OLD PRESIDENT, NEW CHALLENGES

President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan Rouhani was re-elected for the second term, which means he will continue the policy of warm dialogue with the West. But will the West and primarily Washington accept the strengthening of Tehran's regional positions, which will entail inevitable increase in cooperation between Iran and the EU and the U.S.?

Reformists versus Conservatives and vice versa

Hierarchically, the president of Iran is the second powerful person after the spiritual leader (ayatollah), Ali Khamenei, who has been ruling the country since 1989. Nevertheless, the president is by no means a symbolic figure. He is an official with sufficiently broad powers that exerts a significant influence on the political line of official Tehran. During his first term, Hassan Rouhani has personally proved that his post has a lot to do with the implementation of the Iranian politics.

Two years ago, Rouhani has managed to secure a deal with the West despite the opposition of the most conservative part of the clerical elite - the adoption of a joint universal plan of action to limit the nuclear program of Tehran in exchange for the abolition of international sanctions against Iran. Majority of Iranians supported this achievement assuming that emerging from the isolation would lead to a flow of large-scale foreign investments, as well as significant economic improvement.

A certain degree of improvement in the economic situation occurred already during the first term of Rouhani's presidency, which apparently played in his favour in the election. In particular, compared to 2013 when the national currency (Iranian rial) depreciated by 40%, the process was reverted by 2016 with the inflation rate falling to 7.5%.

Many voters are impressed by Rouhani's policy of maintaining and developing normal relations with the Western states, including the U.S. The expansion of trade and political relations with Japan, China and other leading economies of Asia also include the achievements of the re-elected Iranian president in foreign policy.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Rouhani achieved such an impressive support in the elections. With 57% of the votes, he greatly bypassed his main rival, the former General Attorney Ibrahim Raisi (35%).

Rouhani's re-election can be recognized as yet another success of the reformists within the Iranian establishment. The municipal elections held on May 19 (on the same day with the presidential elections), when the reformists and mostly the supporters of Rouhani won the process, demonstrated the strengthening of their positions in the internal domain.

But does this mean that Hassan Rouhani should expect a completely trouble-free period of presidency, characterised by a lack of any strong domestic political pressure? Not at all. His opponents represented by orthodox clerics rely on a fairly large number of disadvantaged persons, including poor peasants. In addition, part of the population is dissatisfied with the pace of the economic breakthrough, since it expected a rather rapid emergence from the isolation in return of the deal with the West.

It is also worth mentioning the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful organisation with punitive potential and considerable financial resources. The IRGC leadership does not enjoy the strengthening of the reformists after Rouhani's re-election either. Therefore, in order to overcome the opposition of the Guards to reforms, the incumbent president will have to mobilise even more social support. There is good reason to believe that Rouhani, who has successfully rubbed through the hardship of the first presidential term, will be able to accomplish this task too.

External Pressure

Meanwhile, the new foreign policy conjuncture around Iran seems to cause a much greater headache for Rouhani. Apparently, it is likely that we will witness yet another round of escalation of the so-called Iranian problem. And the reason is the dissatisfaction of the new U.S. President Donald Trump with the terms of the nuclear deal. Recently, Washington has significantly toughened its anti-Iranian rhetoric, openly warning of its intention to impede the strengthening of Tehran's positions in the Middle East. This was followed by the unquenchable anti-Iranian ardour of Israel, which enjoys the relations with yet another pro-Jewish American president after the leave of Barack Obama, who has repeatedly expressed the dissatisfaction of his administration with Tel Aviv's stubbornness in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Donald Trump is not averse to deploying almost a real anti-Iranian front in the Middle East judging from the results of his recent visits to Saudi Arabia and Israel. At the Arab-Islamic-American summit held in Riyadh, we could hear the calls not only to unite the efforts of the international community in the fight against terrorism, but also to counter Iran's influence in the Middle East, which apparently is a matter of great concern to the U.S., Israel, and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

Trump was quite frank on this issue: "During my visit to Saudi Arabia, I met with many leaders of the Arab and Muslim world. They expressed the same concern that we share, regarding the ‘Islamic State’, the growing ambitions of Iran and the danger of extremism." At a joint press conference with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, Trump was even more categorical: "There is a growing realisation among the Arab countries that they have common cause with Israel in the threat posed by Iran. What has happened with Iran has brought many other parts of the Middle East towards Israel."

The anti-Iranian stance of the Trump administration was also manifested after the introduction of new economic sanctions against Iran to limit the further development of Iran’s missile program. Teheran’s reaction to this decision was quick and sharp. President Rouhani said that his country would continue testing missiles "if it is technically necessary", and Iran did not need someone's permission to carry out such measures.

Obviously, one of the reasons why Washington toughened the conversation with Tehran, which after the deal with the West had an opportunity to expand its cooperation with the EU, is the reluctance to give the Iranians a chance for an economic breakthrough. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that the U.S. cancels the previously concluded agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. Experts admit that the confrontation between Iran and the West will develop mainly in line with the already existing regional conflicts, especially the conflict in Syria. During the long-term bloody war in this country, Tehran acts as an ally of Syrian President Bashar Assad. So, it again goes against the American interests trying to overthrow the ruling Syrian regime.

North-South and the "Wonderful Neighbourhood"

The toughening of American pressure on Iran, also due to the latter’s stance on Syria, will push the Islamic Republic to further rapprochement with Russia. As known, Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara are initiators of the Astana process for settling the situation in Syria and jointly act as the guarantors of ceasefire between the forces of the Syrian government and the opposition.

However, Iran and Russia go hand in hand not only because of their largely identical interests in the Syrian crisis, but also for the implementation of promising regional projects. One of them is the development of the North-South transport corridor that will connect Northern Europe with South-East Asia through the unification of the railways of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia.

Thus, Azerbaijan acts as an infrastructure hub between Russia and Iran, which was confirmed by the results of the meeting of the presidents of the three countries held in Baku in August last year. At his first press conference after the re-election, Hassan Rouhani assured that cooperation in the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia format will continue and the next trilateral meeting is likely to be held in Tehran.

Hassan Rouhani's assessment of Azerbaijan's role in Iran's policy is noteworthy. At the same press conference, he praised the level of the Azerbaijani-Iranian cooperation, saying that both countries have "good relations and coordinated interaction" and "Azerbaijan is a remarkable neighbour of the Islamic Republic." Rouhani stressed that Iran and Azerbaijan are building upon strategic relations. A similar statement is contained in the congratulatory message of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Hassan Rouhani on the occasion of his victory in the elections. "I attach great importance to the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. Growing up to the level of strategic cooperation, these ties are encouraging," said Ilham Aliev.

The recognition of the strategic nature of the Azerbaijani-Iranian cooperation, as well as the key role of our country in the implementation of the North-South project refutes the analytical outcome of Armenian politicians and experts. They still harbour illusions that Armenia, regardless of its aggression against Azerbaijan and the occupation of our lands, can overcome isolation from regional processes through the alleged transit of Iranian gas through Armenia and the establishment of a communication corridor linking the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea through Armenia, etc. However, all these unrealisable projects will remain in the imagination of Yerevan strategists. In any case, the pragmatist Rouhani is certainly not a supporter of such fancy theories.