3 May 2024

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TOLERANCE THRESHOLD

Reasons behind the crisis in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations

Author:

15.11.2022

Iran continues to take measures that worsen its relations with Azerbaijan. In response, Azerbaijan takes adequate measures to counter the confrontation policy of its southern neighbour.

 

Tehran supports Armenia

Since the restoration of independence back in 1991, Azerbaijan has pursued a course of developing good neighbourly and friendly relations with Iran. However, recent developments demonstrate that Tehran is purposefully destroying the potential of bilateral cooperation established over decades. It seems that the implementation of activities contrary to Baku's interests is increasingly becoming a vector of the Islamic Republic's regional policy.

After the 44-day war, when Azerbaijan liberated the regions of Garabagh and Eastern Zangezur bordering Iran, Tehran regularly declares its commitment to the inviolability of borders of the regional states, while emphasising that the territorial integrity of Armenia is a red line for it. But if Iran is so sensitive to the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of its neighbours, why has it remained silent for 30 years about the occupation of Azerbaijani territories and the violation of its internationally recognised borders by Armenia? Why did not Tehran consider Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories as a red line? Now it is so zealously concerned about the territorial integrity of Armenia, although it has never been violated by anyone before.

The answers to these questions are obvious. For three decades of occupation of Azerbaijani territories, Iran benefited from the expansion of its border with Armenia. Iran, unlike Turkey, did not block its border with Armenia. Rather, it supported Armenia with necessary resources, including gas and electricity so necessary for the survival of Armenia. During the 44-day war, however, Iran provided a transit route for military supplies and weapons through its territory to help the crushingly defeated Armenia. With the end of the war Iran continued, without Baku's permission, to send vehicles to the mountainous part of Garabagh, Azerbaijan, which is part of the zone of temporary deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. This illegal practice was stopped only after the establishment of Azerbaijani police and customs checkpoint posts along the Azerbaijani section of the Gorus-Gafan motor-road.

However, following Azerbaijan’s setting of the new regional reality after the victory in the 44-day war and restoring its territorial integrity, Iran has been extremely concerned about the integrity of its border with Armenia. Even the hypothetical assumption of such border change frightens Tehran. By the way, Iranian mullahs continue to call Armenia 'a friendly and brotherly country'.

Hence Tehran's rejection of the prospect of creating the Zangezur corridor, a transport link between Nakhchivan and the rest of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as stipulated in the November 2020 trilateral statement signed between the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia. Iran views the Zangezur corridor as an option to connect its Turkic neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Therefore, Iran is trying to prevent the further strengthening of the strategic alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey in regional politics. This factor is so unacceptable to Tehran that even its declared commitment to pan-Islamic solidarity pales in comparison.

Thus, by expressing fears about alleged threats to Armenia's territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders, Iran in fact tries to counter Azerbaijan's leading role in the South Caucasus and its strategic alliance with Turkey. Despite Armenia's crimes against Azerbaijan and the destruction of the cultural heritage of the Azerbaijani people on the occupied lands, including the destruction and desecration of mosques, Iran yet positions itself as the "defender of Muslims", but continues to support its Islamophobic and Turkophobic neighbour. This is one of the reasons why Tehran so hastily opened a consulate in Gafan, Western Zangezur, which is original Azerbaijani land, now part of the Republic of Armenia. Another reason was the recent visit of the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Iran.

 

Baku responds adequately

Worried about Azerbaijan's strengthening after the 44-day war, Iran is also trying to motivate its position by the development of friendly relations between Baku and Israel, "the enemy of the Islamic Republic". Tehran even tries to present its rapprochement with Armenia as a reaction to the Azerbaijani-Israeli partnership.

But first, Iran's close cooperation with Armenia began long before the establishment of political contacts between Azerbaijan and Israel. Secondly, what is the so-called Zionist threat to Iran that Tehran implies referring to the Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation? Since its independence, Azerbaijan has repeatedly proved that it will never allow any external force that might put Baku against Iran. Even during the most difficult times for the Islamic Republic, when it faced a real threat of an American-Israeli military attack due to Tehran’s nuclear programme, Azerbaijan has firmly declared that it would never become a platform for attacks on its southern neighbour.

However, after the 44-day war Iran openly views Azerbaijan in the context of a Zionist and terrorist threat. This only confirms Tehran's rejection of Azerbaijan's victory over Armenia. To express support to this position, Iran regularly conducts military exercises near the Azerbaijani border, such as the recent large-scale manoeuvres of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

However, these steps further reveal the anti-Azerbaijani nature of Tehran's policy. But Tehran will fail to gain any regional dividends. Not to mention that these actions will in no way stop Azerbaijan in defending its national interests. It is no coincidence that President Ilham Aliyev in his speech in Shusha on the occasion of the Victory Day said: "We dictate the rules here. We are the main force here. Our army has demonstrated heroism, professionalism and selflessness. If necessary, we will demonstrate this again. We will get what we want. Everyone knows and must know this. And so must those who conduct military exercises near our border to support Armenia. No one can intimidate us.”

Baku's response to the IRGC's military démarche on the Iranian-Azerbaijani border was the military exercise of the Azerbaijani Special Forces on the southern borders of the country. The military exercise led by Lieutenant General Hikmet Mirzayev, commander of the Special Forces, also involved units and subunits of the Air Force and Rocket and Artillery Forces.

Thus, Baku responded to yet another serious Iranian provocation against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. "Recently, a number of social networks published an appeal to the government of Iran by the so-called organisation Nakhchivan People's Movement of Iran on behalf of the local population,” says the November 7 statement by the State Security Service (SSS) of Azerbaijan. Allegedly "the population of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan experiences serious issues concerning the security, science, food and wishes to voluntarily join the Islamic Republic of Iran". In response to these provocations, SSS pointed out that the service was taking appropriate measures and stated the following: "Publication of such nonsense and provocative information by prominent circles with a hostile stance towards our country is unacceptable and disgusting. The state of Azerbaijan and its political leadership are the guarantors of safe and secure living conditions throughout the country, including in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is an integral part of Azerbaijan.”

