18 May 2024

Saturday, 22:59

COALITION VS COALITION

How accurate are speculations about a pro-Iranian alliance ready to confront the the US, Israel and their allies against Tehran?

Author:

01.04.2023

A possible war between the US-Israeli alliance and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the hottest topic in world politics in recent months in addition to the Russian-Ukrainian agenda. With each new week, the likelihood of such a development is getting higher, as Tehran is getting closer to 90% uranium enrichment, increasing its chances of developing nuclear weapons.

 

Washington's preparations and Ankara's wariness

As a sign of joint US-Israeli preparations for a military action against Iran, the head of US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Michael E. Kurilla, visited northern Syria in mid-March, where he met with the leadership of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. The US military is known to support the Kurdish regime in northeastern Syria, thereby having a reason to stay in the country.

Earlier this month, General Michael Milley, the head of the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff, visited the region. He visited the US military base of Al-Tanf in southern Syria to inspect the combat readiness of the US troops.

A brief comparison of both visits shows that together with the visit of the US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, to the region, clearly indicates that Washington is seriously preparing for something, perhaps a serious fight.

Both Iran and Türkiye are monitoring this intensity in the region with concern. Ankara believes that the US generals were in fact negotiating with the leaders of the Kurdish-Arab terrorist organisation People's Self-Defence Units (YPG) in order to support them. The US ambassador to Türkiye was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry for an explanation. For Ankara, such activity is an attempt to put pressure on the authorities ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for May.

Washington has been openly dissatisfied with the ongoing interaction between Türkiye and Russia for a number of years. Some influential political circles in the US see the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Türkiye as a window of opportunity to shift power in Ankara to a loyal section of the country's political elite. The US is demanding that Türkiye join the sanctions policy against Moscow and reduce existing contacts to a minimum.

Ankara prefers to maintain an intensive dialogue with Moscow and tries to be very selective in its compliance with the sanctions regime with Russia. However, Ankara considers trade and economic ties with Russia to be an important factor in its dialogue with Moscow. In 2022, the trade turnover between the two countries approached $50 billion despite the anti-Russian sanctions.

However, at the beginning of March, Türkiye suspended parallel imports to Russia of goods that were previously under Western sanctions. This was done because of the growing US pressure on Türkiye and regional dynamics, in which Moscow prefers to join the Syrian-Iranian tandem.

President of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi, another regional partner of Russia, with whom Tehran has an extensive programme of military-political cooperation, will soon visit Ankara. One of the topics of discussion is expected to be the situation around military preparations against Iran.

Tehran hopes that Ankara will remain neutral in the upcoming confrontation and will not make its territory available for strikes against Iran. It is important for Ankara that Iran also takes Türkiye's concerns into account, in particular those related to the situation in Syria and around Azerbaijan.

Shortly after discussing Ebrahim Raisi's forthcoming visit to Ankara with his Iranian counterpart Amir Abdullahian on March 17, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also held a telephone conversation with the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayramov.

The conversation focused on Azerbaijani-Iranian tensions, including the active Azerbaijani-Israeli rapprochement. Ankara is trying to smooth over the sharp corners between Baku and Tehran, as the development of a confrontation between the two countries can provoke a conflict involving Türkiye as well. Obviously, all three countries are not interested in such developments, which contributes to the convergence of their positions and the search for certain compromises.

 

Arab monarchies offside

After signing a landmark agreement on normalising bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia brokered by Beijing, Tehran also places high hopes for Riyadh. It gives Iran good reason to believe that the Saudi kingdom will not intervene into the conflict by supporting Iranian adversaries.

In Israel, the event is called a failure of Tel Aviv's foreign policy on Saudi Arabia. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett echoed another opposition figure, Yair Lapid: "The resumption of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a serious and dangerous development for Israel, a political victory for Iran and a death blow to efforts to build a regional coalition against Iran. This is a resounding failure of the Netanyahu government, a combination of diplomatic neglect and general weakness and internal conflict in the country."

