MOMENT OF TRUTH

History is full of stories of politicians who fled from their countries for various reasons. For example, Alexander Kerensky, head of the Provisional Government, allegedly fled Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) in October 1917 having dressed as a woman (he denied it, though). Or, Mehdi Bazargan, Iran's first president, who was elected to office after the fall of the Shah's regime. When the anti-Shah revolution turned Islamic, he fled the country in a hurry, dressed as a woman in a hijab and hid in an aircraft’s lavatory.

Ruben Vardanian, who joins this cohort of the ‘chosen’, is also one of those escapees. However, he fled not from his own country, but from Azerbaijan. But after the criminal oligarch rejected Russian citizenship, he has no country of his own. This is a topic for another discussion anyway.

According to reliable sources, Ruben Vardanian was taken out of Garabagh in one of the trucks of the Russian peacekeepers troops, along with uniforms and underwear intended for disposal. Not the most comfortable way to travel, but Vardanian apparently got no other option. Some may even find it symbolic that the truck going to the recycling point also had a former oligarch.

Vardanian's rise and fall

The minister of state in the so-called separatist government of Garabagh has not officially confirmed his departure from Khankendi. He continues to regularly post on his Telegram account a link to his interview with a Spanish newspaper, and statements on relevant subjects. But apparently he is in no hurry to refute rumours of his departure. After all, to make the point clear, he could have appeared before the people or at least arranged a meeting of his cabinet, which would be the best evidence of his presence in Garabagh. But the longer his audiovisual pause drags on, the more reason to believe that Vardanian's flee is neither rumour nor speculation.

Meanwhile, his hasty departure from Khankendi should hardly come as a surprise. It has already been repeatedly mentioned in the media, in the expert community and in the Telegram account that Vardanian has not solved any of his missions. He failed to assemble a sufficiently significant team that would allow him to claim power in Armenia. Nor has he been able to unite the members of the Garabagh retinue. Moreover, his relations with local field commanders like Vitali Balasanian were tense. In this situation, Ruben Vardanian appears to have become simply afraid.

It is difficult to say whether he was aware of the local tradition of political terror when he travelled to Garabagh. Was he aware that political problems in Khankendi, when the separatist insurgency began, were most often solved by gunfire, explosive devices or a grenade thrown through a window? But now the former owner of the Troika Dialog cannot help but wonder what his conflict with Vitaly Balasanian could turn into under the current circumstances in Garabagh, which is teeming with weapons.

Contrary to the commitments made at the signing of the November 10, 2020 trilateral statement, Armenia has not withdrawn the remnants of its troops from Garabagh, while the Russian peacekeepers are in no hurry to disarm the military groups of separatists. But while these remnants of the defeated separatist army cannot pose a major, or rather strategic, danger to Azerbaijan, they are a direct and real threat to Vardanian.

Nor can Vardanian ignore the growing dissatisfaction of the local population, however small it is. Non-locals are not regarded well in Khankendi. Especially since the ongoing rivalry between the local clans. But now the Armenians of Karabakh have to think about the possible consequences of adventures Vardanian is trying to draw them into. It is also unlikely that they forgive him for the food stamps introduced earlier in support of the ranting about the alleged humanitarian disaster in the region. In short, Balasanian and other dissatisfied people have a solid ground to stand on. No wonder that in such a situation Vardanian preferred to flee without looking back, without thinking about comfort.

Vardanian's departure is undoubtedly a serious cause for optimism in Garabagh. He essentially disrupted the dialogue that the Karabakh Armenians were going to start with Baku. And now there is a chance, albeit not a guarantee, to resume the dialogue.

Many believe that the possibility of a serious escalation in Garabagh is low. The same can be hardly applied to the borderline between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

What is the intention of Tehran and Yerevan?

The border issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been on the political agenda since the autumn of 2020, when Azerbaijan took control of the border after the forceful liberation of Zangilan and Gubadli and military-political liberation of Kalbajar. Certain traditions have formed since. Winter in the border area is believed to be a relatively calm period—as the mountains are covered with snow, it is impossible to do active work on the heights, hence making one to postpone all manoeuvres till spring.

Meanwhile, a shocking report has unexpectedly appeared in the Azerbaijani media: apparently, Armenia and Iran are preparing a military provocation in the border area. First, the Iranian ‘guards of the revolution’, dressed in Azerbaijani uniform, will attack an Armenian post. Then, they will attack an Azerbaijani post dressed as Armenians. Why? In order to demonstrate this to the European observers in Armenia with tons of accusations against Azerbaijan.

Remarkably, Edmond Marukian, the ambassador-at-large, has quickly denied the news. A sure sign that Armenia is nervous and the leakage is not groundless.

Obviously, this is a very serious reason to question the degree of coordination between the Armenian and Iranian authorities. But what is Yerevan trying to achieve? The idea brings back to memory Hitler's infamous Gleiwitz operation—a staged attack on a German radio station by German criminals dressed in Polish military uniforms. The provocation was used as a pretext to start the Second World War. However, Armenia is hardly in a position to plan a new war with Azerbaijan and expect anything less than a catastrophic defeat.

On the other hand, Nikol Pashinian needs to derail the border delimitation process and the post-war settlement. It is no secret that Armenia appropriated considerable territories back in the Soviet period, and more lands during the occupation of the neighbouring Azerbaijani districts. Now, regardless of the delimitation scenario, they will have to return these lands. It is therefore natural that Yerevan is in awe of the imminent signing of a peace treaty.

The meeting between Armenian and German foreign ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Annalena Baerbock gives considerable food for thought. The German minister made it clear that in Europe the Karabakh Armenians are regarded as a national minority within Azerbaijan, they do not intend to insist on a special status for them, and that the main cause of the tension is the lack of an agreed border. This is not at all what Yerevan wants to hear. Moreover, they are beginning to realise that a peace treaty will have to be signed on terms that are not the most favourable for Armenia. The result is that Yerevan consistently undermines all the mediation missions in the region, delaying them.

Backstage of thwarted dialogue

There is a dual situation in the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On the one hand, everyone is urge the sides to work on a peace treaty. On the other hand, there is an explicit pause in the talks. The once-promising mediation by the European Union is bogged down. It was derailed when French President Emmanuel Macron, along with Charles Michel, the President of the EU, took part in the Prague talks. Paris' explicitly pro-Armenian position forced Azerbaijan to reject the French mediation efforts categorically. Theoretically, Azerbaijan has not rejected the EU mediation yet, but the arrival of the second EU observer mission to the region risks to jeopardise this.

The intensification of US mediation in the region looks promising. But so far it has been limited to telephone calls by the Assistant Secretary of State, with Anthony Blinken joining the dialogue occasionally. However, we have yet to see trilateral meetings or a full-fledged plan involving the US delegation. In theory, this should please Yerevan. But in practice, they understand that with or without a peace treaty, Azerbaijan will push through both the delimitation of the borders and the Zangezur corridor. The only question is the price Armenia will have to pay for its stubbornness.