EUROPE FRIGHTENS THEM OFF, RUSSIA TAKES THEM OVER

At its Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, the European Union signed an agreement to ease visa regulation with Azerbaijan and initialled association agreements with Georgia and Moldova. Despite this the summit can hardly be regarded as a success in terms of efficiency. Such is the opinion of Brussels itself. Thus for instance, under Moscow's pressure, Armenia gave up its bid for European association early in September in favour of joining the Customs Union (CU). Surprising in this situation is the behaviour of Brussels. It had been taking seriously the game of independence played by Yerevan which is totally dependent on Moscow's will. Brussels' actions towards Ukraine, which was just one step away from signing agreements in Vilnius on association and free trade with the EU, were even more short-sighted and unreasonable. There were certain human rights demands set to Kiev but the issue of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko was definitely not raised. Yet as the summit approached, Brussels' rhetoric began to sound tougher just on this issue. Meanwhile Moscow which regards the entire CIS space as a zone of its exclusive political influence started applying the stick and carrot method to Kiev. On the one hand, it was depicting the supposed economic dividends that Ukraine could obtain from joining the CU. On the other hand, it was blocking the way for some Ukrainian goods and refusing to discuss the high price of gas.  

The trench struggle between Brussels and Moscow for Kiev ultimately ended in the Ukrainian government's directive issued one week before the summit opening to suspend the preparations for concluding the EU Association Agreement, "proceeding from the interests of the national security of the state". Precisely to suspend rather than cancel. Official Kiev announced that the government's decision did not at all mean a U-turn in foreign policy, let alone Ukraine's entry to the CU. That decision split Ukraine's society. The opposition took its supporters to the streets practically in no time and Kiev's Maydan (Independence Square) became the main centre. 

Brussels instantly expressed disappointment at this decision of Kiev and urged respect for the opinion of European integration supporters taking part in Euro-Maydan. The latter were supported by visitors such as Catherine Ashton, the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy; Victoria Nuland, the US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia and US senator John McCain. In brief, Ukraine's European integrators have no shortage of western patrons. Yet the Ukrainian authorities accused by the West of backtracking on their European course disagree with this presentation of the problem and definitely reaffirm the country's European choice. 

The rhetoric question suggests itself: "Was Ukraine's about-turn was that much of a surprise to EU officials as they are the first to be blamed for that ending? 

It appears that it was just the European Union's stance that played its negative role: the EU was putting heavy pressure on the Ukrainian authorities while taking no steps to improve the economic situation in Ukraine. First, Brussels not demanded Yuliya Tymoshenko's release from custody as an indispensable condition but also guarantees of her participation in the forthcoming presidential election. One more stumbling block in the EU's relations with Ukraine was the financial and economic issue. According to official Kiev's estimates, to ensure that its EU integration is a success and its enterprises' output is competitive, Ukraine needs long-term loans totalling 160bn dollars. But Brussels was not going to burden itself with such obligations. The most it could offer was 1bn euros spread over 20 years. For its part, the IMF demanded, in return for its 4bn dollars credit, to freeze wage growth, raise prices for energy supplied to the population, eliminate privileges for farmers and hold a series of unpopular monetary measures. In this context, C.Ashton's statement that by giving up its bid for EU association Kiev missed an opportunity to open the way for new investments sounds more than strange. Brussels failing to respond to Kiev's financial requests at the hardest moment is there any guarantee that this issue could be resolved positively in the future. Meanwhile Russia has already agreed to cut its gas price for Ukraine by one-third (from 404 to 268.5 dollars per 1,000 cu.m.). Moreover, without any pre-conditions, Russia is investing about 15bn dollars in the Ukrainian government's securities. 

It should not be ruled out that the Yuliya Tymoshenko issue could have been an excellent pretext to push Ukraine away from the EU. This enabled Brussels to kill two birds with one stone: to avoid both burdening themselves with financial obligations to Kiev and an overt confrontation with Moscow over association with Ukraine. In all likelihood, its refusal to support Kiev financially was prompted by the EU being uninterested in Ukrainian enterprises making competitive products. Precisely Ukraine was supposed to become a big market for the European countries and not vice versa. Apart from this, Brussels was probably concerned with the prospect of a huge influx of Ukrainian workforce to the European countries. Planning to gain great political and economic dividends from the Eastern Partnership programme implementation, Brussels thus intends to lay all risks arising on this path fully on the post-Soviet states involved in this project. This is quite in the spirit of traditional European politics though, and all this means that it is Brussels, not Kiev, that is sacrificing strategic goals in favour of tactical gains. 

Judging by EU officials' statements, Brussels is set to draw serious conclusions from the latest events and pursue a more resolute policy. All the more so that as early as next year, the EU is going to sign association agreements with Georgia and Moldova and Brussels should have no illusions that Moscow has no leverage for pressure on those states. As regards Moldova, speaking in economic terms, it is at least Moldovan wine that still cannot find its market in the European states. In terms of geopolitics, it is the Dniester Region and, if prompted by Moscow, the Gagauz issue. By the way, when Ukraine, being the OCSE president, stepped up efforts to settle the conflict in the Dniester region early this year, the EU (as observer in 5+2 format) remained absolutely indifferent. 

As for Georgia, it may seem to many that there is nothing to loose there now. Yet it is so only at first glance. One should keep in mind the cherished Armenian dream of Javakheti which may find quite a lot of instigators in Moscow. Brussels is hardly likely to stand up against such leverage of pressure unless it itself puts an even stronger pressure. Of interest in this context is a statement by Ryszard Legutko, a European Parliament member from Poland. In his speech at an EP meeting discussing the outcome of the Vilnius summit, he said that this can be assessed as a failure of the EU policy because this was not a project of strategic importance for Brussels and it was not properly funded. Therefore it is no wonder that Russia rather than Europe had the upper hand in this stand-off.