Incidentally, the UAE, which established diplomatic relations with Israel a few years ago, also supported the restoration of relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Thus, the Emirates, too, have essentially refused to participate in a possible US-Israeli confrontation with Iran. UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan even described the restoration of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran as an important step for the region towards stability and prosperity.

Iran re-established diplomatic relations with the UAE in September 2022, welcoming the Abu Dhabi ambassador to Tehran after a six-year absence.

Washington realises that it can hardly count on the Arab monarchies for a real cooperation in the conflict with Iran. It is no coincidence that the head of the Pentagon did not visit any of the Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf during his recent tour of the Middle East, although they host the bulk of the US military contingent in the region.

Yet, such plans seemed relevant quite recently. On February 13-16, the US Gulf Cooperation Council's Defence Working Group met in Riyadh. The US intelligence delegation was headed by Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. The main focus of the US delegation was the possibility of integrating US and Gulf missile defence systems. It is not entirely clear what agreement the parties reached, but it is clear that the recent developments and agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia have significantly altered the current plans of the US.

Thus, in general, the front line against Iran is determined. The US and Israeli plans to involve potential adversaries of Iran in the confrontation proved to be unjustified. Apparently, because Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite their insurmountable differences with Iran, are afraid that the scope of war could also extend to their territories, making them bear the main costs of it. This prompted Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to step aside.  

 

A pro-Iranian coalition?

Meanwhile, on March 14, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad arrived in Moscow for talks with Vladimir Putin. Syria is seen as the most likely theatre of war in a possible open conflict between Israel and Iran. This is clearly confirmed by the visits of US generals to regions outside the control of government forces.

In fact, pro-Iranian groups in Syria also act against the Israeli interests, thereby being periodically attacked by Israeli forces. In the event of an open conflict, the whole country can once again become an open battlefield.

The Israeli missile strike on the Aleppo International Airport on March 22, killing four Iranian proxies, including a military commander, was a prelude to such a scenario. The missile strike damaged an ammunition depot of Iranian proxy forces and the airport's runway, halting its operations.

Bashar al-Assad does not have enough forces to oppose a war between Iran and Israel on its territory and can only count on Russia. It is the only country that can somehow influence both Tehran and Tel Aviv in case of a conflict.

On March 14, Brigadier General Edward Vaughan, Deputy Director for Partnering, Security Cooperation, Policy and Space Capabilities of the US European Command, visited Baku to assess the ongoing military preparations and the overall situation around Iran.

It is likely that Iran dispatched military troops (drones, attack helicopters, fighter jets, tanks and other armaments) to the border with Azerbaijan just these days. In the event of a military threat from Iran, Baku can clearly count on the practical assistance of its partners, including the US.

We can assume that the military activity in the region was the key topic of telephone conversation between Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff, on March 15. The conversation most likely also covered the topics related to the Russian-Ukrainian war. Still, amid Assad's visit to Moscow and General Milley's recent visit to Syria, tensions in the Middle East may have been the focus of discussions.

Air strikes on Iran will affect the interests of many actors, including Moscow. Neither Russia nor the US is interested in another hotbed of global military-political confrontation. Therefore, it is likely that the high-ranking military officials of the two countries have tried to define the red lines beyond which military intervention is impossible.

The March 16 trilateral naval exercises of Russia, China and Iran in the Arabian Sea near the Iranian port of Chabahar, Maritime Security Belt – 2023, did not contribute to détente at all. The China-brokered agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has contributed to the development of this security belt. Now China itself is demonstrating its involvement in the political and military processes in the region, making it clear that it is ready to respond if its growing interests are infringed.

Remarkably, amid the intensified military cooperation between Iran, Russia and China, there are speculations about the alleged pro-Iran coalition ready to counter the plans of the US, Israel and their allies.

However, this is a highly dubious version. Because each of these countries has individual considerations and prefer to act alone strategically. Similar to their adversaries, these countries are commited to the proven principle of "if you want peace, prepare for war".



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