TERRITORY OF ERRORS

-In the expert community there is a lot of speculation about cooling in relations between the two strategic partners - Moscow and Yerevan. Do you think there are really some cracks in relations between the two allies, as some claim?

- When are bilateral relations ever perfect? My impression from many Armenian analysts' comments in recent weeks is that even if Russia might be irritated by Armenia's desires for a more multi-vector foreign policy, Armenia is not a central player in Russia's wider pan-regional plans for economic and soft power projection. It remains a central player, however, in Russia's security calculations for the South Caucasus. I'm sure that Russian-Armenian dialogue will find agreement on cooperation at some point along the economic-security spectrum. Neither Russia nor Armenia needs a diplomatic row with each other at this point.

- To what extent can the activities of the European Union with its regional programmes be successful in the field of promoting the Karabakh settlement?

- It depends on what we call success. The EU has a supportive role in the NK settlement process, it does not have a mandate to do more. It is a question of supporting people-to-people contacts, quiet dialogue streams among different groups and feeding perspectives and proposals upwards into the formal peace process whenever possible.

This may not sound like 'success'. But in the current climate of closed borders, monthly casualties along the Line of Contact, militarization and growing mutual alienation, you could say that keeping these conversations going is success. Outsider interventions can only be as successful as the local conditions allow. I hope that local conditions will improve over time, so that there will be more political openings and more visible success. In the meantime, however, Armenians and Azeris need to keep talking - even if it's quietly - in order to convert the openings of the future into possible breakthroughs.

- Unfortunately, not all foreigners are familiar with the realities of the region like you. What misconceptions about the South Caucasus are typical of Europeans and how does it ultimately affect the prospects of the Karabakh conflict settlement?

- Many Europeans still don't know where or what the Caucasus is, except, sadly, when it bursts onto TV screens with a new violent outrage or war. But there's also been more positive publicity: Eurovision of course, but also sport and the activism of organizations like the British-Georgian Society and the European-Azerbaijani Society.

What do Europeans think about the Caucasus? It's a huge question (even without considering whether Caucasians are themselves Europeans - the answer in any case probably varies). I think one can say that the Caucasus is a region more imagined than really known.

I think there is a lot of romanticising of the Caucasus that goes on. It's seen as a wild or exotic place that is somehow fundamentally different from Europe. Of course it is specific in some ways, but most people wherever they are have similar basic needs and even values, and we Europeans don't help when we make people 'different' or exotic.

Another misperception is that the South Caucasus never actually arrives anywhere - it is always a region of peoples 'facing big choices', 'in transition', 'on the way' to somewhere or at another 'crossroads'. I think we need to accept the South Caucasus as a real place as it currently exists, where decisions have been taken, choices have been made. This is the way to creating a greater sense of responsibility and ownership of politics.

One very clear misperception, however, regards "frozen conflicts", or the language of "neither war nor peace" or even "post-Soviet conflicts". These static and obsolete categories encourage an unjustified sense of complacency about the region's conflicts. This is especially true when we talk about the Karabakh conflict, which I believe needs to be talked about as an ongoing and dynamic militarized rivalry rather than a frozen conflict.

- Why it is that this conflict is not perceived as a threat not only to regional, but also European and Euro-Atlantic security?

- I think the Karabakh conflict is seen as a security threat, just not a priority one.

There are several reasons for that. First, there are not many newsworthy events coming out of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict or peace process on a regular basis. There isn't an ongoing war beyond low-level frontline exchanges, and there isn't much happening at the peace process level either. Unfortunately, the Minsk Group does not engage in public diplomacy except for occasional statements (usually expressing frustration), so what is there to report on? People just don't hear about the Karabakh conflict, especially next to what is happening in the Middle East.

Second, there aren't many people who travel across the conflict divide and who can give a rounded picture of what's going on. Sometimes this is a choice - people adopt one side of the conflict, and don't want to know about the other side.

A third reason lies in the paradox that for all the talk about the South Caucasus as a geopolitically important region, it is actually not very important geopolitically. Yes, there are important pipelines and flyover routes - but the region only becomes important in the light of some other policy priority, not for itself. For as long as developments in the Karabakh conflict don't threaten these other priorities, it does not get noticed. I believe that all the conflict parties in the South Caucasus like to play up the geopolitical importance of the region, but the reality is closer to secondary or even tertiary importance - so long as war doesn't break out.

- By the way, how real is a new war?

- The question is what kind of war might be real. I think that Armenia and Azerbaijan are locking into a long-term deterrence-type military relationship. I don't think an Azerbaijani attempt to reconquer Karabakh militarily is likely without some major internal crisis in Armenian or Azerbaijani politics.

But there remain other possibilities. One is an accidental escalation leading to unintended war, plausible in the context of raw conscripts without adequate training on the frontline. This is why we advocate for an increased level of conflict prevention mechanisms, from the resumption of hotlines between commanders across the Line of Contact, new mechanisms for joint investigation of incidents (as well as cooperation when human remains are found) and increased OSCE monitoring. There is really very little infrastructure for early warning systems and crisis management, which is a big concern.

Another possibility is "strategic self-entrapment" - when a government that has invested heavily in military hardware eventually finds it has to use it in order to stay legitimate. Maybe the goal is to bankrupt Armenia with an arms race, but maybe there will be a point when an Azerbaijani leadership feels compelled to use its hardware in order to justify all the expenditure.

Overall, though, I think key actors in this conflict are quite comfortable at the moment with militarized rivalry and "normal instability".

- Armenian official statistics admit that the demographic problem has become one of the most serious ones for the country's national security. How can this problem affect the political course of Armenia and can it influence the Karabakh settlement?

- Yes, it is true that emigration is a source of serious concern in Armenia, as in several other post-Soviet countries, and it has been so for a long time - this isn't a new concern. What's worrying about it is that emigration provides a kind of pressure valve, allowing people to leave who might otherwise stay and try to reform the system more and encourage the development of more rights and freedoms. If there was more dissatisfaction and more capacity to express it, it could create shifts in attitudes towards the status quo and open up the discussion about what to do differently - including with reference to policies on the Karabakh conflict.

So the question might be how to challenge the monopolies in the region and empower the people who are leaving to stay - and whether Azerbaijan wants a hard-line neighbour with everything invested in the status quo, or a more integrated society capable of weighing up different options with regard to the Nagornyy Karabakh peace process.