26 April 2024

Friday, 10:54

RE-BALANCING THE RELATIONS

Will the Western power centres be able to improve the shaken unity?

Author:

15.02.2021

With the new US administration in power, discussions about the prospects for Euro-Atlantic unity has become particularly relevant. How will the Western power centres interact with each other and what does this interaction promise for global politics? This is one of the most significant issues on international agenda in terms of the further development of global processes.

 

Challenged by changes

Donald Trump’s presidency has been a serious test for the dialogue between the Western states. Obviously, European Union did not approve and even rejected his attempts to isolate the United States through building relations even with the closest allies solely on the basis of the interests of American nationalism. This has shaken, to a certain extent, the power of transatlantic bonds.

It is no coincidence that the leading European states have generally welcomed the defeat of Trumpism and Joe Biden’s Democratic administration in Washington, especially when Mr. Biden declared the intention of his administration to restore the transatlantic unity as a priority of its foreign policy.

Apparently, the new US administration sends quite explicit signals to its European allies, meaning that the US would have refrained from making ambiguous steps, such as torpedoing treaties on global strategic security, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord, and breaking up the deal on the Iranian nuclear program, had it not been for the rule of radical Republicans in the White House. This list also includes a number of other measures, such as the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, blocking the activities of the World Health Organization, etc., which Trump explained by absolute adherence to the interests of the United States. Not to mention the tariffs imposed by Trump on EU products, in response to which Brussels had to impose tariffs on agricultural and industrial goods from the United States. The Biden administration, however, made it clear that it is considering revising the customs policy towards the European Union.

Brussels has clearly expressed its interest to improve the Euro-Atlantic alliance through the statements of various EU leaders. Thus, President of the European Council Charles Michel hopes to build new relations between the EU and the United States, arguing that it is necessary to achieve this "for the sake of a stronger America, a stronger European Union and a better world." French President Emmanuel Macron expressed solidarity with his American counterpart on the importance of strengthening transatlantic unity and agreed to cooperate with Washington on this issue, in particular on foreign policy issues concerning China, Russia and the Middle East.

However, is it safe to assume that the four years of Trump's rule, when even the unconditional military patronage of the US was questionable in Europe, has left no trace in the context of the transatlantic unity preached by Biden?

To answer this question, it is worth considering another quote by Charles Michel said on the occasion of Biden's assumption of the presidency: “America seems to have changed … and the rest of the world has also changed. Likewise, the way the United States views the European Union may also have to change. The EU … does not wait for permission to take its own decisions.”

Apparently, the EU leadership means that the foreign policy trends initiated under the Trump administration, as well as the shocking events of recent years in the US may continue. Disappointingly for the EU, it is possible to assume this turn of events, given Biden's thorny path to power, let alone Trump's plans to take revenge in the 2024 election. In other words, is Europe safe from the same Trumpian practice of neglecting its interests under the Biden administration? Should the EU, given the validity of such fears, abandon the plans developed by its think tanks (under the influence of the American strategy) to strengthen its independence from the US on international arena?

Remarkably, Emmanuel Macron stated that "the strategic autonomy of the European Union will level the balance in transatlantic relations, when Brussels is completely dependent on American weapons... Europeans must be in charge of their own security interests and put an end to the progressively insane relationship when we were under the protection of the US army but in exchange had to buy military equipment from Washington." Based on these considerations, Macron makes a dominant statement: "The strategic autonomy" will not be an obstacle, but "good news for transatlantic relations."

But even this wording has a certain degree of inconsistency, as not everyone in the European Union likes the idea of "autonomy from the US." Thus, unlike the European heavyweight players – France and Germany – their “junior partners” from Eastern Europe (in particular Poland and the Baltic states) do not hide their discontent with the attempts of supranational EU institutions to influence their clearly pro-American aspirations. By the way, it is the Eastern European countries that criticize Germany for its support of the Nord Stream 2 gas project initiated by Russia, while Germany protests against the US sanctions against the project participants, claiming that they "violate the energy sovereignty of Europe."

In addition, there is a factor of Eurosceptics, who had felt much more comfortable under the “nationally oriented” Trump than Biden’s proclaimed return of American globalism.

But, most importantly, there is also Great Britain, which has recently left the EU. In fact, geopolitical configuration on both sides of the Atlantic will also largely depend on the British position.

 

Foggy Albion

After almost half a century as part of the EU, UK has set out on a free voyage. In January 2021, Brexit culminated in the ratification of the trade and cooperation agreement between London and Brussels. Now the interested Western capitals are wondering about Britain’s position on the world stage. It is worth mentioning that even before the Brexit, Britain had been the main ally of the United States, but remained committed to its own interests on a number of fundamentally important international problems. However, in recent years, France and Germany have improved their leading positions in the EU amid Britain's refusal to enter the Euro and Schengen zones, and have significantly raised their standards as leading American allies after the launch of Brexit.

Which course – pro-American or pro-European – will London stick to? Will it prefer to take on a role of the bridge between the EU and the US in the transatlantic unity, which has somewhat weakened in recent years?

French president demanded immediate clarity on this issue as well, urging the UK to decide whether it will focus on the US or the EU. At the same time, Macron warned that if the UK takes a course towards the United States, this could lead to disagreements with the European Union, primarily in economic terms, since it would contradict the EU market rules.

However, we should bear in mind that even when Britain was approaching the finish line with the Brexit, it was driven by the desire not only to get rid of pressure from Brussels, but also to achieve full economic and political sovereignty, including in relations with the United States. Therefore, London expects to become a completely self-sufficient and independent player in the international arena.

A striking example of the ‘special’ position of UK in Euro-Atlantic community is its relationship with Turkey. While the United States and the leading EU states, primarily France, promote the aggravation of relations with Turkey, which threatens even its membership in NATO, London is developing a strategic partnership with Turkey. As a proof, UK and Turkey concluded a free trade agreement just before 2021.

 

China, Russia...

Meanwhile, there are a number of other issues impeding the development of a common position of the West. One of them is the issue of China. Thus, contrary to the consent of the US and after almost seven years of negotiations, EU has reached an agreement with China, which is expected to strengthen business activities in bilateral relations. Brussels acknowledged that the Biden administration is unhappy with the European-Chinese investment deal, allegedly because it "will not be useful in terms of transatlantic cooperation." It implies that, despite the expected softening of Washington's "Chinese policy" during the Biden administration, the US will continue to consider China as its main geopolitical and economic enemy, same as during the Trump administration.

Likewise, we can expect a possible rise of contradictions between the US and the EU regarding Russia, given the intention of the Biden administration to engage in "tough containment of the Kremlin." Although the EU, and particularly France and Germany, declare the need to maintain a dialogue with Russia to solve, but not worsen the problems. It is also worth mentioning that the American and British approaches on Russia follow the same line, which is to limit the political dialogue with and tighten economic sanctions against the Russian Federation.

It is likely that the main scope of international problems outlined above will determine the dialogue between the Western states in the coming months. It is the progress of this dialogue that will largely indicate how well the transatlantic unity develops to ensure the leadership of the West currently and, possibly, in the future.



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