TO OPPOSE OR TO CONTROL?

The past few months have seen obvious changes in Washington's foreign policy vector veering round towards a thaw with Iran. This came as a surprise to many. One of the US founding fathers said that "we should not like anyone so much as to feel affection or hate anyone so much as to be enemies forever". This statement tells a rich story about the basic principle underlying US foreign policy. As is known it is guided solely by national interests. In this context, the thaw in the mutual relationship between Washington and Tehran fits quite well into the framework of common sense. The election of the centrist politician Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran can be regarded as the point of departure for this step. The appointment of Mohammad Javad Zarif with his serious experience of negotiating with Washington on easing sanctions against Iran was taken altogether as a sign of Tehran's constructive spirit. It should also be noted that Javad Zarif was close to Iran's ex-President Mohammad Khatami who is characterized as a steadfast reformer. Hassan Rouhani's first speech at the UN General Assembly in the last days of September was, in all likelihood, another signal to Washington. Noteworthily, the signal carried positive notes and was heard out carefully by the US delegation. It is after the above said moments that Washington changed its rhetoric in its dialogue with Tehran on the Iranian nuclear programme. 

For its part, Teheran is taking steps to ease censorship in literature, discussing the possibility of reforms in the human rights sphere to the point of abolishing capital punishment, planning to ban the "Death to America" slogan in Iran and other things. This is why despite serious dissatisfaction of Israel, the USA's strategic ally in the Middle East, Washington is not going to turn off this path of easing sanctions against Iran. This desire of the White House can be attributed to certain historical and geopolitical factors. 

First, the US-Iranian mutual relations have deep historical roots. Before the Islamic revolution in 1979, it was Iran that acted as one of the traditional allies of the USA in the Middle East. Iran's relations with Israel were also spoiled because of that revolution. Apropos, the alliance between the USA and Saudi Arabia was a forced step taken by the White House after the Islamic revolution took place in Iran and it is viewed by many experts up to now as something unnatural. 

Second, Washington's attempts to build an Islamic model of democracy in some Arab states contributed to radical Islamist forces coming to the forefront and caused a strengthening of the Sunni trend of Islam. Correspondingly, with a view to providing some balance it was decided to play in favour of Shiite Iran. It is also possible that Washington's rapprochement with Tehran is levelled at breaking up the Iran-Russia tandem supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. 

Third, the main principle of the US foreign policy is to prevent an individual state or alliance of states from playing a dominant role in any region of the world. Against the background of the latest events in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia financing the "Arab spring" in some countries was gradually gaining political weight and claiming a leading role not only in the Arab but also in the entire Islamic world. 

Fourth, although Iran is regarded as a regional state, Tehran nonetheless tries to influence even developments on the American continent and supports anti-Washington sentiments in Latin American states. Therefore it should not be ruled out that Washington is trying in this way to weaken Tehran's influence on the Latin American states. Thus the following principle is working here: "If you cannot oppose the development of events, try to control them". 

Fifth, in terms of ensuring US interests in the Middle East - a region having tremendous reserves of conventional energy supplies, Iran may play a more significant role for Washington than even Saudi Arabia. In this respect, Iran not only occupies an advanced position but is also a very advantageous corridor for transporting energy supplies from the Caspian and the Central Asian regions. If close allied relations are established between the USA and Iran there will be no more need for any Trans-Caspian projects that are being hampered in every way possible by Moscow. Moreover, that would minimize cooperation between Tehran and Beijing and weaken Russia's positions in monopolizing the transportation of energy supplies from Central Asia. In geopolitical terms, that would cast a lot of doubt on Moscow's projects for integration on the CIS space and strike a serious blow on the positions of China which has essentially strengthened its influence in the Central Asian and the Caspian regions. Apart from this, the USA can well use Iran to strengthen its geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus and, using close relations between Tehran and Yerevan, try and take Armenia out of Moscow's control. So far as the initiative of the West to unblock the Armenian-Turkish border which was ultimately supposed to take Armenia out of Moscow's control, has practically collapsed. 

In general, this process should be considered in the light of the Washington-Beijing and Washington-Moscow oppositions. Renowned US strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski repeatedly pointed out the need to establish allied US-Iranian relations proceedings from US interests in the Caspian region and Central Asia which have enormous reserves of conventional energy supplies. To prevent Russia's coalition with China and Iran, Brzezinski urged Washington not to be so short-sighted as to arouse antagonism in Beijing and Tehran simultaneously. Currently it is the growing influence of Russia and China on the international scene as well as their cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that worries Washington a lot. In addition, in the context of strained relations between the USA and its old ally Pakistan and the establishment of the Islamabad-Beijing tandem, Washington's desire to normalize its relations with Tehran is logically explainable. The matter is that Islamabad received geopolitical support in its confrontation with India not from its traditional ally, the USA, but from China. Moreover, when one or two years ago Washington was hatching out plans for invasion of Pakistan to fight against Al Qaeda, Beijing's reaction was very tough: "If the USA invades Pakistan it will have to deal with China" which cooled Washington's ardour very much. Thus the China-Pakistan tandem became a priority for Islamabad. 

Now Washington's major task is to persuade Tel-Aviv that its rapprochement with Teheran not only does not threaten Israel but, on the contrary, it can even play a positive role in ensuring security throughout the Middle East. Yet by all appearances, Washington is failing to succeed in that so far.