 

Failed export of the Islamic revolution

Meanwhile, Tehran's policy against the interests of Baku clearly reflects the former’s deep disappointment at the failure of the plan of Iranian mullahs to export the Islamic revolution to Azerbaijan. Indeed, contrary to hopes and calculations of the supporters of the export, Northern Azerbaijan, i.e. the Republic of Azerbaijan has restored its national independence and has chosen the path of secular statehood. Azerbaijan’s closest ally in the international arena is the fraternal republic of Turkey.

For a long time the Iranian mullah regime tried to spread its influence in the Republic of Azerbaijan through a number of Iranian structures that gained access to its territory in the process of interstate cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran. Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the good neighbourly relations between the two countries, various Iranian institutions acted counterproductively in different regions of Azerbaijan. Through humanitarian aid campaigns for the poor, as well as social, cultural and religious measures, they selected people who became fanatical warriors of the Islamic revolution. In both figurative and literal sense, given the facts of recruiting and training Azerbaijani citizens in special camps in Iran and a number of other countries under varying degrees of Iranian influence. The creation of pro-Iranian agents in Azerbaijan was also carried out intensively through the virtual space—a media network serving Tehran's interests under the control of Iranian residents.

Azerbaijan has successfully suppressed this extensive network of agents of Iranian influence. On November 1, SSS of Azerbaijan disclosed a report on an armed group created by the Iranian special services. Thanks to immediate measures, it was possible to detain 19 members of the organised criminal group and to collect many evidences of their involvement in the religious and extremist criminal acts, including religious literature and relevant video materials banned in Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the practical consequences of Tehran's policy of exporting the Islamic revolution demonstrate that it is merely a cover for the goals and objectives of Iranian, or rather Persian, nationalism. This was most evident in Iran's disregard of Armenia's anti-Azerbaijani policy.

President Ilham Aliyev also hinted at this fact in his statement: "We have established close links with Muslim countries and explained to them that Armenia was pursuing an aggressive policy not only against us, but also against the entire Muslim world. Those who destroy mosques cannot be friends of Muslims. Can leaders of Muslim countries embrace those who destroy mosques? Can they hug and kiss them? This is hypocrisy, this is betrayal. There is no other name for it.”

 

Factor of southern Azerbaijanis

Iran is making every effort to demonstrate that the very existence of a well-established, strong, dynamically developing Azerbaijan is perceived by Iran's political elite as an undesirable phenomenon and even a threat. Apparently, Tehran considers this fact more significant than pragmatic considerations based on Baku's clearly expressed intention to expand cooperation with Iran. After all, today Iran has even greater opportunities for cooperation following the complete restoration of the Azerbaijan-Iran border.

Meanwhile, Tehran's adverse reaction to Baku's strengthening its regional influence is also associated with the alleged risks of the national awakening among the multi-million Azerbaijani population in Iran.

In fact, with the assertion of the clerical authority following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, there were expectations that the new rule would seriously change the national issue as well. However, it soon became clear that the mullocracy was unwilling to take any serious steps to secure the national rights of southern Azerbaijanis. Even today they are deprived of elementary opportunities for the development of national culture and education.

After the 44-day war, Tehran began to fear that the factor of South Azerbaijan would demonstrate itself under the influence of the victory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the liberation of Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur from the Armenian occupation, the demonstration of the power and success of northern Azerbaijanis, as well as the strengthening of the strategic alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the new regional reality. This factor can also be seen in the growing number of protests in Iran. Protesters in the cities of South Azerbaijan distribute posters with the following content: "We have a common Motherland! We are all part of Great Azerbaijan!". Some messages were addressed personally to the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan: "South Azerbaijan is with you, Mr. President", "The Turkic youth has received your message".

Baku makes it clear that it intends to make every effort to protect the rights of southern Azerbaijanis. "There are many more Azerbaijanis living outside Azerbaijan than in Azerbaijan, several times more. And, of course, their security, their rights and their well-being are of paramount importance to us,” President Ilham Aliyev said during his meeting with Baghdad Amreyev, Secretary General of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS).

At the 9th summit of the OTS held in Samarkand Ilham Aliyev clearly pointed out that "the Turkic world consists not only of independent Turkic states; its geographical boundaries are much wider. I believe it is time to keep such issues as rights, security, preservation of national identity, prevention of assimilation of compatriots living outside the member states of the Organisation of Turkic States in the focus within the organisation on a permanent basis. The younger generation of Turks should have an opportunity to be educated in their native language in their countries of residence. Unfortunately, most of the 40 million Azerbaijanis living outside the state of Azerbaijan are deprived of these opportunities.”

Given the specific number of Azerbaijanis indicated in Mr. Aliyev’s statement, it is clear that he also had in mind the need to ensure the rights of the Azerbaijani population in Iran.

Apparently, we are going through a difficult, even critical stage of the Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. For example, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Tehran Ali Alizade was recently summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, while his Iranian counterpart in Baku, Seyyid Abbas Musavi, was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Musavi was informed of Baku's dissatisfaction with the recent propaganda against the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Iranian media, the smear campaign and the threatening rhetoric of high-ranking political and military figures of Iran. It was also mentioned that the citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan who committed crimes against the foundations of the constitutional system of Azerbaijan should not be allowed residence in Iran. It was noted that the reception of persons inciting separatism in Azerbaijan and hiding from criminal prosecution in other countries in Iranian embassies was an unfriendly step toward Azerbaijan.



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