PECULIARITIES OF NEW ERA

At a panel session of the recent St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made some statements that caused a great resonance in the post-Soviet space and throughout the world. Motives and content of these statements make it possible to draw a number of important conclusions not only about the political position of Kazakhstan and its leader, but also about the possible nature of further geopolitical processes in Eurasia, primarily in the post-Soviet space.

Tokayev at SPIEF

President Tokayev made it clear that Kazakhstan did not and would not recognise the independence of separatist entities of Donetsk (DPR) and Lugansk (LPR) in south-eastern Ukraine. "The estimates show that implementing the right to self-determination for each nation across the globe will give birth to more than 500-600 states instead of existing 193. It would be a chaos. That is why we will not recognise Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The same principle also applies to quasi-state entities of Lugansk and Donetsk," said President Tokayev.

His statements sounded in contradiction to the opinion of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was sitting next to him. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Russian leader has tried to justify it with the need to protect LPR and DPR and insisted that the "special military operation" in the neighbouring state complies with the principles and norms of international law.

In addition, Tokayev rejected the possibility of Kazakhstan not joining the US and European sanctions against Russia because "sanctions are sanctions". It means that Kazakhstan, with its economy closely linked to the global economy, is oriented towards the leading global economic centres represented by the EU, the US, Britain, China and Turkey, and does not want to become a platform or a tool to help circumvent Western sanctions against Russia.

Many politicians and experts both in Russia and around the world evaluated Tokayev's statements as a challenge to the Kremlin and to Putin personally. Remarkably, the Kazakh president refused to accept the Russian Order of Alexander Nevsky. Although the Kazakh media quoted the press office of the head of state and explained this step by Tokayev’s decision not to accept local and foreign awards before the end of his tenure. Similarly, for example, Tokayev refused to accept the highest state award of Kyrgyzstan, the Order of Manas, during his visit to the country.

However, these explanations, not to mention the political and international legal basis of the Kazakh president's statements, do not seem to have convinced the Russian circles, which have previously threatened Kazakhstan with territorial claims, political problems and economic pressure. It is difficult to say whether Moscow can really intimidate Nur-Sultan. What we can say is that right after Tokayev’s statements in Saint Petersburg, Russia initially reduced and then stopped shipping the Kazakh oil on Caspian Pipeline Consortium in Novorossisk. According to the official Russian version, they were clearing the area from munitions left in the port from the Second World War. Either way, President Tokayev’s statements have raised a number of issues that characterise not only the current level of dialogue between Nur-Sultan and Moscow, but also directly relate to the fate of the post-Soviet Eurasia.

Armenian influence

First and foremost, it is worth noting one significant point here. In his keynote speech at the forum, President Tokayev, as an experienced diplomat, avoided a number of sensitive issues concerning, in particular, the war in Ukraine and the anti-Russian sanctions. However, at the panel session with President Putin, Tokayev had to answer an openly provocative question, which came from the moderator of the discussion, Margarita Simonyan, Editor-in-chief of Russia Today. She is well-known for her regular criticism of Nur-Sultan's policies. During the January 2022 political crisis in Kazakhstan, she called to force the country to obey Moscow's decisions and to introduce a national and language policy that meets Moscow’s ambitions. Simonyan's husband, director and propagandist Tigran Keosayan, who recently threatened Kazakhstan with the ‘Ukrainian example’ against the country, also allows himself similar anti-Kazakh statements. For his provocative statements, he was finally banned from entering Kazakhstan.

Obviously, in addition to a group of Russian deputies, journalists, and other public figures known for their support to destructive forces, the enemies of friendly relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, President Tokayev also meant this Armenian couple, who pretend to be the mind, honour and consciousness of the ‘Russian world’. Equally adequate wat the response of the Kazakh leader to Simonyan's attempt to catch him by surprise, with an obvious intention to do her nefarious trick in the presence of the Russian president.

No ambitions

Yet another and much more significant point than the provocations of the Simonyan-Keosayan couple was the semantic value of President Tokayev's statements on the unacceptability of separatist threat for the whole world. After all, it is obvious that separatism can well lead to a situation when some of the 500-600 new countries replacing the existing 193 may contain the territories of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Tokayev's reference to the danger of the existence and support of quasi-state formations for global security and stability is a subtle and unambiguous message addressed to Russia itself.

Also, during the panel session, President Putin once again made statements about the territorial ‘gifts’ allegedly made by Russia to other former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR. He referred to the entire Soviet Union as ‘historical Russia’, but in doing so, willingly or unwillingly, only confirmed the danger of such claims. Especially in the context of Russia's own interests, which now has to think about defending, for example, Kaliningrad (historically known as German Konigsberg) amid fierce confrontation with the West.

The most important point of the polemics between presidents Tokayev and Putin was the former's demonstration of Kazakhstan’s unwavering will to defend its independence and sovereignty, no matter how explicit or veiled the threats are.

At the same time, Mr. Tokayev’s participation in the SPIEF undoubtedly confirmed the high level of strategic partnership and alliance between Moscow and Nur-Sultan. Mr. Tokayev expressed Kazakhstan’s interest in developing such relations with the following words: “In fact, we do not have any issues that can be manipulated so as to promote discord between our nations”. After the forum, Mr. Tokayev added that he was happy to have close relations with his Russian counterpart, whom he considers a reliable ally of his country.

Tokayev's visit to St. Petersburg also marked the limits of the Russian-Kazakh alliance defined by the inadmissibility of crossing Kazakhstan's red lines. Primarily, the rejection of any encroachment on the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan, which can be seen in the position of influential political circles of Russia. Most importantly, President Tokayev made it clear that the allied, partnership relations of Kazakhstan with Russia do not mean subordination to the interests of the latter. Thus, speaking about the tragic January events in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh president expressed his gratitude for the support not specifically to Russia and its troops, but to the CSTO as a whole. "Some people in Russia are distorting the situation arguing that Kazakhstan should bow down to Russia for saving Kazakhstan. I think such statements are completely unjustified," Mr. Tokayev said.

Thus, Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a country ready to defend its sovereignty, not intending to become a vassal of any major power centre of global politics, be it Russia, China or the West.

This desire to strengthen state independence is not only characteristic of Kazakhstan, but is a general trend in the political course of almost all the post-Soviet now-independent states. This, points to the impossibility of realising any ‘historical’ ambitions that imply the development of relations based on subordination of one to the other.

Obviously, no regional or global integration in the 21st century is possible to realise forcibly. The future of Kazakhstan and the Central Asia makes no provision for the revival of 'historical empires' either. The nuances of the dialogue between Moscow and Nur-Sultan confirm this too.