. Banking and other requisites for donations for jihad had been posted on them. But it's a kind of information adjustment. Then there is personal contact. And among recruiters there are a lot of people of Slavic appearance. Usually they have a good education and an excellent command of the Russian language. Recruiters find their victims on social networks or on various forums. Then those who deliver the "rookie" to the destination step in.

As a rule, the main targets for recruitment are young people - both boys and girls who believe that they have no prospects at home, are persecuted for their religious beliefs and are dissatisfied with injustice, corruption and limited self-expression surrounding them.

According to data for February-March this year, poverty among young people is 15 per cent and among the active part of the population - 17 per cent. Because of the sharp drop in the rate of the rouble, Russia is at the end of the list of countries by the size of the minimum wage.

Manipulation is also effective among people not integrated into society - we are talking about guest workers, especially illegals, most of whom exist in isolation from the outside world, communicating in very closed communities. Law enforcement agencies tend to consider the recent clashes that happen with disturbing regularity on national and religious grounds in the north - in Surgut, Nefteyugansk, Raduzhny, Khanty-Mansiysk, Salekhard - to be the result of active recruitment by Islamic State emissaries. Migrants, mainly from Central Asia actively settle in regions of the country that are attractive by their oil income. The preachers of extremism are operating in their midst. Underground organizations, including supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic State have been uncovered.

People are being manipulated very actively in prisons. In Russia, 250,000 people come out of prison every year and the same number are sentenced to imprisonment. Approximately 55 per cent of them are sentenced for a second offence. Those who serve their sentences come back without profession, money and property, angry and with criminal connections. According to experts, they are easy prey for recruitment by terrorist organizations.

Along with the above social groups, a lot of attention is paid, strange as it may seem, to representatives of the law enforcement agencies. In this case, they use dissatisfaction with the management.

It is also important to understand that not everyone recruited by Islamic State comes from poor, persecuted or oppressed strata of the population. Wahhabi gangs are often joined by financially secure people, including businessmen and children of wealthy parents. Islamic State propaganda promises those who join it justice, brotherly love and life in a state that does not repeat the mistakes made by the country in which these people live. And it is attractive not only for poor, but also for successful people.

Curiously, Islamic State ideologues admit that these and other recruitment methods are often taken not from the practice of Islamist terrorist movements, including Al-Qaeda, but from left-wing terrorist movements that operated not so long ago in Latin America and Europe. 

In 2015, 770 militants and their accomplices were detained in the North Caucasus, and 156 militants in the North Caucasus were killed, including 20 of the 26 leaders of the groups that swore allegiance to Islamic State. According to media reports, in Dagestan alone, 40 recruiters operating in Chechnya, as well as in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Stavropol and Krasnodar Territory were arrested and convicted. In the same Dagestan, according to the prosecutor's office of the republic, 15,000 people, including the wives, widows and sisters of militants, their children and parents were registered.

According to a member of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Adalbi Shkhagoshev, legislation changes virtually "online", in accordance with the situation, studying how the terrorist manages to escape from prosecution. For this reason, laws are becoming stricter.

For example, the age of criminal responsibility for acts of terrorism, hostage-taking and deliberate false information about a terrorist act has been lowered from 20 to 14 years. Compensation for damages, including moral, caused by a terrorist act is paid both by the person who committed these acts and by his family and loved ones, if the property is acquired as a result of terrorist activities.

Supporters of the further tightening of legislation suggest that the recruiter whose "client" committed a proven offence should be recognized as a terrorist and sentenced to life imprisonment instead of 5-7 years as it happens now.

This "tightening of the screws" does not get the approval of many layers of Russian society. And this is an explanation for that. During the first and second Chechen wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2000) the anti-terrorist policy of the state was dominated by tough police methods of dealing with terrorists and their accomplices. However, it did not give the desired effect - dead militants were replaced by new ones.

Only in the autumn of 2010, were mechanisms aimed at reducing social tensions launched. In the North Caucasus republics, adaptation commissions were set up at local government bodies and a constructive dialogue began between the followers of different Islamic religious movements. The leadership of the republic began to say that people cannot be persecuted for believing, praying and dressing differently. This immediately had a positive effect.

Many of those hiding in the forests of the North Caucasus were faced with a choice - to surrender and get prison sentences if they have committed a crime, or to be destroyed in the course of counter-terrorist operations. Those who were drawn into gangs, but did not commit crimes return to civilian life.

Extremism is not only the result of the influence of external forces. It is also possible as a byproduct of the processes that occur in society. It contains an element of protest against what is not right in a country in the field of political, economic, social, cultural and ideological relations. Prevention of extremism should be comprehensive and not only involve the use of force and law enforcement methods. Otherwise, it turns out to be an endless war with the symptoms of the disease rather than its causes.